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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

19980113 356

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NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-91-004

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29 January 1991

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Baltics

International 'Baltic Europe' Conference

91UF0336A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 91
Union Edition p 6

[Article by correspondent V. Shmyganovskiy: "A Union of Baltic Countries"]

[Text] Helsinki—The idea for its creation was put forward by the parliaments of Europe

A conference of parliamentarians on questions of cooperation in the region of the Baltic Sea, convened for the first at the initiative of the parliament of Finland, attracted legislators from 19 countries and territorial formations. Among them, the Aland and Faeroe Islands, Greenland, the authorities of the "free city" of Hamburg, and Bremen were represented.

The goal is not only to help the sea, which is seriously ill according to the opinions of specialists, but also to restore traditions of communications between peoples. Many recalled the trade and political union of Hanza, created in medieval times at the proposal of the German city of Lubeck. Hundreds of years ago it was a central point for trade between all the parts of medieval Europe. It connected Bruges, Novgorod, London, Bergen...

"It is important to carry out regional development together with modern Europe," said Kalevi Sorsa, chairman of the parliament of Finland. "For a long time our part of the continent has not had its own identity. Now the idea of the creation of a 'Mare Balticum,' a Baltic Europe, a Scandinavian-Baltic political space, a new Hanseatic Union, changes things..."

He called for the free exchange of opinion:

"No obligatory recommendations! That would contradict the spirit of the conference. We should freely discuss all forms of cooperation."

In the words of K. Sorsa, the region of the "Mare Balticum" includes 100 million people, and has six percent of the total world foreign trade. With the elimination of the cold war, broad creative forces and human energy have been awakened here. Now it is a question of the close integration of all the countries—for the sake of common prosperity.

Questions of security were also mentioned at the meeting. It was proposed, for example, that the naval forces of the countries of the region exchange schedules for maneuvers in advance.

Unfortunately, this forum of democratically elected parliamentarians almost turned from a conference into a confrontation. Delegates from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia called upon the conference to concentrate on their political problems and "condemn the actions of

Moscow." In vain many speakers tried to speak about things "that unite us, not divide us." Many speeches were emotional.

Nonetheless, thoughts on the main theme of the conference predominated—the search for paths to cooperation.

Estonian Appeal Notes Soviet 'Threats'

91UN0709A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 20 Dec 90 p 1

["Appeal of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet to the Population of the Estonian Republic, the Organs of State and Local Power, and All Democratic Associations of Citizens"—SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA headline]

[Text] Lately there have been increasing numbers of threats from ruling circles and the military command of the Soviet Union to halt the process of democratization and restoration of the independence of the Estonian Republic.

The Estonian Republic is trying to resolve the contradictions with the Soviet Union through negotiation, and it is convinced that in today's world political problems should not be settled from a position of force.

The Supreme Soviet assesses the supercharging of tension by the Soviet Union as an attempt to exert political pressure on the Estonian Republic, and it calls on the population to remain calm. At the same time, taking into account the political instability in the country, the Supreme Soviet does not exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union will make an attempt to block the action of the laws and state authorities of the Estonian Republic by force.

The Supreme Soviet regards any forcible interference in the internal affairs of the Estonian Republic as aggression, and it reserves the right, in the event that such a danger arises, to appeal to international organizations for help.

Recognizing the possible danger, the Supreme Soviet expresses the conviction that any forced retreat from the path of freedom can be only temporary. The logic of history leads to the downfall of empires and to self-determination of nations.

Much now depends on the ability of the Estonian people to keep faith in the righteousness of their cause, and on their skill in acting in a purposeful and agreed manner under extreme conditions.

In the situation in which the possibility of action by the state authorities of the Estonian Republic may be restricted by the Soviet Union, the highest value from which we should proceed is the demand to insure that the Estonian nation is preserved. This excludes the use of force as a means of resistance. The path for our opposition to possible arbitrary rule, if required, will be civil disobedience directed against foreign power, and

holding only to those laws that have been passed by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet.

Our goal remains democracy and state independence.

State and local organs of power in the Estonian Republic, and also the democratic associations of citizens must stand ready to maintain their capabilities under the conditions of a possible new aggression.

A. Ruutel, chairman,
Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet.
Tallinn, 18 December 1990.

Girenko Addresses Estonian Party Congress

91UN0715A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 18 Dec 90 p 2

[Speech delivered by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Andrey Girenko, from report by MOLODEZH ESTONII correspondents S. Sergeyev and I. Ristmyagi on the 21st Congress of the Estonian Communist Party (on CPSU Platform), held in Tallinn 15 December 1990: "Nine Months Which Shook the Communist Party of Estonia, But Failed To Break It"]

[Text] The Speech by Andrey Girenko

In my opinion there are two tasks that the 21st Estonian Communist Party Congress must resolve, namely, complete the organizational unification of the communists, and on the basis of an in-depth analysis decide on a clear-cut political line. In the speeches by delegates I have sensed a very profound anxiety about the state of affairs in the country, and about all the shortcomings that are directly affecting each person. While sharing this anxiety and concern, I would like to say that obviously the basic attribute distinguishing our reality today is very acute political struggle which is becoming heated as we come closer to resolving the main tasks of perestroika. These include the switch to a market economy. This is an essential condition for rising to a qualitatively new level that should guarantee intensive development. Only this will, after a certain period, make it possible to ensure a higher living standard.

On a fundamental plane this task has already been resolved, and the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a program for the switch to the market. But almost every step taken along this road is encountering difficulties. Hence also the government crisis and the desire to leave everything as it was. But there are also forces that with this switch to the market are trying to introduce not socialist relations but relations that are more similar to capitalist relations. Everything connected with the switch to the market is setting specific tasks for the party organizations. Today, enterprises are operating under extraordinarily strained conditions. Essentially we are starting the new year without a plan and without a budget, and with weakened or totally lost ties, but with the hope that we will succeed in organizing the work during some period in the year that is beginning. Under these conditions the party organizations must make a

careful study of new processes, determine where the bottlenecks are, and safeguard the social gains of the collectives and of each individual.

The supertask that both the party and society in general must resolve is to conclude a new Union treaty. At its plenum the CPSU Central Committee considered a concept for the Union treaty and adopted it in the main, setting appropriate tasks for the party organizations. The party has every justification for supporting the draft of the new Union treaty since its principles coincide fully with the party's approaches to national policy—the priority of human rights, the self-determination of nations, and the sovereignty and independence of the republics.

In Estonia these issues are more acute because this republic, like the other Baltic republics, has announced that it has a special attitude toward the Union treaty, and that it desires to achieve independence by breaking many of the ties with the Union. The new captains of the Estonian ship of state did not think for very long and they have hesitated with respect to the choice of course, but they have, in my opinion, not moved along the best road but have followed in the wake of the Lithuanians. They have come into conflict with the laws of the country, and this has been reflected in how people feel. It is impossible to achieve independence along this road, primarily because the economy will be destroyed. The numbers of cattle have already declined significantly, only 40 percent of the housing program has been completed, and there are many other alarming factors, including rising prices. The breaking of ties is now extremely dangerous and no one needs it. With the switch to the market it is simply ruinous. Estonia has only insignificant export opportunities and it will therefore be unable to develop the economy and raise the living standard without the Union.

Moreover, a split between our republics and peoples will lead ineluctably to a breakdown of human ties and a breaking of the thousands of vital threads that link the people who live in different parts of the country.

The 28th congress defined quite clearly the goals and tasks of our party, rejecting everything that led to distortion and discrediting of the socialist idea itself in the field of ideology, the economy, and national and social policy. The new rules make it possible to make our party more democratic and, by relying on initiative, make it possible to respond more immediately to changes in the sociopolitical situation.

I would like to conclude my speech by assuring you that we in the Central Committee have no doubt that the process of communists defining their own position both in the past and after the 21st Estonian Communist Party Congress will, as the communists close their ranks, occupy a worthy place in the life of Estonian society.

Lebedev on Estonian Interregional Session

91UN0709B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 12 Dec 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Lebedev, chairman of the Interregional Council of People's Deputies and Workers' Delegates of the Estonian SSR, by V. Ivanov on 10 December: "Step by Step. But Whither?"; use of Moldavia and Moldova as published]

[Text] An information report on the third session of the Interregional Council of People's Deputies and Workers' Delegates of the Estonian SSR that took place on 7 December in Narva was published in the Saturday issue of our newspaper. And on Monday our correspondent asked the council chairman, Vladimir Lebedev, to comment on the results of the session.

[Lebedev] The main issues raised at the session were these: attitudes toward the Union treaty, our action program, and the concept of privatization.

As far as the first question is concerned, the session unanimously supported the idea of a Union treaty. It was stated unambiguously that if the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and the republic government do not sign a Union treaty then the Interregional Council will assume that right. And, naturally, with all the obligations stemming from that.

One small point. On Wednesday of last week Mr. Savisaar gathered together representatives of the various public movements. At that meeting Sergey Petinov represented the United Council of Labor Collectives [OSTK] while I represented the Interregional Council. The statement by the government chairman was very typical. He said that in the event of an economic blockade, Estonia could hold out for 20 days... However, there can be no question of a blockade when we are talking about the mutual relations between two states that are in no way linked, either by political treaty or economic treaty. In this case, each of the sides decides things at its own discretion: with whom it will trade, under what conditions—with what privileges or, on the contrary, restrictions, whether at world prices and in which currency...

Moreover, there is no need to be naive and think that it is possible to get by without the political part of the Union treaty by concluding some sort of economic treaty that provides for certain advantages and privileges for any particular republic. We therefore believe that a Union treaty without a political part is inconceivable and will not play the role assigned to it.

However, we do allow that for the Baltic republics, and for Estonia in particular, there might be a treaty with a greater degree of freedom. Critics may seize on this formula: Aha! That means that the treaty does not envisage total freedom, does it not? But any treaty is the result of compromise. There can be no such thing as a treaty in which both the parties are absolutely free...

We always say that sovereignty is essential in order to improve the life of the people. And if sovereignty leads to impoverishment of the mass and economic collapse—well who needs THAT kind of freedom? The slogan "We Shall Be Poor But Free" suits no one.

With respect to the council's action program, political, economic, and social questions are closely interwoven in it. The main emphasis is placed on safeguarding people's rights regardless of their national affiliation, qualifications with respect to residence in the republic, language, and so forth. I will not list the points of the program in detail; they have been published in the newspaper MOLODEZH ESTONII. Unfortunately, they have not been published in any Estonian-language newspaper.

The main thesis of the program—protecting citizens' rights in the matter of property—has something in common with item No. 3 on the agenda of the Narva session: on attitudes toward privatization. We believe that the advantages here should be enjoyed by the labor collectives, to which it is also necessary to transfer the ownership of enterprises and state institutions, creating joint-stock companies based on them. The controlling interest of shares here should rest with the LABOR COLLECTIVE, and the state should own the other 49 percent of the shares.

Only in this way can we safeguard the rank-and-file worker from the real threat of unemployment.

[Ivanov] In ETA information on the session it talks about the creation under the council of a system of law enforcement agencies "guaranteeing compliance with the USSR Constitution on the territory of the Estonian SSR (the internal affairs administration, procurator's office, arbitration bodies)." What does this mean?

[Lebedev] Within the republic, in connection with the reorganization of the militia and police agencies, an active process of "eroding" the Russian-speaking cadres is under way. These people are threatened with unemployment, and many people have already turned to us with these kinds of problems. These people need help with their employment. Moreover, a trend can be seen at the level of the republic leadership, namely, to take over Union enterprises. That is, to replace "Moscow's diktat" with "Tallinn's diktat." And if the question of privatization is resolved in the way we think—in the form of joint-stock companies—then the problem of **protecting such property** against encroachment by anyone at all—the government, any kind of militarized formations, or any other system of suppression—will become a real one. And for this we envisage the creation of organs of internal affairs and the courts and procuracy. Similar demands stem from regions whose populations are in favor of the Union treaty and the preservation of Soviet power.

[Ivanov] Following your explanation a mass of questions arises but, without going into the details, I would like to ask a major question that involuntarily arises—the

resemblance is too great: Are we not facing (though God forbid!) a repetition of the situation that arose in the Dnestr region?

[Lebedev] You know, I myself was in Tiraspol on the day that the congress of deputies at all levels took place, at which the Dnestr-Moldavia Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed. I am well aware of the situation, which differs somewhat from ours. In Moldavia the situation is more tense than here. All our "stones" are under the water, but they have started to come to the surface and they are very sharp.

[Ivanov] So is it worth our while to let things go to that degree?

[Lebedev] You see, there a **referendum** decided it: to proclaim the creation of the Dnestr Region Republic; so that it is a question not of a "group of politicians pushing someone in a particular direction," but rather the will of the people.

We also have some hotheads who have counseled in favor of following the example of the Dnestr region and proclaiming **our own republic**. But in principle we are **against** carving Estonia into pieces. And all the people of Estonia should decide its destiny, not some national group, even less a group of politicians...

However, if we nevertheless say that the politicians will exacerbate things, it is not out of the question that a new state formation will arise in the northeast of Estonia. And a recent session of the Narva City Soviet showed that this kind of outcome is very real.

[Ivanov] It is common knowledge that the "center"—Moscow—is not offering much encouragement to the actions of the Tiraspol and Gagauz activists. Although it is not condemning them directly. In short, it is behaving cautiously. Might it not be that in Estonia, too, similar actions will not provoke Moscow to the kind of reaction that we might count on? Analyzing the situation in the Union, a competent press organ like KOMMERSANT (see yesterday's issue of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA) concludes that the most favorable region for the investment of capital is almost the entire Baltic region; but the KOMMERSANT observers do point out specifically that Narva and Kohtla-Järve as unstable regions are precisely the least favorable for this purpose. Are you not rendering to the inhabitants of those cities a questionable service that could result in your criticized (and rightly so) principle of "we will be poor but free" being realized precisely **there**?

[Lebedev] As far as condemnation of separatism in the Dnestr region and the Gagauz republic is concerned, the comrades there did not state that they were **leaving** Moldavia. They are setting the condition that the parliament of Moldova rescind all laws discriminating against the rights of national minorities. They have agreed to remain as part of Moldova if Moldova remains part of the USSR. There is one other demand, namely, preservation of a certain degree of autonomy as an essential

condition at this stage in order to safeguard their interests. A similar situation may also take shape in the northeast of Estonia.

Now, on the subject of the stability of the situation and opportunities for the outside investment of capital here. I do not fully agree with the assessment that western capital is more interested in the southwest part of Estonia than in the northeast. In principle, of course, the Baltic area is more attractive for business than other parts of the Union; of this there is no doubt. But absence of stability within each particular republic is a quite serious obstacle for any businessman. In any event, up to now the companies that are trying to get in here are not offering any serious amounts of capital. While the interethnic situation remains unstable, no solid entrepreneur will invest his assets here.

[Ivanov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, you said earlier that the Interregional Council's action program consists of political, economic, and social points. But could it be that perhaps all our ills also stem from the fact that we are all the time trying to resolve our problems as some kind of close-knit "sheaf"? And all the time **NOTHING** is happening... Is it not time to separate them and solve them individually? And to start with the economic and social problems. As the Americans say, step by step...

[Lebedev] I think that under present conditions it is impossible to separate politics, economics, and social issues. What I have in mind is the situation both in the republic and in the country. The situation is now such that without the resolution of political questions it is impossible to resolve economic and social problems. It is such an interconnected tangle that I would not risk trying to untangle it...

Lithuanian Mission in Estonia Opened

91UN0685B Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
15 Dec 90 p 4

[Interview with Doctor of Technical Sciences Professor Sigitas Kudarauskas, permanent representative of the Lithuanian Republic in Estonia, by LETUVOS RITAS correspondent A. Maldeikiene; place and date not given: "Tallinn, Freedom Square, 10"]

[Text] The official inauguration of the permanent mission of the Lithuanian Republic in Estonia was held in the center of Tallinn on Freedom Square. Taking part in the ceremony were K. Prunskiene, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Council of Ministers; E. Savisaar, leader of the Estonian Republic Government; I. Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian Republic Council of Ministers; and other officials.

A LETUVOS RITAS correspondent met the day before the ceremony with Doctor of Technical Sciences Professor Sigitas Kudarauskas, permanent representative of the Lithuanian Republic in Estonia.

[Maldeikiene] What are the main directions of the work of the post of representative, which you hold?

[Kudarauskas] By exchanging missions, we most of all wanted to stress both the continuity of activity of these missions and the continuation of the development of our states—Lithuania and Estonia. We had to renew our activity from zero. What specific tasks are being set? To inform the Lithuanian Government and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the situation in Estonia, and also to regulate effective communications between the heads of state. For some reason, this process did not always run smoothly. In addition, to work normally, it is necessary to know what is happening not only in Estonia, but in Lithuania as well. But this is complicated—we get almost no immediate information, the press is late, and radio programs can be heard only on winter nights.

[Maldeikiene] What is the status of your establishment of the mission?

[Kudarauskas] It seems to me that a strange name has been chosen—permanent mission. The word “permanent” is not necessary. It is the mission of the Lithuanian Republic. True, there is a mission in Moscow, but it is on another plane and of a different rank. At the present time, absolutely different questions are being decided in Moscow. Thus, although the name is the same, the activity is fundamentally different.

[Maldeikiene] Do you feel that you have the support of the Estonians?

[Kudarauskas] The chiefs are favorably disposed. We arrived at an agreement about what, on an equal footing, Lithuania provides the mission of Estonia, and what Estonia provides Lithuania. And this is good: A lot can be decided quickly. However, paradoxical situations also arise at times. For example, we have to ask the Estonians about providing some Lithuanian symbols of state. But this is ridiculous.

The chiefs help us with what they can: We acquired wonderful premises and furniture. True, we still do not have available compulsory organizational technical means. (Perhaps it will not be uninteresting to the curious reader to learn that the headquarters of the Lithuanian mission was set up in a five room apartment of the seventh story of a building. There are accommodations for conferences, reception of guests, and a spacious office for the permanent representative—A. M.)

[Maldeikiene] Do you maintain contact with local Lithuanians?

[Kudarauskas] Of course, and from the very beginning. It was a pleasant surprise that the chairman of the Lithuanian community works in the building in which we are located. She is an expert on culture, and she helps eagerly and a lot in establishing contacts with the Lithuanian community in Estonia. Our mission operates courses in the Lithuanian language, which, by the way, are headed

by Rasa Unt (For the time being there are only two employees in the representation—A. M.)

[Maldeikiene] Can visiting Lithuanians count on your help?

[Kudarauskas] This does not come under our immediate duties. We are not a consulate. However, people come to us. When Lithuanian citizenship is formally legalized, apparently, a consular service will appear here that will defend the interests of Lithuanian citizens and help them in every possible way. And we help now however we can. It is true that there are also the kind of visitors whom we are unable to help. Some who learn that a Lithuanian mission is established here call us up and demand, for example, that we order a hotel room for them in Tallinn. We have neither hotels, nor the ability to make reservations. Perhaps for members of the government.

[Maldeikiene] You, professor, worked in Klaipeda. Did you not regret leaving your work?

[Kudarauskas] The current duty was a complete surprise. I was also very satisfied with my former work. However, after some persuasion, I agreed. Especially because for about a year I went to Moscow to the USSR Supreme Soviet, but even then I did not stop my work. I teach a little even now, although not on a regular basis, and mainly on days off.

MVD Role in Political Demonstrations

91UN0685A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
15 Dec 90 p 2

[Interview with Arnoldas Stackevicius, deputy commander of a special militia subunit of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, by LETUVOS RITACA correspondent Kazimieras Budris; place and date not given: “A Step to the Side?”]

[Text] [Budris] Today your people have become permanent companions at rallies and demonstrations. By doing this are you not violating your own rule: “Politics is not our job”?

[Stackevicius] We are on duty on the streets of Vilnius. When we receive an order from the minister, we depart for any other city of the republic to maintain public order there. Together with colleagues from departments to combat organized crime and workers of the Criminal Investigation Department, we set up ambushes and take part in the arrests of especially dangerous criminals. During political actions, we perform the very same work—we guarantee safety.

At times, we end up as if between two fires. The situation is not a pleasant one. Thus, on 7 November in Vilnius, on Gediminas Avenue, at the city party committee building of the Latvian Communist Party (CPSU), we were called “traitors” and “informers,” in that we tried to protect people standing guard at the committee from aroused young Lithuanians. A real fight took place. A lot

of people could have suffered. We are the militia. It is unimportant to us what nationality a person is and what his political convictions are. Epithets of "fascists" and "murderers" were bestowed on us on that day by the defenders of October who gathered at the conservatory. Incidentally, the newspaper LITVA SOVETSKAYA in the 3 December issue published a report about those events. A certain V. Banaitis writes with irony about the director of the department for the protection of the kray, and he calls us a bodyguard for this official...

[Budris] What facts did the newspaper use as a basis?

[Stackevicius] Our commander, Eriks Kaliacius, who is well-known to the public, can be seen clearly in a newspaper photo standing behind Director A. Butkevicius. After reading the material, people could have reached an erroneous opinion about our tasks. One colleague brought this newspaper and asked: "So, whom are you serving, commander?" Of course, he said this as a joke, for the situation is extremely obvious. If it were not for our subunit, then on that day many of the representatives of the Latvian Communist Party (CPSU) would have been given a sound thrashing. On the other hand, the newspaper should present objective information, and not mislead the readers. Eriks Kaliacius is directly subordinate only to the Minister of Internal Affairs.

[Budris] What are members of your subunit guided by while on duty when political actions are taking place in the city?

[Stackevicius] It is possible that my answer will seem somewhat strange: Indeed, by nothing! We simply execute the instructions of the leaders of the ministry. There is still no law on the police. And there are no documents that regulate the procedure for conducting rallies and demonstrations. We are doing work that would have to be performed by an independent battalion of the patrol service. Our subunit should be used only in special cases, and on an alert signal.

[Budris] The dispute between leaders of the youth radio station "M-1" has received wide publicity. It seems that somehow militiamen of the special purpose subunit also got involved in this story?

[Stackevicius] The situation is really unpleasant. Several of our workers who were not on duty at the time (I emphasize this) interfered in what was none of their business. We do not encourage such things. Indeed, they themselves, it seems, behaved improperly. We, as is the entire militia, are awaiting a new law on the police, which, in the end, will promote the normal execution of our duties.

Centrist Bloc Leaders Visit Riga

91UN0693B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 19 Dec 90 p 4

[Pavel Romashin report: "There Are Forces..."]

[Text] The visit to Riga on the part of several leaders of the Bloc of Center Parties and Movements, which advo-

cates a single and indivisible Soviet Union, would seem not to be accidental in the light of the stormy debate on the matter of the Union treaty. Such trips have now become for them customary: This is a big program, in the course of which representatives of the bloc have already visited many cities.

They managed in two days to get a great deal done: a conference of the Center for Democratic Initiatives, a congress of the Interfront of Working People of the Latvian SSR, a meeting of representatives of the citizens committees of the Republic of Latvia, a meeting with officers at a military school—this is an incomplete list of the activities in which the leaders of the bloc actively participated. "In politics, as in love, the main thing is patience!" a visitor, V. Kandaurov, leader of the Russian Popular Front, said. But for what are we to wait and show patience? This question was answered by V. Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union: "There is not long to wait. Very soon you will be hearing a new voice from Moscow. And then there will be order in the country!" It is significant that it was V. Zhirinovskiy, declaring his hardline position without beating about the bush, who invariably made the biggest impression on his audience. An example: Following his speech at the congress of the Interfront, which had been quiet and composed, the public in the literal meaning of the word awoke: applause, shouts of "hurrah" and so forth. The same at other meetings also.

"We do not conceal our positions, and it was for this reason that we went to the citizens committees—let them know that there are political forces that aspire to preserve the state," were the words of V. Voronin, leader of the Sakharov Movement.

Latvian Popular Front Activities Scored

91UN0693A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 12 Dec 90 p 1

["Statement of the All-Latvia Public Salvation Committee in Connection With an Appeal of the Latvian Popular Front Board"—SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH headline]

[Text] An appeal of the Latvian Popular Front to the non-Latvian population of Latvia and servicemen was broadcast on republic radio and television on 7 December and carried on 10 December in the newspaper RIGAS BALSS.

It maintains that the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] is "opposed to the infringement of human rights, regardless of nationality, religious belief, and type of occupation"; "supports the right to own private property, regardless of nationality and possession or otherwise of citizenship"; is "opposed to the creation of all-Union joint-stock companies" and calls for a display of loyalty to the reviving Latvian state and, addressing servicemen, the NFL calls on them to support its demands.

The All-Latvia Public Salvation Committee declares that this appeal was made at a time when the fateful question of Latvia's future path is being decided, is of a fraudulent, opportunist nature, and pursues the goal of deceitfully winning over the republic's non-Latvian population to its side.

The All-Latvia Public Salvation Committee has repeatedly exposed the antipopular, antidemocratic, nationalist policy of the NFL, which has nothing in common with the building of a humane state based on the rule of law and the defense of human rights and liberties. Testimony to this are the documents adopted by the Third NFL Congress, as a result of whose realization almost half the population of Latvia will be deprived of the right of citizenship and the civil rights of servicemen will be infringed, which is incompatible with the Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international instruments. Fulfilling the wishes of the majority—NFL deputies—the republic Supreme Soviet is preparing and enacting laws and legally binding instruments aimed at the realization of its political aspirations. Confirmation of the hypocritical assertion in the NFL appeal to the servicemen concerning defense of their rights is the republic Supreme Soviet decree of 14 November 1990, "Impermissibility of the Criminal Activity of the Special Militia Detachment and the USSR Armed Forces on the Territory of the Republic of Latvia," which, in violation of all rules of law, speaks of a curtailment of social and material support for servicemen seriously infringing citizens' elementary rights to subsistence. The Supreme Soviet and the government are broadly supporting measures that in fact encourage a refusal to serve in the Army and desertion from the USSR Armed Forces and resistance to execution of the USSR law "General Military Service," which is pushing young men onto the path of crime. Citizens' liberties and rights are being flagrantly flouted in the republic. Purposive work to replace competent and scrupulous personnel adhering to international positions is under way. Proceeding from political motives and a devotion to the ideas of the Latvian People's Front, personnel in the machinery of state and ministries and departments has been replaced.

Also without foundation is the assertion that the creation of joint-stock companies is a squandering of property belonging to the people of Latvia.

In reality, the conversion of state-owned Union enterprises, associations, and organizations on the territory of the Latvian SSR into joint-stock companies has been brought about by the objective course of the development of market relations. Many outfits wished to be the true proprietors of the enterprises.

A USSR Council of Ministers ordinance has transferred 51 percent of all-Union state property to the workforce. Distribution of the remaining 49 percent of all-Union property should be decided by way of the Union Government's negotiations with the republic government.

It is thereby the Union Government, not the republic authorities, that wants to help the working people become the owners of their enterprises.

This is being understood increasingly clearly by the workforce, and it is working actively on converting its enterprises into joint-stock companies and joining the state intersectoral joint-stock association. In addition, the laws being enacted by the Latvian Parliament do not take account of the interests of Union enterprises and their workforce when questions of property are being decided.

According to the draft citizenship law, the right to property is acquired merely by "true" citizens of Latvia and their heirs. And the Republic Government is unilaterally declaring all state-owned property on the territory of Latvia property of the Republic of Latvia. The diktat of the center in respect to property in the past is being replaced by a republic monopoly and diktat.

The NFL appeal to the non-Latvian population is just the latest farce. The NFL monopoly of the mass media has deprived representatives of progressive movements of presenting a different viewpoint on republic radio and television. Unconcealed propaganda of nationalism and neofascism, the whitewashing of war criminals, and the debasement and disparagement of Latvia's historical path within the USSR are under way. Without regard for the opinion of the working people the Latvian Supreme Soviet and Government are speeding up the process of creating the legal base of a totalitarian regime and the final severance of ties to the Union of SSR.

Burokevicius, Moteka Remarks on Events Cited *91UN0726B Moscow TRUD in Russian 16 Jan 91 p 3*

[Article by TRUD correspondent G. Koncius under the rubric "About Events in Lithuania": "Tension Persists"]

[Text] Vilnius—The sky over Lithuania is clear. However, the bright sun is in contrast with the mournful faces of pedestrians. They continued through Saturday night and Sunday morning to mourn those who perished. The line in front of the Palace of Sports of people who have come to say a final farewell to those who perished was kilometers long. How did this tragedy occur? The military keeps silent, whereas witnesses tell of tanks which, having picked up speed, advanced on the crowd obstructing their way, and of precision automatic weapons fire. The 14th victim died in the hospital the day before yesterday. There are dozens more wounded in the hospitals. Sixty-four people are missing. Where are they? Under an agreement with M.S. Gorbachev, which V. Landsbergis announced here, it was resolved to allow medical personnel to enter the TV tower and the building of Lithuanian Radio and TV. However, the military allowed J. Olekas, republic minister of health, into only the first floor of the TV tower. This is why still more rumors are circulating in the city about defenders who are still barricaded there, wounded, and even

corpses which the military are allegedly hauling away from there in bags at night...

Yesterday K. Moteka, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, announced that negotiations were held with the military command headed by V.I. Varenikov, commander of the USSR Ground Forces who had arrived in Vilnius. It turned out that there had been no order to impose a curfew in Vilnius. Nonetheless, last night military patrols stopped and checked cars and people and ordered the drivers of regular buses and taxis to go back to their garages. They control entry points to the city.

The radio station Soviet Lithuania signed on again. A recording of a speech by M. Burokevicius, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, at a meeting of party activists was broadcast by the station. He analyzed the situation in the republic and military actions. In his opinion, "the most reactionary parliament in the entire history of Lithuania" strove to topple Soviet power in the republic and sever it from the USSR. This is why the Congress of Democratic Forces (nothing was mentioned about its founders) demanded that Landsbergis respond favorably to the appeal by the USSR president to the Supreme Council of Lithuania, and restore in the republic the effect of the USSR and Lithuanian SSR Constitutions. After an unfavorable reply, it was resolved to set up the Committee of National Salvation of Lithuania (its composition is likewise still unknown). After a clash between workers' detachments, created by the committee, and "the fanatics of Landsbergis," the former appealed to the military for help. "The struggle has reached such a stage that a retreat means letting go of Lithuania within the USSR." The struggle has begun, and it should be seen through to the end—M. Burokevicius ended his speech with this call. In the speeches of participants in the meeting, doubts were voiced about the mentioned number of victims in the course of military actions, and apprehensions were aired concerning the safety of activists of the Communist Party of Lithuania; the need to hold a rally of the defenders of Soviet power was mentioned.

In response, K. Moteka, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, spoke on Lithuanian Radio and assured that no measures infringing on the civil rights of the members of the Communist Party of Lithuania will be taken against them.

A meeting of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania was held. It was stated at the meeting that all industrial enterprises in the republic are operating, and permanent communication with the local soviets is being maintained. The Ministry of Internal Affairs communicated that during this week the number of common crimes declined by a factor of two.

In the evening, B.I. Oleynik, member of the USSR Federation Council delegation, spoke at a session of the

Supreme Council of Lithuania. Having expressed his condolences to the Lithuanian people in conjunction with the tragedy which has occurred, he said, addressing the deputies, that the delegation had been sent by the USSR president in order to stop bloody clashes, and it had accomplished this task. A certain agreement has been reached. A representative of the USSR president who will work with you during this difficult time will be sent. In the opinion of B.I. Oleynik, the opposing sides have started to move closer together.

Lithuania Situation Update

91UN0727B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 17 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Report from Vilnius by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondents Igor Baranovskiy and Sergey Balyutskiy: "Even Words Are Explosive"]

[Text] *Starting Tuesday evening all streets, lanes, and squares in the vicinity of the Vilnius Sports Palace have been jammed to capacity by cars. Tens of thousands of people formed a huge line—to bid a last farewell to the fallen ones laying in state here.*

To avoid potential incidents, the military authorities decided to again make certain concessions; as they had done the night before, they decided not to impose a curfew.

The day passed in relative calm. Meanwhile, Vilnius is increasingly acquiring the features of a frontline city. White paper crosses bind the windows in many buildings—the residents are afraid that the windows will shatter in case of artillery fire. Store windows on the central streets and advertising kiosks are plastered with photos of the dead bodies. Right next to them are glued portraits of "enemies of the Lithuanian people"—OMON [special-purpose militia detachments] officer V. Makutynovich and local television studio employee V. Subbotin, who has single-handedly, for four days already, ensured that the broadcasts of the Central Television Channel One continued uninterrupted.

For the past 24 hours fortification work at the parliament building has continued nonstop. Gedimines Prospect is barricaded with multi-meter-long concrete blocks. Other means of access to the building are barricaded, too.

The Supreme Soviet is still surrounded by Landsbergis supporters. Much like the slips pinned on the store cashier's paper holder, thousands of passports, military, party, and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] cards are impaled on the metal rods that circle the parliament building. Medals and other decorations and state symbols are also pinned here as if on a New Year tree. And endless posters, banners, cartoons, and flags everywhere...

Nor is it quiet in the parliament building itself. Thousands of young people, armed with hunting rifles and

other firearms, stay here round the clock. They sleep piled up on chairs and on the floor. Right here is also an improvised mess. All of this resembles a huge agitated waiting room. The waiting has indeed heavily permeated the air here—waiting for the unknown. According to the parliament guard, the building is impregnable from the street. The only assault they worry about is one from the air—the paratroops. At the same time the underground Committee for National Salvation and Protection of the Soviet Constitution made a public warning on Tuesday. Among other things, it warns the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and its chairman V. Landsbergis that the smallest encroachment on the life, honor, and dignity of USSR citizens, communists, and family members of the military will inevitably provoke a most resolute response. The committee demanded, time and again, that the Supreme Soviet relinquish its powers.

During the last days, rumors have been circulating that there are still hostages—members of the kray protection department—being held at the television tower taken over by the paratroops, and that more bodies of people killed during the storming of the building are hidden from the public here. Yesterday a group of Soviet and foreign journalists was given an opportunity to tour the building and see with their own eyes the situation there. The correspondents met the unit commander and the chief of staff—the two people who directed the storming of the building on the morning of the 13th. According to them, the military did not use combat arms during the storming of the building. The chief of staff, Major Danilov, stated that only the officers in the unit had live ammunition; the clips in the soldiers' automatic weapons contained only blanks. At the same time the officers said that no firearms had been found in the possession of those who had been defending the tower, and that no fire was aimed at the soldiers from inside the tower. The military, however, say that they were fired at from nearby buildings. Fortunately, there were no casualties. The journalists were shown different evidence, though—a different kind of ammunition that could have been used in defense of the tower. This includes Molotov cocktails, metal rods, and heavy truncheons. Foreign reporters insisted on seeing the entire television tower building to ascertain that no hostages from among the Lithuanian population were currently present on the territory of the tower. There were none.

The presidential commission, led by N. Dementey, member of the Federation Council and chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, has finished its work.

"Do not be offended, but at this time it is too difficult to comment on everything we have seen and heard. Even one careless word can be explosive now," said USSR People's Deputy V. Foteyev, a commission member, in reply to our request to share his impressions of meeting with republic residents.

There is good reason for such a statement. We received further proof of it at the meeting between commission members and workers from the radio measuring devices

plant. It seemed that people representing extreme opposite points of view (there are no others left today!) spoke in different languages. On top of that, they simply did not want to—or perhaps no longer could?—listen to each other. Emotions were running so high that at one point it almost ended up in a physical fight.

In the evening B. Oleynik, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, spoke to the people's deputies.

"We were sent to Lithuania by the president in order to stop the bloody confrontation, and we have done everything we could, and in one sense even more than we could, to avoid bloodshed in the future. In my opinion, both sides in the conflict have started to move toward each other," he informed the Supreme Soviet deputies.

The same thought—"It is possible to have dialogue with the military"—came through in the speech to the parliament by Prime Minister G. Vagnorius, who had met with representatives of the military leadership the same day.

"We have resolved two issues: to rescind the curfew and to establish regular contacts between ourselves and the military," he said. "It appears that there will be no curfew in the near future."

However, although tension has receded somewhat in regard to these issues, on the whole social tension in the republics is still running high. In some places it is even increasing.

CPSU's Burokevicius on Lithuania Events

91UN0728B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
17 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Professor M.M. Burokevicius, doctor of historical sciences, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee, by SELSKAYA ZHIZN special correspondent V. Simonenkov in Vilnius on 15 January, by telephone: "Lithuania: A Time of Troubles"]

[Text] The so-called radical press, closing its eyes to the Lithuanian legislature's gross trampling on the basic rights of hundreds of thousands of people, is trying to heap all the blame for the tragic events in Vilnius on the "center," the army, and the communists. But the facts show something else: The roots of the events lie in the totalitarian regime of the "Sajudists" and in the nationalistic and antipopular policy of V. Landsbergis. In this connection, our special correspondent met in Vilnius with Professor M.M. Burokevicius, doctor of historical sciences, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee.

[Correspondent] Mykolas Martynovich, how does the present situation in Lithuania look? What is the position

of the Landsbergis government and Sajudis which, as we recall, began its political activity as a movement for perestroika?

[Burokevicius] The situation is critical. The economic, political, and moral crisis has reached its highest point. The Lithuanian leadership through the republic legislature and through the mass media has developed wide-ranging anti-Soviet activity, which is directed toward having people blindly believe in everything done by the Landsbergis legislature. The role of Sajudis has become quite clear here. In this stage it has become a political organization holding positions of separatism and Lithuanian nationalism. The separatist parliament and the separatist positions of Sajudis have joined tightly together. The dangerous thing is that they are implanting in people's minds the idea of the superiority of the Lithuanian people over people of other nationalities. This is being done in keeping with the principles that ensue from the hatred for everything Soviet and everything positive that has been accumulated over the years of Soviet rule in Lithuania.

The primitive egoism widespread in the mass media generates a nationalistic psychosis. The Lithuanian leaders—Landsbergis, Motieka, Stankevicius, Butkevicius, and Laurinkas—are trying to develop people who do not value their own lives who will defend the republic legislature and the chairman personally. And this is no accident. Essentially they have been gripped by a fear of the possibility of the restoration of Soviet structures in Lithuania and the preservation of its socialist orientation. The current leaders of the legislature and the republic government have only one goal: to get Lithuania out of the USSR by any means and to restore the state and economic structure that existed before 1940.

The republic leaders have rejected in the most cynical way the proposals of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev presented in his appeal to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. As you know, the legislature has stated that it rejects the restoration of the Lithuania SSR Constitution and the USSR Constitution. And it does not intend to repeal the antidemocratic laws that violate human rights which have been adopted since 10 March 1990. This position on the part of the legislature has disturbed a considerable share of the workers of Lithuania and has led to a situation in which the people have begun to act more decisively.

Thus intolerable actions were taken by members of revolutionary fighting groups against the workers of Vilnius who spoke out in favor of the proposals of the USSR president who were supported by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. And it was only after large-scale clashes that Soviet Army troops came to the aid of the workers.

Here the question automatically arises: Why did the Soviet military servicemen so actively support the worker patrols of Vilnius? In the first place, the families of military servicemen in Lithuania were placed in a

position in which they do not have the minimum social conditions for a normal life. This includes deprivation of coupons for food, a critical housing problem, firing of officers' wives from their jobs, and making it impossible for children to peacefully attend schools and kindergartens. Officers and enlisted men are deprived of elementary voting rights.

In the second place, the active work of the department for protection of the region of Lithuania was and is based on espionage and the gathering of information about the condition of units of the Soviet Army stationed in Lithuania. As the facts show, representatives of the department are working under instructions from the West. Nor can one forget about the fact that the leaders of the department have created armed groups of fighters who are to implement all the decisions of the current Lithuanian leadership through force. And therefore it is not surprising that many arms, radio stations, and so forth have been confiscated from them. All this was intended for use in fighting against nonconformists. Now they have made statements about instructions according to which they are to repress party functionaries, active communists, and their families—all these people are declared to be criminals. In rural regions of the republic they have already set up loudspeakers through which they shout demands for punishment of communists. They want to have the communists of Lithuania shot, and those who support the restoration of Soviet power are to be intimidated, and this will prolong the existence of the despotic regime and structures created by Landsbergis at the local level.

[Correspondent] Here it is obviously appropriate to ask the question of what the role of the Communist Party of Lithuania is under these conditions. And what is its condition?

[Burokevicius] The Communist Party of Lithuania is now the strongest of the political parties and the most organized. There are more than 40,000 communists in its ranks. It has its own local party organizations and rayon and city structures. And the only people who have remained in it are those who are fighting for socialist progress based on the communist idea. The communists have only one privilege now—to be arrested and put in jail in keeping with Landsbergis' laws. If the people are not frightened by the draconian antidemocratic law of the Lithuanian parliament concerning political parties, which prohibits the Communist Party of Lithuania and threatens its members with from three to six years, functionaries with from six to 10 years, and the leaders with 15 years in prison and the highest measure of punishment—execution—then these people are in the party out of conviction.

I think that the person who is a member of the Communist Party of Lithuania is a person devoted to an idea, a person with a capital letter, this is a person of heroic temperament.

I think that the events taking place today cannot be correctly understood by certain members of the Communist Party. On the other hand, I have obtained information to the effect that under the conditions of such tragic events in Vilnius, 17 Lithuanians in Utenskiy Rayon demanded the return of their party cards which they turned in during the split in the republic Communist Party. Before these events nine people of the same rayon had already obtained party cards and become members of the CPSU. I also have facts about the kolkhozes. But out of consideration for the security of these people I do not want to give their names or exactly where the rural party organizations are located. And do not forget that this is taking place at a time when communists are constantly being threatened.

Yesterday I received information to the effect that the department for protection of the region was hunting down first secretaries of rayon party committees in Radvilishkiy, Utenskiy, Prenayskiy, and other rayons. The people were unable to spend the night at home because there was the threat of their physical destruction. Extremists tried to take over the building of the Communist Party of Lithuania in Prenayskiy Rayon. They closed themselves off, put up barricades, and somehow defended their "fortress." But the first secretary's car was damaged. So it is very difficult for communists of Lithuania to work. But they will not throw up their hands.

The Communist Party of Lithuania has received 206 new members. True, I think that now some people might abandon our ranks. For purposes of personal safety—not so much their own as that of members of their families. And this is even logical.

Along with the working class we must fight to create normal living conditions for each person in Lithuania. And this is possible only with the restoration of the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR and with the USSR Constitution in effect on the territory of the republic, and with the repeal of all antidemocratic laws adopted since 10 March 1990.

The Communist Party of Lithuania cannot be destroyed. If only because then it would be necessary to destroy the working class as well, and also the working peasantry, whose interests our party reflects and defends.

I repeat again: The Communist Party of Lithuania is the party of the working class and the working peasantry. I draw this conclusion from the fact that its nucleus really is made up of workers and peasants. And this is only one difference from the Communist Party of Lithuania that existed before the split and in which the majority were employees. There are members of the intelligentsia in the party now as well. But...here is the kind of interesting picture that emerges. If you take an enterprise, the majority of its leaders are in Sajudis or the legislature, or they are members of other parties or do not belong to any party. But the party organization based on the CPSU platform has only workers. This is the peculiarity of our

Communist Party in the modern stage. You will not see this anywhere else in the Union. This is a unique situation. It is approximately the same on the kolkhozes. The rank-and-file kolkhoz workers are communists and the leaders are not. With individual exceptions. Therefore I believe that the Communist Party of Lithuania will continue to exist.

[Correspondent] Mykolas Martynovich, how do you feel about the idea of presidential rule? Is it necessary or not? If it is necessary, is it not a little late to be introducing it?

[Burokevicius] I think so. We need to stabilize the situation. I see only one way to do this and normalize the life of the people—to introduce presidential rule. And I hope Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is not offended, but he has been too slow in doing this. But I fear most of all that there will be more victims. I cannot even agree with what has happened here. I have in mind the events about which the entire country knows. Even if he acted stupidly, he is still a person. And we should have solved all problems politically, and without spilling a drop of blood. But the Landsbergis government provoked the people. An officer was killed and then they began to fire from the bushes and windows, and not so much at the officers who had come but just at anything at all. I am firmly convinced that Landsbergis and his friends should be held responsible for this.

Names of Vilnius Casualties Listed

91UN0725A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 2, 16 Jan 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "We Mourn for Those Who Died"; all names transliterated from the Russian]

[Text] 1. Asanavichyute, Loreta—born 1966.

2. Vaytkus, Vitautas—born 1973.

3. Gerbutavichyus, Darius—born 1973.

4. Druskis, Virginius—born 1969.

5. Shatskikh, Viktor—born 1969, serviceman.

6. Kavalyuskas, Algimantas—born 1939.

7. Kanapinskas, Alvidas—born 1952.

8. Masyulis, Titas—born 1962.

9. Makulka, Alvidas—born 1930.

10. Matulyavichyus, Vidas—born 1966.

11. Povilaitis, Apolinaras—born 1937.

12. Shimulenius, Ignas—born 1973.

13. Yuknevichyus, Rimantas—born 1966.

14. Yankauskas, Rolandas—born 1966.

There were 164 people wounded, 43 people hospitalized, and 26 people in critical condition.

We mourn for the souls of those who were ordered to kill.

RSFSR

Democratic Russia Calls for Protest March

91UN0746B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 3, Jan 91 p 8

[Unattributed announcement: "Rally in Moscow"]

[Text] The Coordinating Council of the movement Democratic Russia and the Interregional Group of Deputies call on all Muscovites to attend a demonstration, a rally protesting events in the Baltic area and the onset of reaction in the country. The rally will be held on 20 January. It will begin at 1130 hours. The segment of the Garden Ring between Mayakovskiy Square and Vosstaniya Square will be the assembly area. The route will be through Kalinin Avenue and the Manezh to the building of the CPSU Central Committee.

Crimea Prepares for Referendum

91UN0744A Moscow IZVESTIYA 18 Jan 91 Union
Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Filippov: "Acquiring Merit. The First Referendum in the USSR Is Being Prepared in the Crimea"]

[Text] On 20 January Crimeans will live through an event that cannot be called anything but historical. On that day, a special session of the oblast soviet has designated a referendum on the state and legal status of the Crimea. Every adult of full legal age on the peninsula will be able to express their attitude toward the creation of a Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a subject of the USSR and participant in the Union treaty.

You become convinced of the fact that this is the main event for Crimeans today with your very first steps on their land. Store windows, the walls of houses, and even the halls of establishments are covered with posters in support of autonomy as the only guarantee of the equality of the rights and prosperity of all the people of the peninsula. This idea permeates the publication KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA and the transmissions of radio and television. I, to tell the truth, even doubted the objectivity of my colleagues: Perhaps, I thought, such attitudes are not that widespread? But in the oblast soviet I saw the results of a recent sociological survey: An absolute majority of Crimeans support autonomy, for they hope that an independent local authority will be capable of quickly leading the abundant land out of the poverty to which the dictatorship of departments has subjected it. Seventy ministries and 450 powerful enterprises have their own property and interests in the Crimea. But what do the residents have in exchange?

"The invasion of chemistry makes life unbearable," explains L. Blinchik, a female resident of Simferopol. "Piped water has a foul taste, and even soup made from it is not tasty. The children have allergies from the fruit. The doctor even warned: Under no circumstances give red apples to your granddaughter."

The large household chemistry plant is not far from the center of Simferopol. And in the north of the peninsula, in Krasnoperekopsk, there is an entire complex of chemical plants that is mercilessly poisoning Sivash. And to the south, in Saki, where there is unique therapeutic mud, there is also a "gift" of great chemistry—the plant for the production of chemicals for agriculture.

"It was with great difficulty that we got the government to close the nuclear electric power station," says V. Kurashik, chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]. "But we do not have the power to make a fundamental change in the consumer attitude of the republic and Union departments to the Crimea. We see the future of the Crimea as a comfortable health resort region, with a well-developed agricultural and processing industry. We are viewed as an ordinary oblast that is obliged meticulously to deliver grain, meat, and fruit to Union and republic stocks. But more than 8 million vacationers come to the Crimea annually who have to be well fed. But with what, if the central planning organs allocate resources for only 2.5 million local residents? When I come to Kiev with unusual proposals, I am told: "Who are you? From what department? So, adhere to existing laws." But according to these laws we do not have the right even to collect payment for land in the local budget from those who use it. Thousands of health resorts occupy the coastline free of charge, each hectare of which costs many millions of rubles. But the Crimea is catastrophically short of municipal and rural services and utilities. In my opinion, the development of national health resorts is impossible without Crimean autonomy. It is only then that we will be able to rid ourselves of the disastrous dictates of departments and establish mutually beneficial relations with them on the basis of contracts.

National problems have been added recently to everyday adversities. They, strange as it may seem, have been aggravated by the Law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR," which declares Ukrainian to be the official language. But approximately 70 percent of the population in the Crimea is Russian, and, according to data from the last census, 82.6 percent of the residents of the peninsula claimed Russian to be their native tongue. Until February 1954 Crimea Oblast was part of the RSFSR, and it by no means changed its "residence rights" through the will of the people. The rulers of the country at that time bestowed the Crimea as a grand gift in honor of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of the Ukraine with Russia. It is not surprising that many Crimeans have assessed the requirement of the law on the compulsory study of the Ukrainian language as a step that was

not well thought-out, and which caused unnecessary friction among the representatives of the two fraternal peoples.

"Moreover, we were very alarmed by the refusal of the Ukrainian parliament to sign the Union treaty," says G. Kapshuk, deputy chairman of the oblast soviet. "One would like to think that common sense will still be victorious. But to insure ourselves against the worst case, the oblast soviet decided on the referendum. If the Crimean ASSR is reinstated, then, in accordance with USSR legislation, it has a right to determine its attitude toward a Union treaty independently. I especially want to emphasize that a restored republic will not be based on the priority of any kind of single nation but only on the priority of individual rights. This is the only way that equal opportunities can be guaranteed for everyone living in the Crimea."

We also are not raising the question of revising the decisions of 1954, if for no other reason than that the treaty between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR of 19 November 1990 reinforced mutual recognition of the inviolability of the currently existing borders between Russia and the Ukraine. However, at the same time, the oblast soviet considers unconstitutional the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 30 June 1945 and the RSFSR Law of 25 June 1946, which abolished the Crimean ASSR, and it declares the people's right to reestablish their own statehood. The main motive for the elimination of the republic was the deportation from the Crimea of a number of people who were accused of collaboration with the fascists and the fact that a majority of the population of the Crimea did not oppose traitors to the Motherland.

Today, deported peoples are returning to their historic homeland. Last year local authorities set up 16,000 families, but they still have been unable to help 6,000—the oblast's housing and building materials resources are very modest. But without prior permission, the people who arrived occupied 4,000 parcels of land: They set up shanties and are spending the winter there. This illegal conduct on kolkhoz and sovkhoz lands led to disputes with local residents and resulted in strong anti-Tatar feelings. In the opinion of the oblast leaders, the return of the Crimean Tatars was not prepared for economically. At first, the people were told: Go to your homeland. Afterward a state commission was established on problems of the Crimean Tatar people, which began to think: But what will this "great resettlement" cost? As a result, the unbearable burden of setting up people who had neither house nor home fell on the oblast with its multimillion budget deficit. True, last year the Union government allocated 225 million rubles under the Crimean Tatar resettlement program. But at present these are meaningless rubles, which are practically not backed up by resources. The proclamation itself of an autonomous republic, of course, will give the Crimea neither bricks, timber, or cement. But then the local soviet will stop coordinating even such a trifle as granting a builder a piece of land in the republic Council

of Ministers. But without instructions from the center, a person's right to solve his own problems for himself reinforces enterprise considerably.

But how do the Crimean Tatars feel about the reinstatement of the republic? In the oblispolkom committee for deported people's affairs I was shown a resolution of meetings of Crimean Tatars that were held in different rayons of the peninsula. Their opinion is: We will not participate in a referendum. What is the reason?

"We are also for the restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the Union and a participant in a Union treaty," says Yu. Osmanov, one of the leaders of the national movement of Crimean Tatars. "But in the status that this republic had until its abolition in 1945. We have one homeland—the Crimea—and autonomy must be national-territorial. And the oblast soviet proposes voting for territorial autonomy. But the majority of the population in the Crimea is Russian, so one asks why do the Russian people need one more state, besides Russia? With such autonomy we do not see a guarantee that the language and culture of the Crimean Tatar people will be preserved, and that its national integrity will be restored. That is why we are making an appeal to refrain from taking part in the referendum."

Today 105,000 Tatars live in the Crimea, and all told there are 2.5 million inhabitants in the oblast. How the referendum is organized, how it proceeds, and how it ends will be discussed in subsequent reports from the Crimea.

History of Mordovian Leadership Change

91UN0710A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jan 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Nezhnyy: "Dictatorship of the Oblast Scale"]

[Text] Mordovian ASSR—The power is changing hands in Mordovia.

For the past two decades A.I. Berezin has ruled the autonomous republic with an iron fist. For two decades he held Mordovia on a true course from successes to new achievements, but in the final analysis he raised it to the heights of economic collapse and deep social anguish.

And no matter how hard the leaders tried last spring to harness the preelection passions and put a stop to the anti-Berezin (this was what they were called in the fliers) rallies, regardless of how much they enlisted the aid of the convenient phrase "Soviet Mordovia," the militia, and the court, regardless of how Berezin personally warned the always compliant, to use his terms, "socialist nation" of the danger of the "upstart pseudodemocrats," from the "class enemy" who were "obviously activating ideological sabotage"—the foundations started to shake. First Berezin left the post of first secretary of the CPSU obkom [oblast committee], having first assured himself the position of chairman of the Mordovian ASSR; then

he was forced to give up this position also, to unclench his fist and let go of the power he had stolen.

Yesterday—almighty; today—a has-been. Are we again taking potshots at the same old target, shot through with hundreds of bullets—the former leaders, the past? If this were indeed the case, true, it would not be worthwhile to resurrect this discussion. But the essence of it is that it is not so simple to keep our tenses straight in our unpredictable times.

When the subject came up in connection with something I was writing, when I dared to say a word in opposition to it, having published in the most central of our newspapers an article in defense of the chief of Mordovavtodor, A. Salimov, even before the investigation and, consequently, before the trial that accused the bureau of the Mordovian CPSU obkom of padding figures, Berezin called this newspaper's editorial office and swore that Salimov would be arrested. And for almost two years Anatoliy Ivanovich tried to keep his word—perhaps also so as to remove from the Mordovian citizens the last remnants of the temptation to look for any kind of truth beyond the borders of the autonomous republic.

A brief word about Salimov. During 17 years of self-sacrificing labor he literally created a system of roads for Mordovia. A born business leader, he was quick-witted, enthusiastic, and enterprising. He is one of the people responsible for the fact that the essentially dead system was still breathing.

The long-standing animosity of the first secretary of the CPSU obkom toward the chief of Mordovavtodor adds nothing to the essence of the relations between the dictator and the creator. Dictatorship on any level (from rayon to state), without moving an inch, will determine the best place for creative activity from its point of view—a prison think tank surrounded by barbed wire. It has a gnawing longing for order, the cherished zone, and the harmony of the barracks; it is drawn to violence and hates freedom, sensing the fatal danger issuing from it to his boundless and criminal self-will.

A dictator is a slave to power, for which he is prepared to do anything; the creator is the possessor of divine freedom, which draws minds, souls, and destinies to him. Compassion in creativity (be it intelligent rural labor, road construction, or gold mining) liberates man, generating in him a sense of his own worth, confidence in his own powers, and independence. Thus the creator without even knowing it destroys the dictator, who responds to him sincerely with the profoundest hatred. It unerringly catches them unaware in the denial of the artificial letter in favor of active pursuits—and, having taken them unaware, either tramples them to death (like Khudenko and Khint) or stamps out their souls with its boot (like Salimov). This is why it is not at all surprising that in 1986 Salimov was accused of padding accounts; what is surprising is that this did not happen until 1986 and that he was not put behind bars much earlier.

Did he break the law? Yes, he did. He should have gone around to all the offices hat in hand, adding up expenses for travel and for clothing, and so building roads by meters per year rather than kilometers. And by building asphalt highways, he risked capital investments intended, for example, exclusively for agriculture. (At the beginning of the seventies, when Salimov was in charge of the highway department, losses in Mordovian agriculture from the lack of roads amounted to 22-24 million rubles [R] per year. In 1986, they were half that amount. But apparently they do not relate this to agriculture.) I recall that the minister of construction and operation of highways of Russia, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Nikolayev, said angrily and bitterly that there were plenty of funds for land reclamation, but pathetic amounts for roads. "Only in an insane asylum," he exclaimed, "do they begin to wash a staircase from the bottom step!"

From the small staff of the Mordovian procuracy they put together a brigade (five people), provided it with the highest instructions, and then avidly undertook to put a rope around Salimov's neck. If we really had justice in our country and if our judges were not on the party payroll in the obkom that quivers and quakes before Berezin—then I would sleep more peacefully. But this not being the case, I had no doubt that the Mordovian Themis, candidly looking out from under the her blindfold, would with her own hand place on the opposite side of the scale a weight with the inscription "guilty." The Salimov case exploded not in days but in hours, and before Berezin put him behind bars, I decided I would definitely make my voice heard by the top person in power.

This was a completely Russian audacity with deep historical roots—to bow down before the tsar and complain about a bad nobleman. There was a good deal of servility, social degradation, and civil powerlessness here, but at the same time there was also a naive delusion characteristic of distorted sense of law and order, as though appealing to the highest level of justice would make it possible to overcome injustice everywhere.

In Mordovia, even among the most exceptional people, the bitterness about fruitless appeals above has degenerated into a sad conviction that Berezin can do anything, that he has a powerful barrier there and that in Moscow he walks through the Bolshoy Dom as if it were his own apartment. There is absolutely no justification for this confidence.

My telegram (addressed to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev—167 words, R9.35) did not fly very high—to the sector chief of the Central Committee organizational department N.P. Gromyko. I telephoned him, Comrade Gromyko, and I will not forget until the day I die the humiliation I experienced when I asked him to see me and hear what I had to say (after all, I was not asking for myself!) and in response he politely said good-bye.

You get used to everything. I ultimately got used to this manner of being spoken to with restrained irritation—as if you were a poor beggar and he had callouses on his hands from constantly turning the wheels of state. And I knocked on the door of the “party conscience”—KPK [Party Control Commission] of the CPSU Central Committee; and my materials even ended up one time on the desk of Comrade Solomentsev (at that time he was the “party conscience” for the leader), and his assistant telephoned me at home: from the lofty spheres to my tiny apartment on the seventh floor of a panel- construction building in the former village of Zyuzino...

But it all turned out to be in vain—as did subsequently two of my other appeals to the department of administrative-legal organs of the CPSU Central Committee.

I remember how I first ended up at entry No. 11—the reception room of the Central Committee and the KPK. Silent people with tormented faces were sitting everywhere, and the militia man walked with a firm step from wall to wall. My brothers and sisters, persecuted by violence and arbitrary treatment, dragged themselves here with their last hopes, and now they were patiently waiting for mercy from the party. As if feeling a weight around my neck and dragged down by it, I leaned toward the window with the sign “Receipt of Letters From Citizens,” handed my packet to a heavily made-up blonde on the other side of the glass, and quickly got out of there.

Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy visited Saransk one time. There is a certain special meaning in the fact that the hotel where he stayed and the church next to it were torn down long ago, and towering on the place where they had been is the multistoried white marble building of the CPSU obkom throwing out to the fairly poverty-stricken city an unabashed challenge and overwhelming the city with its tasteless grandeur.

Among the people this building was immediately dubbed the “Bastille,” with reference partly to the prison and partly to the symbol of freedom gained through destruction. True, they named the street after Lev Tolstoy; but a certain mysterious and unkind ridicule shows through in the image of the gloomy KGB building and the immense inscription stretching across it: “The Party Is the Mind, Honor, and Conscience of Our Age,” with a depiction of V.I. Lenin and nine hammers and sickles in a row.

Each time I have walked on this street I have been unable to keep from thinking, for example, that it was here, to the KGB Administration, that they summoned the peaceful residents of Saransk and questioned them, the ones who were said to have audaciously encroached on the security of the Soviet state merely because they made a copy of the typewritten text of Bulgakov’s “Heart of a Dog”; that the Mordovian procuracy (it was located right next door to the Chekist building) can simply take a

completely innocent person behind the grating—all that was necessary was a simple phone call from a high person, merely a hint.

Many have tried to fight Berezin, including people who have worked with him, as it were, side by side. For example, the former secretary of the Mordovian CPSU obkom, Nikolay Ivanovich Chinyayev. Not so long ago he received a letter from a former department head of the Mordovian Pedagogical Institute, Nikolay Stepanovich Afonin. Afonin once had the unfortunate idea of sharing his considerations about the extremely poor condition of Mordovian policies with Comrade Suslov. They bounced from the head ideologist of the CPSU and the Soviet state as from a wall and, of their own accord, ended up in the obkom, on Berezin’s desk. Nikolay Stepanovich’s bitter but unwavering belief in the purity of the meadows and the whiteness of the snow that remained untouched at the heights of the CPSU, brought him to write one more letter to the Central Committee. It too was returned it Mordovia.

Terrible days began for the author. “He,” the poor Afonin admitted to Chinyayev, who had also come under Berezin’s fist, “dragged evidence out of me making it feel like torture, and he threatened me with a trial and terrible punishment. And I was sick, I had just had an operation. At the same time, I was being called into the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the procuracy, and the party commission. There was nobody to help me. And in this condition, I gave the testimony about myself that the chief needed.”

It is hardly necessary to explain who it is Afonin means by “he” and the “chief.” One might add that Nikolay Stepanovich sent the same letter of confession to Kirov, to Vladimir Nilovich Sergiyenkov, the former secretary of the Saransk City CPSU Committee] (he refused to participate in the “case” of V.N. Martynov that was fabricated by Berezin with the help of local Chekists—he refused and was forced to leave Mordovia). And one could also add that SOVETSKAYA MORDOVIYA, a newspaper that is not squeamish at all, obeying Anatoliy Ivanovich Berezin, published a remarkable article in its own right, “Lampoonists,” about all three—Afonin, Sergiyenkov, and Chinyayev—which unequivocally threatened them with “Yezhov-like iron fists.” (“Yezhov’s iron fists” were common in our country under the notorious People’s Commissar Yezhov, which added a great historical significance to the promise of the organ of the Mordovian CPSU obkom).

The concerned comrades sent the issue of SOVETSKAYA MORDOVIYA containing this article not only to Kirov where Sergiyenkov “fled,” and not only to his wife at work. A third envelop from Saransk ended up in a Vyatka village with Vladimir Nilovich’s mother. As soon as she started to read it, she understood that something bad was being planned for her son, and without feeling anything she collapsed on the floor,

hitting her head on the open door of the stove that she had intended to stoke. After this she was ill for a long time and then died.

Nikolay Stepanovich Afonin, as you will recall, began with an appeal to Suslov. Moreover, he wrote to: Brezhnev, Pelshe, Solomentsev, Gustav, Andropov (whose accession evoked an influx of new hope in Afonin), all of the Politburo, Chernenko, and, after the death of the worthy old man, Gorbachev. "I appeal to you for protection from the persecution and oppression to which I am being subjected by the Mordovian party obkom and the first secretary of the obkom, Comrade A.I. Berezin, personally." (In the party manner, he placed the letter T [for Comrade] in front of the name of his tormentor.) Both Chinyayev and Sergienkov also appealed to the leaders of their native party... Do you know what response they received to their letters? I will tell you: A smile on Berezin's face.

But what can be said about the rank and file, so to speak, citizens? Barinov, Mikhail Vasilyevich, pensioner, agronomist (40 years work tenure) like myself was convinced that only Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev could rein Berezin in, and he sent a letter with a description of the acts of, as he put it, the "Mordovian mafia" to this same address at entrance No. 11 of the Bolshoy Dom on Kuybyshev street.

Mikhail Vasilyevich had a more interesting result. First, Yu. Mashin (chief of the organizational department of the CPSU obkom, Berezin's right-hand man), V. Adushin (the guardian of the law—the procurator), and also Anatoliy Ivanovich personally did everything they could to persuade him to admit that his letter was a desperate mistake and they promised him that if he did they would forgive and forget the whole affair. Barinov responded to this with words that were strange for him: "I really want the truth to triumph."

The people's court of Proletarskiy Rayon in Saransk (L. Grishina, court chairman, pronounced the judgment) sentenced him to a year in the camps for slander, and in the courtroom the old man was placed in handcuffs as an especially dangerous criminal. This happened at the height of the renewal that was sweeping over the country.

The people's court of Ardatovskiy Rayon (court chairman A. Avtayev presiding) sent his son, kolkhoz chairman Nikolay Barinov, to corrective labor in construction for daring to challenge the first secretary of the Atyashevskiy Rayon CPSU committee, A. Kunyayev. Barinov stated that he had been forced to give Kunyayev a bribe, and he stood his ground in spite of all the efforts on the part of the procuracy of the autonomous republic through threats and promises to make him hold his tongue. (Father and son were released: They were acquitted by the RSFSR Supreme Court).

Militia Captain Ivan Buyanov, who has earned two diplomas with distinction (Yelabug Secondary and Kiev Higher School of the Militia) was demoted and thrown out of the militia merely because he became dangerous to

the oblast dictator as a result of the professional attention he paid to this same Kunayev. A historian and assistant at the Mordovian University, B. Savelyev, one of the first to stand up against the dictator, was utterly humiliated, slandered, and reduced to poverty...—and there are so many stories like this. And the plot is always the same, just the names change.

But Berezin as a phenomenon of our reality would be fairly uncomplicated if today, when summing up, as it were, the result of his 20-year rule, one were to speak exclusively about the human destinies on which he has trampled. The power whose creator, whose support, and at the same time whose servant he was, could not exist outside a permanent lie, fanned from day to day, offending national sensibilities. What the citizens of Mordovia did not learn about themselves from his statements! They, it turns out, "had reached unprecedented heights of social, economic, and cultural development," and their poor, long-suffering Mordovia had accomplished a "mighty ascent to the heights of social progress." But perhaps the cruelest blow to the secret core of the people's spirit was dealt by Anatoliy Ivanovich quite recently when he declared that "under the leadership of the Leninist party the Mordovian people have become a socialist nation." My dear Mordovian peoples of Erzya and Moksha! Did you know that the great experiment begun in 1917 was successful and you are not some kind of Mordovia but a socialist nation brimming with satisfaction and happiness?!

The absolute unwillingness to deal with either the merit of the individual or the merit of the people, the expulsion of the native language from the schools, for which there is absolutely no historical justification, but at the same time the 500th anniversary of the joining of Mordovia to Russia, which was celebrated with great pomp—these are more terrible results of the 20 years of Berezin's rule: The self-awareness of the people that had been driven underground is now breaking through to the surface, sometimes with a distorted, nationalistic face.

There were probably two basic values in his life: power and himself as the embodiment of power. This why for him the true representative of culture was the person who ideologically consecrated his dictatorship such as, for example, the confirmed Stalinist, the rector of Mordovian University, A. Sukharev. This is why, according to the testimony of people who knew him well, he was constantly perfecting his mastery of intrigue, the art of vengeance, and his ability always to remain in the shadows. And this is why he tormented SOVETSKAYA MORDOVIYA photographers, demanding that people see him in photographs as properly unpretentious but definitely significant.

One sleepless night in Saransk, I had a vision of myself in a preserve of antiutopia, one which was the more exemplary because inside it, surrounded by barb wire, the patrol towers, and the barking of guard dogs, there spread out a zone that was the legitimate daughter of the GULAG—the gloomy Potma. During the past two or

three years the administration of the preserve has tried to depict it as an oasis of democracy, but all attempts reminded one of the tricks of an old woman using powder and rouge in an attempt to bring to her sagging and malicious face the enchantment of youth.

And now answer me this: Does Berezin's departure into political nonexistence mean the triumph of justice on Mordovian land? The people he subjected to the torment of public defamation, regular persecution, and social degradation, against whom he unleashed the ever obedient SOVETSKAYA MORDOVIYA, the procuracy, the militia, state security, and the court, the people whom he broke and brought to the threshold of hopeless despair—will they believe that the fall of the idol means an end to the idolatrous ideology he engendered? The scars and sores that he left as the legacy of his 20-year dictatorship, the moral impoverishment of corrupt spongers, the strongmen of various calibers who for many years have gotten fat on the crumbs they were allowed to sneak away into their corners (although they were nothing more than corners, and not always their own—more than 50,000 families of Saransk are on the waiting list for apartments), is it not clear that his retirement is nothing more than a hasty retreat into the shadows?

"The country under the burden of adversity, under the yoke of savage violence, like an angel—drops its wings, like a woman—loses its shame," repeating these prophetic words of Aleksandr Blok and looking with horror around us, we see the poverty—as the result of the economic activity of Berezin and all those like him, and the blood—as a direct consequence of their national policy of creating "socialist nations," and the universal malevolence—as the result of an ideology that has destroyed everything sacred.

And perhaps this is also why we are no better off at all because Grishin, Medunov, Romanov, Berezin, and others like them are no longer with us.

For them repentance is utterly unthinkable (the weeping Bolshevik, as Mayakovskiy says, is an utterly absurd notion) and, as always, they escaped punishment. Moreover, they departed to their comfortable retreats with a sense of a job well done. And through those who have been brought up in their image, with their icy, sticky-fingered hands they will as before grab onto every living thing and person.

Where are all the aides, instructors, and sector chiefs at the Bolshoy Dom—the activists in the party apparatus on whom I knocked myself out trying to save Salimov? I strongly suspect that they are still at work. Where is the Mordovian procurator Adushkin, the cornerstone, as it were, of the dictatorship? At his combat post. Where are the judges of Grishin and Avtayev? They are judging as usual and they are probably convinced that they are the truest guardians of the Truth and the Law. Where is Berezin's first deputy for the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republic, N. Zhachkin, who at a meeting

with the electorate gave a high rating to the well-known speech of Colonel General A. Makashov ("...the general is right...the military can play their role and put a stop to this agitation")? Of course, they are all in their places where Anatoliy Ivanovich put them. Where are the members of the Supreme Court of the autonomous republic, the leaders of its Ministry of Internal Affairs, and state security administration, who served the dictatorship with all their might? The answer is the same in all cases. So how can we be surprised when to this day people who like to beat their drums, people who have jumped right out of Anatoliy Ivanovich's hands, praise us for our alleged unwavering adherence to the socialist option and with professional agility use the name of the people to conceal their unquenched desire to divide everyone up according to the categories of the bright future?...

There has been a change of power in Mordovia.

A new chairman of the Supreme Soviet. A new secretary of the CPSU obkom. A new chairman of the Saransk City Executive Committee, as well. They were the ones who elected Salimov, who was saved from Berezin two years ago by amnesty alone. Salimov was also lucky. Now, I am sure, Saransk will be lucky as well.

But I cannot bring myself to write that all this has a happy ending.

Tatar's Shaymiyev on Sovereignty, Treaty

91UN0706A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Jan 91
Union Edition p 2

[Interview with M. Shaymiyev, chairman of the Tatar SSR Supreme Soviet, by A. Sabirov; place and date not given: "Tatarstan Is Faithful to the Union"]

[Text] Tataria is located in the heart of Russia. In terms of its economic and scientific potential this former autonomous area surpasses certain Union republics. The dispute about the status of the "Kazakh land" has been going on for centuries, including since October. But today, after the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan, it has assumed a qualitatively new character, especially on the eve of the signing of the Union treaty. Here is what M. Shaymiyev, chairman of the Tatar SSR Supreme Soviet, told our correspondent about this.

[Sabirov] The position of the autonomous area is known: It is in favor of equal rights of peoples, regardless of how large in number, including the right to participate in the signing of the Union treaty. Mintimer Sharipovich, what role will Tataria play in this process?

[Shaymiyev] I think its role is constructive, although I am fully aware of how variously it is sometimes assessed. It seems to some people that the proclamation of the sovereignty of Tataria will lead to a split within the republic. But the unanimous adoption of the declaration by our Supreme Soviet dispelled all doubts and misgivings. Last year, regardless of how difficult it may have

been, was a year of civil peace and harmony. This is very great credit of the people of Tatarstan, in which we have a right to take pride and which we must protect.

The situation of political stability has enabled us, in spite of everything, to retain practically the same volume of agricultural and industrial production and per capita consumption that he had achieved, and this stability has become a powerful factor in maintaining the positions of authorized representatives of the republic during the course of negotiations on the Union treaty.

Today we are living in a world relativity pervaded with a multitude of ties. All states, large and small, are interconnected. But you will agree that dependence in the form of administrative subordination is radically different from mutually advantageous cooperation in a common market system. I am gratified and encouraged by the fact that the development of our Union is now proceeding in this direction. And it could not be otherwise.

At the basis of the cooperation is the economy. From the example of our Kama Automotive Plant alone it is easy to imagine how ramified and large-scale our economic ties are. And yet there are also the aviation, radio-technical, and construction industries, there are petroleum and petrochemistry, and there are the light, wood processing, and food branches. But it turned out that 80 percent of the enterprises are under the jurisdiction of Union departments. And 18 percent are under Russian departments.

Undoubtedly when proceeding toward the conclusion of the Union treaty and the treaty with Russia we assume that all property within Tataria, with the exception of that which will be stipulated in the Union treaty, must be transformed into the property of the Tatar SSR.

[Sabirov] But will this not develop into a regular administrative shakeup with a shifting of the jurisdiction of the enterprises and replacement of departmental dictatorship with local?

[Shaymiyev] Of course, we need not a change in decorations but a radical reform. I think the labor collectives will gain the necessary independence in any case. After all, that same Kama Automotive Plant gained it when it was transformed into a joint-stock company. The republic has begun to construct a number of joint enterprises with foreign firms. And it is creating its own hard currency fund.

We have established contacts with business circles in the United States, Germany, Taiwan, Holland, Italy, Austria, Luxembourg, and Australia. Ties with Yugoslavia, Poland, China, and Turkey are continuing to develop.

[Sabirov] Mintimer Sharipovich, the republic has already spoken out in favor of having a quota for representation in Soviet foreign institutions, for training of diplomatic and consular personnel, and for work in

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international organizations. For up to this point, for example, Soviet delegations to the United Nations have not included a single representative of the autonomous region. This, of course, is not fair. But to be frank, many people are alarmed by the entry of former autonomous regions into the international arena. Will this not lead to national isolation?

[Shaymiyev] Only the people who know the real state of affairs can say anything like this with respect to Tataria. According to data from the census, more than 1.7 million Tatars are living in the republic itself. And more than another five million are living in Russia and other republics. How and for what purpose would our republic separate from the majority of its ethnic brothers and sisters? It would not occur even to a crazy person to separate a unified people.

We have finally started to solve problems that have been at a standstill for many years. Slowly but surely we are making progress with the development of the national school. The state status of the Tatar language is being given new meaning without detriment to other languages. Tatar theaters are opening up and new newspapers are beginning to be published. Work on the creation of a Tatar encyclopedia, a republic academic center, and artistic film studios is underway.

[Sabirov] So will these steps be followed by more? Expanding its rights, the republic is also taking on greater responsibilities. Apparently you will have to rely more on your own forces and local resources and local initiative.

[Shaymiyev] Indeed, not all of our problems can be resolved centrally. But also dependent on the position occupied by the republic and other processes taking place here, to no small degree, is the nature of the incipient union of sovereign states and the ways and means of the formation of a unified economic space as a basis for overcoming the crisis in the life of society. It is obvious that the demand presented in the ukase of the USSR president concerning maintaining existing ties for 1991 is the key one in the present situation. Not only do the enterprises of Tatarstan have the right to expect greater responsibility from their associates outside the republic, but they must also improve appropriately.

Tatarstan is faithful to the Union. We consider the most important result of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies to be the resolute expression of the mood favoring preservation and consolidation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a unified federative state. We participated actively in the work during the course of the preparation of the draft Union treaty and its repeated discussion. Naturally, more work will be done on the draft, but even now one can give a confident prognosis: When the referendum is held in our republic the Union treaty will be given full support.

[Sabirov] The draft envisions that the republics participating in the treaty will enter the Union either directly or

along with other republics. This sounds like an invitation for Tataria to sign the treaty not for itself but through Russia. What is your position here?

[Shaymiyev] In keeping with the Declaration of State Sovereignty we must sign the Union treaty as full-fledged subjects of the Union without a "protective" agreement with any other state. Moreover, our declaration does not envision any other treaty, such as a federative one, unlike a number of other autonomous republics which have declared that they will remain subjects of both the RSFSR and the USSR. In a word, we are acting strictly in keeping with our declaration. And relations with Russia will be arranged taking into account multilateral ties and traditions which have developed traditionally—through history. In our opinion, the basis should be a bilateral treaty between Tataria and Russia, and its conclusion should be accelerated. And if one is to speak of the draft of the federation treaty in the form in which it is now being presented, we would not sign it even if we did not have our declaration. We would like to participate more actively in Union structures as well. For example, in all times representatives of Bashkiria and Tataria have included in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But how is this being taken into account in the creation of new state organs formed in connection with the changeover to presidential rule? At the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies they adopted an amendment to the USSR Constitution which envisions the inclusion of Tataria and other republics in the USSR Council of the Federation. We are counting on having this principle observed in the formation of the interrepublic committee and also other Unionwide structures.

I am confident that the Union treaty will place everyone and everything in their proper places if the realms of authority of the Union and the sovereign republics are clearly defined. The main thing now is to remove such negative aspects as the superiority of the laws of the republics, which, although temporary, is causing a certain amount of destabilization, and put a stop to the notorious war of the laws.

For our part we have actively developed preparation of the constitution of Tatarstan, which should be introduced no later than the first half of this year. This will be a constitution of a sovereign republic. A constitutional supervisory committee has already been formed. Of course, there are complexities and there is tension. People are hoping for operational, concrete, and fair solutions. Everyone is waiting for the signing of the Union treaty, which will be, at least for us, a true historical landmark.

Western Republics

Belorussian Legislative Process Assessed

91UN0650A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 15 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by I. Sidorchuk, candidate of legal sciences, Minsk, under rubric "Parliament Through a Jurist's

Eyes": "Striving for the Optimum: Or, How to Improve the Quality of Legislative 'Output'"]

[Text] At the present time, when the regular session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet has begun its work, one wants to look back, to re-interpret the lessons of the previous session, and to express one's views concerning the ways to improve parliamentary activities.

Behind the seething of passions and the constant fluctuations of the political temperatures at the special session of the Belorussian parliament, one could not fail to notice that it was precisely there that one saw in the most obvious manner the manifestation of and the poor performance of a new phenomenon in the enactment of legislation—the **ALTERNATIVE**. Alternative drafts prepared by the opposition and by other deputy groups constituted a worthy competition to the official, governmental, and departmental drafts.

The crux of the matter is not that certain legislative drafts can be evaluated as extremely "rightist" ones, and others as very "leftist" ones. One would scarcely think that the course of history will wait until one part of the Belorussian parliament becomes more radical, and the other becomes more moderate. A law-governed foundation for carrying out cardinal reforms is necessary right now. How can we achieve a consensus, accelerate the production of legislative "output," and supplement the laws with moral and spiritual values that are common to all mankind? What should we undertake so that the spinning of wheels in enacting legislative drafts that occurred at the special session will not be repeated in the future? Those are questions that give no rest.

It is well known that, before a legislative draft gets to the Supreme Soviet, it travels a long path, or, to use legal language, a definite number of stages. The degree of consistency and the degree of completeness with which all the draft travels through all the stages of preparation largely determine the result of its discussion at the session. One cannot reduce the enactment of legislation to state acceptance, that most "celebrated" method of achieving the quality of output. A screen against incompetency and hastiness must be set up as early as the process of "producing" the statutes. The people's deputies must penetrate deeply and completely into the essence of the legislative acts not only at the parliamentary session, but also when developing their overall concept, when preparing the normative framework, when coordinating, and when carrying out scientific evaluations.

The parliament's work time has increased considerably, and that, it would seem, allows the deputies themselves to engage directly in preparing the drafts. Unfortunately, a large number of them continue to come from the government, the ministries, and the departments. The departmental approach in the enactment of legislation is also being reinforced by the abundance of subjects of the right of legislative initiative. The tendency toward the

constant expansion of their scope is fundamentally consolidating the transmission of the initiative in the preparation of laws not to the legislative agencies. It seems that, on the contrary, the bulk of the work of preparing the drafts of laws should be carried out by the deputies. And the interested departments, before presenting a draft to the session, should engage the support of a definite number of deputies: the greater the number of deputies who will take part in preparing the law, the greater the chances for its success in the parliament. This certainly pertains in equal measure both to the official drafts and to the opposition's drafts.

The imperfection of certain new laws was largely engendered by the impersonality of the legislative activity. Certainly one must smile, for example, at the fact that the authorship of the draft of the Rental Law, which authorship was defined in the statement made by the deputy minister of justice, is approximately as follows: it is easier to name those who did not take part in developing the draft than to list all of them who worked on it. A legislative draft, apart from its judicial symbolism, must bear the name of the author who prepared it. Obviously, drafts are developed by groups, by entire collectives, but at the same time there is always a leader, an initiator, a "midwife." It is necessary to find within oneself the bravery to bear the responsibility for preparing a weak law, or, conversely, in the event of success, for accepting well-deserved praise without any embarrassment. A similar practice exists in other countries. For example, in the United States the 1947 legislative act dealing with labor is referred to by the name of its authors—Senator Taft and Congressman Hartley. Similar examples occur in our country: the programs for stabilizing the national economy and making the transition to the market economy have specific authors—L. Abalkin, S. Shatalin, and G. Yavlinskiy.

An important role in improving legislative activity is played by the committees and commissions. The latter, by establishing that a legislative draft is of inferior quality or is unready for consideration at the parliament, have the full right (in conformity with the standard operating procedures) to hinder its inclusion in the session agenda. Once again, everything depends upon the deputies and their competency. It is no accident that in the work practice of the U.S. Congress the committees act as the "grave-diggers" for weak, hastily prepared legal drafts.

Something else that is necessary for improving the work of enacting legislation is the use, when developing laws, of the achievements of world civilization, of national political and legal culture. Under the conditions of perestroika, the USSR proceeds from the hypothesis that the norms of international law and the state's obligations have a force that transcends the domestic principles. However, as is well known, words and deeds frequently do not keep in step with one another: the legislation of the USSR and the republics has not yet stated firmly many of the principles enunciated in the

Human Rights Declaration, the Helsinki and Vienna accords, or international pacts and conventions.

It is also necessary to reinterpret the process of enacting legislation in the light of a very important legal act in the life of our republic—the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR. The firm statement in this document of the statutes governing the priority of the republic's laws over the laws governing the entire union means nothing else but the republic's departure beyond its previous framework and trends in legislative policy. But the orientation of the developers of the official legislative draft entitled "Belorussian SSR Citizenship" to the corresponding union act became one of the basic reasons for the utter insolvency of many of its statutes, and, in particular, the norms that establish dual citizenship, the equality of the rights and duties of the citizens of various republics on the territory of Belorussian SSR, and the procedure for appealing decisions dealing with questions of citizenship. This also pertains in full measure to other legislative drafts: those dealing with property and with enterprises.

The truly scientific approach in the enactment of legislation is taking on fundamental importance. That approach has not yet been properly assured. There is no precisely developed legal mechanism for conducting scientific evaluations or for taking into consideration the scientists' recommendations and comments. There is not yet any clear notion of the conditions for their participation in developing and preparing legal-normative acts. A role of no small importance for increasing the authority of science in the enactment of legislation could be played by the creation under the Supreme Soviet of a special scientific-analysis evaluation service. Powerful services whose staffs include jurists, politicians, economists, sociologists, and representatives of the technical sciences, and which are engaged in making evaluational computations and providing analytical support to the activities of the legislators, are functioning successfully in foreign countries.

Our parliamentarians are having to work at a difficult time—a time of crisis and transition. The time is moving ahead at such a headlong rate that in only a few months, or at best a year, many new laws are already out of date. The USSR Law entitled "The State Enterprise (Association)" was not even enacted before it was already replaced by a new legislative act—the Law entitled "Enterprises in the USSR." And just consider how many additions and amendments have been made to the USSR Law "The Cooperative System"! Without a doubt, the highly dynamic nature of the social processes requires a corresponding level of development of legislation. At the same time, the "legislative leap-frog" undermines the authority of the laws and gives rise to doubts not only concerning their ability to carry out leadership in the legal system, but also to execute the role of the foundation for legal reforms. The large number of laws in a state, as Voltaire justly wrote, is the same thing as a large number of medicines: a sign of disease and of debility.

With a consideration of the period that has been experienced by our country and our republic, it seems that the enactment of legislation ought to develop in two basic directions: the creation of fundamental laws that are designed to be in effect for a prolonged period of time, those legal acts that could successfully function in the future under conditions of economic and political pluralism, a multiparty system, an economy with many different types of economic structures, changes in the system of administration, in administrative-territorial arrangement, etc. And the second direction is the promulgation of provisional statutes of a legislative nature that are more mobile, more dynamic, that react to the current needs, that respond sensitively to the creativity and initiative coming from the outlying areas. Active work is currently in progress on the draft of the Law Governing Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in Belorussian SSR. But why again is it a "Law"? Because there still is no clear notion of the political, economic, or social basis of the institutions of local authority. Is it not better, for the time being, simply to promulgate a Provisional Legislative Statute Governing the Local Soviets?

In a word, it will be necessary for the people's deputies, legal scientists, individuals in legal practice, and various kinds of specialists to do a large amount of joint work in order to assure that the Belorussian parliament will become a reliable foundation for building a law-governed state.

Belorussian Unions Appeal For Improvements in Cultural Life

91UN0530A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 30 Nov 90 p 1

[Letter to the Belorussian CP 31st Congress from the republic's artists' unions signed by N. N. Yeremenko, Belorussian SSR Union of Theatrical Performers; V. V. Zuyenok, Belorussian SSR Union of Writers; Ye. M. Kovalevskiy, Belorussian SSR Union of Architects; A. G. Dlotovskiy, Belorussian SSR Union of Designers; L. S. Yekel, Belorussian SSR Union of Journalists; I. M. Luchenok, Belorussian SSR Union of Composers; G. V. Buralkin, Belorussian SSR Union of Artists, and V. A. Nikiforov, Belorussian SSR Union of Cinematographers: "Letter From the Republic's Artists' Unions to the 31st Congress of the Belorussian Communist Party"]

[Text] Honorable Congress delegates!

We appeal to you in the name of the republic's artists' unions.

Today we are all united by a common goal—to bring our society out of the deep socio-economic and spiritual crisis, and to preserve the cultural and intellectual potential of our nation.

At the present time, new forms of party interaction with the socio-political forces, including also with cultural structures, are arising. We hope that the Congress of

Belorussian Communists will define the directions and methods of participation by party organs in the republic's cultural transformation.

What is important to us?

In our opinion, it is first of all necessary to recognize the dramatic state of our national culture. Its root system has been destroyed—the language, historical memory, and spiritual continuity of traditions. Legislative statutes which have been called upon to resurrect the lost values are still singular instances, and cannot change the situation.

Many cultural facilities are in a state of poverty or semi-poverty. The infrastructure for cultural provision to rural areas is developing very slowly. Belorussian-language periodical literature is in a catastrophic state. There is an acute shortage of shops, studios, rehearsal halls and cinema viewing halls. Practically none of the artists' unions have the necessary material conditions for pursuing their multi-functional cultural activity.

There is increased pressure on cultural leaders in the form of enslaving taxes.

This is only a small portion of the problems which demand the attention of all public forces.

At the current stage, there is a growing need for creating such structures which might effectively stimulate cultural processes. Specifically, we are proposing support—organizational and material—for the proposal to create culture funds under the Soviets—from the republic to the rayon. A certain portion of party funds could be transferred to these funds for financing cultural programs, which would be initiated by the party organizations themselves.

The creative intelligentsia is hopeful in its perception of the CPSU Central Committee resolution of 11 September 1990, "On immediate protective measures in the sphere of culture in connection with the transition to market relations". This resolution contains the following recommendation: "In individual regions where a crisis situation has arisen with the cultural material base, to examine the possibility of transferring certain buildings listed in the CPSU balance sheets to the needs of culture".

A positive initiative in this direction has been taken by the Vitebsk oblast party committee. We are referring to the transfer of the Belorussian Communist Party gorkom building to a professional theater.

We hope that the republic party organization, and primarily the Minsk oblast and Minsk city Belorussian Communist Party committees, will exhibit the same concern for the needs of culture. We must consider the fact that republic artists' unions—the Unions of Designers, Cinematographers, Composers and Artists—do not have buildings for meeting with viewers and listeners. These unions, like the Union of Journalists, also do not have houses of artistry where they can pursue

their professional labor and rest. They do not have them now and, because of their poverty, will not have them soon. This means that the republic's capital will be deprived of a number of professional cultural centers for a long time to come.

In artistic circles, where there are many communists, the following idea has legitimately arisen—to give the Minsk oblast Belorussian Communist Party committee's sociopolitical center building to the republic's artists' unions for creation of a Belorussian cultural center.

Only by universal efforts, utilizing new forms of cooperation, will it be possible to significantly improve the cultural situation in Belorussia.

It is still not too late for this.

Public Surveyed On Belorussian Sociopolitical Situation

91UN0530B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 28 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by A. Savastenko, deputy head of the Ideology Department, Belorussian CP Central Committee, and A. Kotlyarov, consultant in the Ideology Department, Belorussian CP Central Committee: "Where Are We Going And What Do We Think About This? Results of a Sociological Study"]

[Text] Sociological surveys conducted in February, April and October of 1990 allow us to see how public opinion has changed during the elapsed period of time, and how people now evaluate the socio-political situation in Belorussia. The figures which will be presented do not require particular commentary. They speak for themselves.

An analysis of the survey results has shown that people are unhappy with the situation which has arisen, and that tension in the republic has increased. Today only 3.5 percent of those surveyed believed that there is no tension, while in April this figure was four times greater. The emphasis has also shifted in problems of everyday life, which worry people most of all. While in April the problems of international conflicts, the growth in the crime rate and the shortage of goods headed the list, today it is the deterioration in the economic situation, the increase in the crime rate, and the weakening of authority in the country.

Respondents and experts repeatedly expressed the opinion that the complex political situation in the country and the destructive forces pushing people toward the abyss are largely to blame for the socio-economic situation which has been created, and that we need stable state authority and party discipline.

What are the means of solving the economic problems? The most widespread idea was the transition to a regulated market. However, it seems that the initial euphoria in public consciousness is already beginning to pass.

While in April this idea was supported by 66.5 percent of those surveyed, in October only 42.2 percent spoke out in favor of it. Moreover, the idea of a market is supported by 1.5 times more ITR [engineering-technical workers] and white collar workers than blue-collar workers and peasants. The number of people who fear unemployment has more than doubled. These people rightly believe that they cannot live comfortably on unemployment benefits.

The transition to the market is inevitable, but a regulated market must be oriented toward the social needs of the population. Most of the respondents spoke out primarily in favor of measures for social protection of the people, for giving enterprises full economic independence, and for equal rights of all forms of ownership. At the same time, the use of hired labor and the introduction of private ownership on means of production were supported by only one in four of those surveyed (blue-collar workers—18 percent, engineering-technical and white-collar workers—25.9 percent). Eight out of ten persons surveyed see the solution to the socio-economic problems in the restoration of prestige of honest, conscientious labor and in a fair wage according to the results of this labor.

The most difficult task today is the resolution of the food problem. Again and again the question arises: What agricultural enterprises are the most promising? Around 45 percent of those surveyed believe that these are kolkhozes, sovkhozes or agricultural cooperatives, 24.9—farmsteads and 22 percent—subsidiary private farms. We will note that peasants expressed a preference for collective forms of economic management as compared with farmstead management by a 5:1 ratio. At the same time, three times more blue-collar, engineering-technical, and white-collar workers expressed a preference for farmstead management as compared with persons who worked directly on the land.

The people of Belorussia have spoken out decisively in favor of the socialist path of development. Even under conditions when all around they hear affirmations that it is not the system which is important, but only that they be fed and clothed, only an insignificant portion of those questioned expressed a negative attitude toward socialism.

The same may be said of the attitude toward the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Over half of those surveyed believe that it is correct, even though it requires further development. In the opinion of one out of every 14 people, this theory is erroneous. However, the overwhelming majority of those who reject Marxist-Leninist teaching could suggest nothing to replace it.

The people are particularly concerned about the question of what force is capable of bringing the republic out of its crisis situation. In the opinion of those surveyed, the Belorussian Communist Party has the highest rating in the public consciousness. All other political parties

and public movements, including the BNF [Belorussian People's Front], were supported by only 13.5 percent of the respondents.

How do the republic residents see the Belorussian Communist Party? This is a party of socialist choice, independent within the membership of the CPSU, and having its own program. Its highest goal is to ensure the well-being of the Belorussian people. The party participates in managing state and public affairs through its representatives in the Soviets, state organs, and public organizations. That is what seven to eight out of every ten people surveyed think.

Most of those surveyed (and among communists, 3/4) support the basic principle of party structure—democratic centralism. The ideas of cooperation of Belorussian communists with all public forces acting in favor of renewal of society on a socialist basis (71 percent), participation of Belorussian CP members in mass movements operating within the framework of the law (69 percent), and inadmissibility of membership by communists in other organizations of anti-socialist directionality (61 percent) also received support. Six out of every 10 persons surveyed spoke out in favor of affirmation of the real power of the party masses and in favor of strict discipline.

Most of those surveyed favored affirmation in the public consciousness of the ideas of social justice, diligence, comradeship, mercy, kindness, and humanism. By creatively developing Marxist-Leninist theory and defending socialist and all-human values, we must ensure the free competition of views and ideas. That is what seven out of ten respondents believed.

The people are worried about the state of moral-educational work in the labor collectives. Its present level does not suit about half of those surveyed. The struggle against negative occurrences, against lawlessness and the shadow economy is being poorly waged. The republic residents gave an extremely low evaluation of the activity of the mass media in formulating all-human values and ideals. Only 9.8 percent of those surveyed called it effective. Complaints were expressed about the editorial offices of the youth newspapers LIMA, PRATSY and others.

The question of the future of the USSR is very acute today. The opinions differed here. 45.5 percent of those surveyed spoke out in favor of a confederation of free republics united by a Union Agreement. 36.9 percent supported a renewed federation, while 15.5 percent spoke out in favor of retaining the same state as we had before. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of Belorussian residents does not see any other prospects for the republic's development other than within the make-up of a union state.

This survey once again confirmed that the interrelations of people of different nationalities in Belorussia are on the whole acceptable to its residents. At the same time, people are concerned about the destructive activity of

individual elements which, in the opinion of the respondents, are not being sufficiently rebuffed by the state organs, party organizations, and people's deputies. Is this perhaps why almost every third respondent told us that inter-ethnic relations in the republic may take a turn for the worse in the near future, while only three percent believed that they would improve? 61.3 percent of those surveyed spoke out in favor of the active realization of the state program for development of the Belorussian language, while 89.3 percent had a positive attitude toward retaining Russian as the language of international communication.

We must remember that a dangerous politization of inter-ethnic relations has currently taken place. This fine and complex sphere encompasses not only masses of people, but each person and his vital interests individually. Therefore, it deserves the specific attention of both the party organizations and the organs of Soviet power.

Goals of Belorussian United Democratic Party Outlined

91UN0649B Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
2 Dec 90 p 2

[Interview with Stanislav Gusak, co-chairman of the Belorussian United Democratic Party, conducted by journalist Dmitriy Patyko: "‘To Undercut The Roots of Totalitarianism’, or What the New Party is Fighting For”]

[Text] As we have already reported, in early November a new political force announced its existence—the Belorussian United Democratic Party [ODPB]. Journalist Dmitriy PATYKO asked one of the ODPB co-chairmen, Stanislav GUSAK, to tell us in more detail about the goals and tasks of this socio-political organization.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Grigoryevich, first of all, let me say a few words about the new party's program. How does it envision the way out of today's crisis situation and the prospects for the republic's development?

[Gusak] At our constituent congress there were no principle differences of opinion regarding the program among the delegates representing different democratic currents. We see the rebirth of the real statehood of Belorussia through political and economic independence. The Democratic Party will strive to see that legislative, executive and judicial power, as in all civilized countries, are strictly separated, so that the political parties cannot interfere in the activity of state organs. This will help to undercut the roots of totalitarianism and to create a legal mechanism to rid society of misuse of power.

We also need decentralization of state control, development of local self-government, depolitization of the army, the militia, the KGB, the courts and the procurator's office, and de-ideologization of economics, culture, public education and other spheres of our life. These and other principles discovered and verified along the path

of mankind's democratic development must enter into the republic's new Constitution on the basis of a "General declaration of human rights" and other international legal statutes.

[Correspondent] Our readers are of course interested also in the economic section of the democrats' program.

[Gusak] There is no longer any doubt that the method of plan-distributive economics has proven to be entirely inconsistent. Our goal is the transition to normal economic life regulated by market mechanisms, with the provision that citizens be economically independent of the state as a condition of their true freedom. This presupposes the denationalization of state property and the full equality of all its aspects, the adoption of anti-monopoly legislation, and the provision of consumer interest protection.

Radical reform will also touch upon the rural areas, where the private sector will be formed, primarily on the basis of kolkhozes and sovkhozes which are operating at a loss. At the same time, we must create equal conditions for all forms of economic management. The land is to be given to the peasants without remuneration, and its inalienability is to be legally secured. Moreover, the state must repay its debt to the rural areas by giving economic aid to the formulation of individual farms at the expense of funds used to subsidize kolkhozes and sovkhozes which operate at a loss.

We believe that in order to revitalize the economy it is necessary to attract foreign capital. However, we are decisively against that financial aid from abroad which under current conditions will be used not for the transition to new forms of economic management, but for retaining the command-bureaucratic economy. The state has reserves to correct the situation without resorting to currency injections and without putting its hand in the pocket of the people. It is enough to moderate the appetites of the military department and to reject the so-called international aid—the support of non-viable regimes. Moreover, issuance of USSR credits makes the creditors allies of the unitarian state, which in turn will cause difficulties in the recognition of independent states from the disintegrating empire.

[Correspondent] Your program, as far as I have understood, differs little from the program of the Belorussian People's Front?

[Gusak] There are differences, but we do not place ourselves in opposition to each other. The BNF presents the task of achieving a flourishing economy and democracy through the solution of national problems. We, on the other hand, strive to achieve economic flourishing of the republic and solution of national problems through the democratization of society. In other words, the object and subject in the philosophical conception and the political doctrine of the BNF are the nation and the people, and of the ODPB—it is man, the individual. Nevertheless, these two forces will stand side by side.

[Correspondent] The emphasis on national problems is natural for the leaders of the front, and we can understand their concern. The language and national culture of the Belorussian people are really being threatened, and they must be saved. However, under conditions when most of even the native population holds an indifferent attitude toward these questions, such a placement of priorities has not allowed the BNF to secure mass support and to become the same serious force as, for example, "Rukh". Judging by everything, is it the distinction of the programs about which you spoke that gives us reason to assume that the United Democratic Party will receive a broader social base?

[Gusak] Judging by the questionnaires filled out by the people entering our party, its social base really may turn out to be broader. These are people who are about 40 years of age, with an average income—the artistic, scientific and technical intelligentsia, skilled workers and peasants. In short, they are hard workers who want to work and to earn. The BNF, on the other hand, rests primarily on the national intelligentsia and the youth. However, this is a conditional boundary. We do not intend to create a watershed, especially since many members of the ODPB are also members of the BNF. Together we will fight to see that our much-suffering people begin to live as they should.

[Correspondent] How do you intend to achieve this?

[Gusak] The ODPB is a party of the parliamentary type. We will propagandize our goals and, if they turn out to be in accord with the aspirations of the people, our candidates will receive the majority in the elections to the organs of power, and will be able to realize their outlined goals. The work will be conducted through the means of mass information, political clubs, public self-government committees, and at places of residence. For the time being, until the question of depolitization is resolved, our primary organizations will be created also at the workplaces. Already today they promise to be larger than the primary organizations of the communist party.

[Correspondent] By the way, in regard to the communist party. Some of the ODPB program principles have something in common with the documents adopted by the CPSU and the Belorussian Communist Party. Will it not turn out that you will fight with each other for the same goals?

[Gusak] The intentions proclaimed by the CPSU-Belorussian CP in the sphere of democratization of society and the transition to market relations do not in any way correspond to the real goals of the party apparatus, and it will not seriously fight for them. For it, raised on dogmatism and not having any other traditions except totalitarian, the democratic way of life does not promise rosy prospects... The example of the East European countries indicates that old political forces cannot be written into the new life and the people do not trust them under a democratic arrangement of society.

[Correspondent] I cannot help but ask about the event upon which certain newspapers continue to comment—the alternative meeting held before the Government House in Minsk on 7 November. There were ODPB members who participated in it, including you yourself. What is your attitude toward the conflict which took place there?

[Gusak] Of course, this incident was not an adornment of the meeting, and its organizers might have thought that the placing of “gifts” on the monument would evoke the counteraction of the militia. The meeting could well have done without such straining of relations. I would say that is not even the fault, but rather the misfortune of each of the sides, which proceed from that culture which we have inherited over the 73 years of Soviet rule. As for the illumination of all this in the press and on television, the events which have occurred are, as a rule, presented in a very biased manner. In the speeches presented at the meeting there was not only criticism of the existing order and the party apparatus (the most emotional moments were partially shown), but there were also some constructive proposals (this remained off-screen).

[Correspondent] The constituent congress has concluded its work. What is the party leadership doing now?

[Gusak] We have a great number of requests from organizations, enterprises, and individuals who want to familiarize themselves with the party program. Therefore, much time and money is spent on duplication of documents. The question of publication of a newspaper is being resolved. A commission on legislative initiatives has been created, and we are already attracting young political scientists, sociologists, economists, psychologists and other specialists to work on specific proposals. With them we will go to the republic Supreme Soviet and to the local Soviets, where there are deputies who have already joined the democratic party or who agree with its program.

[Correspondent] Although the communist party is losing its positions, it still has ample capacities to block any of your initiatives.

[Gusak] The situation is rapidly changing and, as the economic situation deteriorates, evidently the question of trust in the authorities and the question of unscheduled elections will arise. Very little time will pass, and we will be ready to say our word.

We are ready to meet every Thursday in the Minsk house of political enlightenment, auditorium number 102, with anyone who is interested in the position of the democratic party on various questions. You may write to us at the following address: Minsk, p/o 94, a/ya 299 (for ODPB); or telephone us at: 47-09-63 (Stanislav Grigoryevich Gusak) or 56-98-41 (Anatoliy Terentyevich Zhi-votnyuk).

We would be grateful to anyone who would lease us facilities of no less than 12 square meters, preferably with a telephone.

Support For Gomel Strike Committee Diminishes

91UN0649A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
20 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by A. Shkut, ZNAMYA YUNOSTI correspondent: “And Toward The Market—To the Left...”]

[Text] Eight months ago a city strike committee was created in Gomel. What has changed since that time?

A conference for representatives of the city's enterprises and its strike committees was held in the “Gomselmash” association's Palace of Culture. The purpose of the meeting was to analyze the work performed by the city strike committee since the time of its creation—12 May of this year. At that time, the wave of strikes which roared through the oblast and the city motivated their organizers toward joint action and toward coordination of efforts. And now the city strike committee which was created 8 months ago has decided to present a report.

The flood of people which carried me along the underground passageway made me think that all these people, like me, were hurrying to the conference—to the place where “fates are decided”... Alas, at the exit from the undercrossing the mass of people did not turn toward the Palace, but set off instead to the left, toward... the market. This seemed symbolic. I thought: What do my fellow citizens want more—to strike or to acquire the goods which they need?

Judging by the hall which was far from filled, and by the almost complacent atmosphere within it, everything associated with strikes no longer worries the city's citizens as it did 8 months ago. Even the reporting speech which was presented by the co-chairman of the city strike committee, Aleksandr Bukhvostov, did “not upset, did not guide and did not inspire” most delegates. However, for the sake of fairness we must ask: But, in general, is it possible to specifically evaluate the effectiveness of, say, such a large-scale action of the strike committee as “marches for survival”? And where is that measure which may be used to precisely determine the contribution of the strike committee or, on the other hand, the people's deputies into solving the problem of, for example, payment of “Chernobyl” subsidies to Gomel residents? In short, it is hardly prudent today to ascribe all the victories to a single “general”—the strike committee. Especially since even in the reporting speech there are not many such victories. Perhaps this is why the speaker's concluding words in support of the strike movement (“We must always have a loaded weapon in our hands!”) were perceived without the expected enthusiasm even by an audience which was so loyal to A. Bukhvostov.

Undoubtedly, the delegates were also disturbed by the fact that the speaker once again stressed the need for political neutrality of the strike committee, designating its purposes as purely “Chernobyl- oriented”. Finally, those who had gathered in the hall already knew that the former plant trade union leader Aleksandr Bukhvostov

has now become a trade union leader on a republic-wide scale. Well, and the attitude toward the "fugitives" in Gomel has for some time not been the most enthusiastic...

Then the discussions of the speech began. Unlike the constituent conference, this time they practically did not discuss the Chernobyl catastrophe, if we do not count the one or two questions concerning payment of monetary compensation and bringing officials to responsibility. Here is a brief list of the most widely discussed topics: The need for consolidating the strike committee with the "League of Women" (there is also such an organization in Gomel) and with the Elector's Club; disbanding the republic and union parliaments and holding emergency elections; granting Gomel the status of a free economic zone; demands addressed to the republic parliament to proclaim private ownership on land, and the impossibility of consolidation with the CPSU...

We might add that the last point was immediately reinforced in "deed". Belorussian CP gorkom Secretary Valeriy Nekrashevich, who had taken the podium and begun to tell the CPSU Central Control Commission work in Gomel for the purpose of evaluating the actions of officials in the post-accident period, was, to put it mildly, not allowed to finish. Here it seemed that if the chairman of the party apparatus were to speak out at the conference, he would immediately have been reprimanded for "fear of entering into dialogue". As they say, already in this he was guilty...

In regard to the second question on the agenda—the interrelations of the strike committee with the trade unions, the debates were short but emotional. It all came down to the need "to create independent trade unions, and not those which are 'a school of communism'". There was also an appeal for a general political strike, reinforced by the thought that: "The CPSU will not give up power voluntarily, and it is too long to wait for democratic methods".

There was also another turn of the topic. Since, they said, the strike committee is successfully fulfilling numerous functions of the oblast trade union, then... the conclusion is obvious. We might add that these changes are not that impossible... Who could not like the announcement by one of the strike committee leaders which resounded at the meeting: "We are against the transition to the market at the cost of reducing the living standard of the people! This must be only at the cost of the state!" This is pure populism, not secured by anything. But how attractive it is!

As a third point, the delegates reviewed the questions of improprieties the sphere of trade and in the distribution of housing. They angrily and, I must admit, rightfully denounced many leaders of oblast and city rank. They resolved to demand their dismissal. Here an almost fantastic idea occurred to us: What if tomorrow the appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies which had appointed these people to their official posts were to

present the question of dismissal of members of the strike committee? It would seem logical...

After the conference had concluded, I descended into the pedestrian undercrossing. When I came to the fork in the road, I turned without hesitation to the left. Toward the market. Debates are fine, but one still has to live somehow...

Moldovan Official Favors Party Unity

*91UN0700A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 7 Dec 90 p 2*

[Report of I.T. Gutsu, second secretary of the Moldovan CP Central Committee, at Moldovan CP Central Committee plenum: "Preserving the Unity of the Communist Party of Moldova"]

[Text] Comrades!

The question on the agenda of this plenum is not new. It was raised in the course of various debates on the eve of the 17th Moldovan CP Congress. And, as you know, despite the various rumors of an inevitable split, the congress definitely advocated the preservation of our party's unity and championed its unity. This imbued all the decisions of the congress, the Program of Renewal of the Communist Party of Moldova that was adopted, and the resolutions. This largely determined its significance for our party.

The 28th CPSU Congress and the new party rules strengthened even further the faith of each of us in the chosen path and the party's possibility of self-renewal, democratization in the spirit of the times, the adoption in society of a new, fitting place and the playing of an active part in the restructuring of all spheres of the life of our republic. Much has been done in this direction in the recent period.

The Central Committee notified the primary party organizations of the republic's Communists of this in a recent Central Committee letter.

Wide-ranging discussion of the draft Moldovan CP Rules is now under way in all components of the Communist Party of Moldova. They enshrine the independence of the Communist Party of Moldova. We are sure that this will be a good basis for the further cohesion of the Communists and all our ranks for ensuring that under multiparty conditions, the Communist Party of Moldova will be an influential political force.

We are having to address the question of unity today because since the 17th congress forces have begun to emerge in our ranks that have in one way or another been pushing the Communists and the primary and certain city and rayon party organizations toward the creation of a regional party organization of the Left Bank and withdrawal from the Communist Party of Moldova.

It has to be said that the Central Committee Bureau and Secretariat saw the inception of separatist tendencies

and acted to prevent their development, both in the Dnestr area and in the South.

Secretaries and members of the Central Committee Bureau met repeatedly with party activists of these areas. We participated constantly in gorkom and raykom [city and rayon party committee] plenums and expressed our position at the special conference of the Tiraspol city party organization, which was held this October, included.

Groups of members of the Moldovan CP Central Committee and party activists of Kishinev, Beltsy and a number of rayons were dispatched to areas of the Left Bank and the South.

In a word, while explaining its position, the Central Committee Bureau endeavored to find ways out of the current situation and prevent a spurring of separatist tendencies in the republic and division in the Communist Party.

In embarking on these and other actions we proceeded from a consideration of the actual political situation in which we all have to operate. Our movement toward the new character of the party and its new role and place in a multiparty society is proceeding in contradictory and complex manner.

We are very disturbed by the development of trends connected with communists' departure from the party and the reduction in the growth of its ranks. This year alone the numbers of the Communist Party have declined by more than 11,000. There has been a considerable increase in the number of workers, peasants, and members of the intelligentsia leaving the party.

Statutory discipline is diminishing, and many party organizations cannot extricate themselves from a state of disarray and apathy. Others are manifesting their assertiveness in the development of a campaign of opposition to the elective authorities.

The reasons here are various—from disagreement with the policy being pursued by the party and the position of the Central Committee through personal circumstances. There is confusion and an endeavor to "lie low," wait and see, and keep one's distance from the party. Many people do not know how to adapt to multiparty conditions or to find their place under the new conditions.

These processes have intensified markedly in connection with the growth in the republic of anticommunist manifestations, acts of vandalism and unconcealed pressure on individual Communists and the increased frequency of instances of the flouting of human rights and injury to man on a national basis.

Under the cover of certain provisions of the Decree on State Power in Moldova alone, ministers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, health care, science, and education and a number of leaders of enterprises and establishments have adopted administrative measures aimed at the elimination of the party organizations. As a result,

approximately 100 party organizations in Kishinev and dozens in Yalovenskiy, Teleneshtskiy, Feleshtskiy and other rayons have already ceased to exist.

In the current situation the Central Committee Bureau and Secretariat adopted, in our view, the necessary measures to forestall unlawful actions. A draft law on parties and organizations in the SSR of Moldova was drawn up and submitted to the republic parliament. Appeals were addressed to the president of the SSR of Moldova and the republic Supreme Soviet in connection with the infringement of the rights of the Communists, the pogroms against party buildings and the attempts to alienate party property.

At the same time, the sponsors of a regional party conference, of the Left Bank in particular, are unwilling to understand the complexity of the ongoing processes and the conditions of the activity of the Communist Party of Moldova.

The Moldovan CP Central Committee is aware of its responsibility for what is happening and is not absolving itself of the responsibility for the mistakes that have been made, tardiness and the lack of firmness of position. We openly told all Communists this in the well-known letter.

Yes, we have unequivocally condemned the separatist actions in the South and in the Dnestr region, the formation there of so-called union republics, the holding of elections and the formation of power structures. But everyone knows also that the Central Committee Bureau made a political appraisal of the decisions of the second congress of the Moldovan Popular Front connected with calls for a change in the system and of the name of the republic and the substitution for Moldovan distinctiveness of other concepts and categories. We condemned those who attempted to solve complex interethnic problems by power methods and who brought about the tragedy in Dubesary, and we demanded that proceedings be brought against the guilty parties.

The Central Committee has expressed its positions, it would seem, on the most serious issues, placed the emphases and proposed measures pertaining to a way out of the social and political crisis, on the basis of the plan of civic consensus "National Harmony in the SSR of Moldova" included.

We now need, it would seem, to act, having united the efforts of all Communists, who might disagree in some respects in terms of tactics, but who are united around a common idea and strategy: the unity of the republic and joint political struggle for the creation therein of a democratic socialist society; the unity of the Communist Party of Moldova and the renewal of its activity.

The Central Committee has supported and continues to support parliamentary, peaceful, civilized ways of solving the southern and Left Bank problems, by way of constructive dialogue, prudent compromise, and concord.

However, use has not been made of late not only of the possibilities of the Conciliation Commission but also of the assistance of the president of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Account is not being taken of the position of good will of the president and parliament of the republic. The refusal of people's deputies of the Left Bank to participate in the republic parliament in connection with the planned visit of M.S. Gorbachev was a serious political mistake.

All our endeavors to adopt with the party committees a number of joint actions have assumed a one-sided nature. The initiative is coming increasingly often only from the Central Committee, but we are not noticing a reciprocal step. And this is no accident.

Course was in fact set this October at a special conference of the Tiraspol party organization toward the preparation and organization of a party conference of the Dnestr region. There has since that time been no fundamental change in the position of the Tiraspol Gorkom or of other party committees of the Dnestr region either. Certain steps taken by the Bendery Gorkom Bureau to curb this trend led to criticism and the picketing of the building even for "apostasy."

The Central Committee Bureau believes that the growing development of events pertaining to the formation of a regional party organization of the Dnestr area is directly connected with the position of the party committees, which have long proceeded in the wake of these events, not attempting to counterpose to them their own specific actions. And while frequently criticizing the Central Committee for the lack of a position, what is more, they failed to express theirs even when the Central Committee was adopting fundamental decisions.

Thus the Tiraspol Gorkom failed to react and express its position in connection with the proposals of the Central Committee Bureau pertaining to a normalization of the social and political situation in the republic, the plan for civic consensus and so forth.

DIALOG, the newspaper of the city party organization, carried on 16 November 1990, the statement of the Moldovan CP Central Committee without any comment or the opinion of the gorkom or editorial board. And right on the next page information concerning the preparation of a regional party organization and proposals concerning the creation of a commission for the preparation of drafts of the appeal and platform of the Communists of the Dnestr area. It was with such a "pluralism" of opinions, if you please, that the city discussed the draft Communist Party of Moldova Rules and the Central Committee letter to the party organizations and Communists of the republic. Over 60 percent of the party organizations declined to discuss the draft rules.

What is the state of affairs in areas to the south of the republic? The raykoms are adhering to constructive, realistic positions and do not support the aspiration of some Communists to division. Thus a Komratskiy

Raykom Plenum on 17 November made an objective evaluation of the processes that have been taking place of late and attempted to channel the party organization's efforts into the consolidation and cohesion of the party ranks.

However, this position of the raykom is not a part of the plans of the leaders of the Gagauz Republic. For this reason the Gagauz Republic Supreme Soviet adopted on 28 November, and published in the rayon newspaper, a decree that condemns the allegedly ambiguous policy of the Moldovan CP Central Committee in respect of a solution of the problem of self-determination of the Gagauz people and recommended that the Communist rank and file and the party organizations make a scrupulous evaluation of the position of the leadership of the Komratskiy Raykom on the question of the Gagauz Republic.

In this same decree the Supreme Soviet recommended that the party organizations convene on 5 December 1990, a party conference to form the Communist Party of the Gagauz Republic on the Platform of the CPSU.

What conclusions may be drawn from this information? Primarily about which forces are prompting them and aspiring to the organizational division of the Communist Party of Moldova.

The initiative, as we can see, is coming from the local soviet authorities—the so-called supreme soviets of the Dnestr area and the Gagauz Republic—and the Communists elected to these bodies. They need their own parties for support of their separatist policy and ideological and organizational service thereof.

The Dnestr area is attempting to persuade us that people there adhere to the platform of the CPSU and that relations are being severed out of ideological considerations. But let us turn to the program documents of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Moldova. They contain no fundamental differences or contradictory propositions. Just as the CPSU Rules and the draft rules of the republic Communist Party do not.

Mention has to be made in this connection of the primary organization secretary councils. As you know, in creating these horizontal structures at city and rayon level we placed big hopes in them, on questions of a strengthening of the connection and trust between the highest elective bodies and the party masses particularly. But, as can be seen, the secretary councils on the Left Bank have begun their work not with the practical implementation of the decisions of the congress and the provisions of the new rules and realization of the rights of the primary organizations to independence, but mainly with one problem—the division and split of the Communist Party of Moldova.

Nor can we today be satisfied with the position and the actions that are being manifested at this time by the first secretaries of the gorkoms and raykoms of the Dnestr

area and the South and also the members of the Central Committee representing these regions.

The threat of a split in the Communist Party of Moldova is a serious problem. It should disturb all party committees of the republic, particularly of Kishinev, where many party organizations tacitly support the idea of a split. The anticipated number of Communists who would quit the Communist Party of Moldova and join the ranks of a new party is being cited even.

We believe that the time has come when the Central Committee must speak with all certainty about the centrifugal trends in the party organizations of the Dnestr area and the South of the republic. Their further development would not only lead to the division of the Communist Party but would in fact remove it from the political arena of the republic.

Hitherto we have had the moral right to declare that the Communist Party of Moldova, being multinational in composition, integrates within it all the processes occurring in the republic and could act as a force consolidating society. Our general strategy has amounted to sublating the extremes arising in the republic's political life and pursuing a policy of the normal development of the restructuring, democratic processes.

The formation of regional party organizations would irreversibly weaken the ranks of the Communist Party of Moldova and lead to its self-disbandment and self-liquidation as an influential force. This could only benefit our opponents, our political enemies. This would essentially be a betrayal of the interests of all who live in these parts. Whether the leaders of the Dnestr area like it or not, this is what would happen.

The Central Committee Bureau does not believe that there is no way out of the current state of affairs. We believe that it is necessary to appeal directly to the Communists of these areas and cities and explain to them the disastrous nature of their actions, both for the Communist Party of Moldova and for the CPSU as a whole. We hope that our appeal will be heard by the Communists of the Left Bank and the South. We are sure that there are many healthy party forces here.

But this needs to be done for the added reason that, as our extensive contacts with the Communists of these regions show, many of them have themselves not defined their positions, had succumbed to emotions of the moment, and have joined the opposition to what really is not in keeping with the spirit of perestroika in the republic and what has always been and continues to be condemned by the Communist Party of Moldova. Consequently, we need all the more to look for a solution together, we need to be together to the end, and we need to preserve our unity—the party's main weapon.

We believe that it is necessary to continue our consultations with Communists directly in the primary organizations. It is necessary to come to grips with everything right here, in each organization individually. And each

party official, from secretaries, members of the Bureau, and members of the Central Committee, should participate in this work.

We believe it necessary that the question of party unity be discussed at gorkom and raykom plenums. Our future lies in open, honest party dialogue at all levels and the restoration of trust and comradeship.

A sociological survey of Communists of the Dnestr area, in which more than 1,200 persons took part, was conducted recently. Its results testify that a broad base has been preserved with us for unity of goals and actions and an understanding of the complexity of the situation and the possibilities of its solution.

Why, then, given the mutual interest in a solution of these problems, do we have no unity and mutual understanding? Is it not because we are listening to one another, but not hearing; speaking, but not understanding; understanding, but not doing. We need to precisely determine our position from the viewpoint of joint actions based on concord and reasonable compromise.

In fact, it is toward this that the 17th Moldovan CP Congress orients us. The firmness of our position is precisely the fact that we have acted and are prepared to continue to act given unswerving compliance with its decisions, with regard, naturally, for the new realities. It is important that the Communists of the Dnestr area and the southern parts of the republic now act on this basis also. All problems need to be solved by exclusively political means. We are sure that there is no question that is not ultimately soluble by peaceful, political means.

The Central Committee Bureau deems it essential to adopt at this plenum an appeal to the Communists of the Dnestr area and the South of the republic. Our task is to persuade them that under the conditions of tough political struggle and the antiparty aspirations in society, unity of the party ranks is the best guarantee for the realization of the program tasks of the successful renewal of the Communist Party of Moldova.

From the platform of the Moldovan CP Central Committee Plenum we appeal to all Communists of the Dnestr area, the South and the whole republic to preserve as the apple of their eye the unity of the party, the cohesion of our ranks, trust and party comradeship. We believe in your good sense, prudence and wisdom.

The fate of the party is in the hands of all us Communists. We must be together to the end. Only this path will ensure the unity of the party and its worthy future.

Moldovan CP Official on Party Property
91UN0678A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 23 Nov 90 p 2

[Interview with V.I. Tsurkan, leader of the legal group in the Moldovan CP Central Committee, by Yu. Trofimov]

of the Moldovan CP Central Committee press center; place and date not given: "Only the Law Can Guarantee Justice"]

[Text] As has already been reported, in connection with the increasing instances of picketing in the republic and the seizure of buildings occupied by public organizations operating under the law, Moldovan SSR President M.I. Snegur has sent a special letter to the chairmen of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies in the Moldovan SSR. In that letter he asks that property rights be respected and that all actions at variance with the principles of a rule-of-law state and with existing legislation be eliminated.

We discuss the reasons for the appearance of the letter and the attitude of the Moldovan CP Central Committee toward instances of the seizure of party property in an interview with V.I. Tsurkan, the leader of the Moldovan CP Central Committee legal group.

[Trofimov] Vladimir Ivanovich, what, in your opinion, has provoked the desire to seize party property? What legal significance does the letter of Moldovan SSR President M.I. Snegur have?

[Tsurkan] In the present extremely tense situation, certain destructive forces have decided that this is the right moment for them to be able to achieve "social revenge." An unbridled anticommunist campaign has been unleashed in the republic with the aim of driving the Moldovan Communist Party from the political arena. Moreover, today this is not being limited just to appeals and threats and insults directed against the party. People who have been deceived and confused and who have trustingly accepted the false words of politicians and demagogues are being drawn into picketing the buildings of the rayon party committees [raykoms] and are engaging in the seizure and destruction of party property. Unfortunately, a considerable number of citizens are participating in these illegal acts, including women and children. Instances of this have taken place in Kishinev, Kakhula and Dungeny, and in Dondyusheskiy, Kantemirskiy, Kelerashskiy, Orkheyskiy, Floreshtskiy and other rayons.

It is most unfortunate that all of this is taking place not only with the complicity of particular Moldovan SSR people's deputies and local soviets, which are called upon to stand guard over rights and the law, but even with their blessing. For example, sessions of the soviet of people's deputies in Frunzenskiy Rayon of Kishinev city and in Streshenskiy Rayon adopted unfounded decisions that encroached on party property and are at variance with the laws in force in the country and the republic. It is a cause for concern that arbitrary rule is to come extent also encouraging inactivity by law enforcement organs, that are not exposing guilty persons or making them liable.

And strangest of all, this is all being done by people who in words are calling for civilized behavior and observance of legal standards. But where and when has lawlessness been affirmed by law?

And so, in these circumstances Moldovan SSR President M.I. Snegur sent a letter to the chairmen of the rayon and city soviets of people's deputies. The letter notes that such actions are in total contradiction of the principles of a rule-of-law-state and existing law, and proposes that all the measures envisaged in such cases to guarantee protection of property rights be adopted, and that unlawful decisions on nationalization of the property of public organizations and mass movements be rescinded, and that restraint be shown in issuing any kind of ultimatum, and that all issues arising be resolved only on the basis of existing legislation.

[Trofimov] To judge from published documents, the Moldovan CP Central Committee is holding to this same position...

[Tsurkan] That is quite correct. The Moldovan CP Central Committee has repeatedly stated that the situation that has taken shape in the republic with respect to party property not only contradicts the standards of law and morality but also can in no way be in line with the principles of a rule-of-law state and existing law, nor with the ukase issued by the USSR president on 12 October 1990 "On Measures To Protect the Inviolability of the Law on Ownership in the USSR," or international legal standards.

Accordingly, no kind of passion of the kind whipped up at meetings, nor power pressure should prevail when issues of ownership are being resolved. Here there can be only one yardstick to insure justice, namely, respect for the law.

Incidentally, I would like to emphasize that the Moldovan Communist Party is in no way laying claim to some kind of privilege in protecting its own rights as an owner. Moreover, as has been reported in the press, giving due consideration to the complexity with respect to free areas, virtually all city party committees and raykoms have found it possible to locate in their own buildings many organizations and establishments that do not have any direct relationship with the structural subdivisions of the party apparatus. You can see that here, too, the party is not trying to gain some kind of monopoly position, but believes that it has the right, along with other owners, to count on an effective state guarantee and protection of its property rights and interests.

Aims of CP Party Club in Moldova Detailed
91UN0680A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 23 Nov 90 p 2

[G. Pavlenko report on first meeting of the party club of the Moldovan Communist Party: "The Party Club and a Mass of Problems"]

[Text] The first meeting of the party club took place recently at the Political Culture Center. It was chaired by I.T. Gutsu, secretary of the Moldovan CP Central Committee.

Party clubs are not something we invented; they have existed for a long time in other countries, and still do. And finally, after becoming a parliamentary party, the Moldovan Communist Party decided that this form is very necessary today. "We have gathered here," it was said when the meeting opened, "to talk about how to organize the work of the party clubs not only in Kishinev but in every city and rayon in the republic. Party meetings do not always offer the opportunity for communists to express their opinions, even less engage in dispute on any particular problem."

"It must be said," I.T. Gutsu noted, "that the situation in the CPSU and the Moldovan Communist Party is now very serious... Difficult work is being done to restructure the party." It was the opinion of the chair that we do nevertheless have a foundation on which it is possible to erect a renewed building. This foundation is the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and its Platform, and the new CPSU Rules. And no matter how some may try to suggest that the party has no clear prospects and that the CPSU is lost, this is all untrue according to I.T. Gutsu, and people have simply not understood what has happened. And the opinion that party restructuring (and hence its survival) is a reality is being confirmed everywhere.

At the same time the chair did admit that party restructuring is proceeding sluggishly, and that confusion and apathy reign at many levels, along with a "state of numbness," particularly among the party aktiv. Our primary party organizations are paralyzed and are unable to take a single step to get moving. And this at a time when the independence of the primary party organizations is proclaimed both in the CPSU Rules and in party decisions! Never before have the party rayon committees [raykoms] enjoyed such rights, but the Moldovan CP Central Committee is itself deciding everything here, at the local level... And no one has telephoned from Moscow for months. Why?

For example, the primary party organizations have been given the right of admittance to the party. Now people do not have to be led through the raykoms and commissions... But since the 28th Congress, only 20 of the 5,200 primary party organizations have exercised that right.

We dictate nothing to anyone—how many meetings to hold each year, what should be on the agenda... But up to now no one is in any hurry to take advantage of this independence.

It is important, I.T. Gutsu said, that everyone now analyze the situation. Both in the Moldovan Communist Party and in the rayon, city, and primary party organizations. Who do we have left? With whom can we work? Who are these communists? To what extent is the party

position held among them, if at all? If our party organization is suffering from many diseases then we should know what those diseases are. Perhaps the primary party organization person is inactive because there is no leader; we must find a leader, and we must determine what the party organizations should be doing. It cannot be ruled out that it may be necessary to rid ourselves of some communists—the ballast. And finally, if a party organization is in general incapable it should be disbanded! And the communists who can work and want to work can be registered with other party organizations. All these processes are difficult, but we must pass through them absolutely at all levels.

Today, when we think about what kind of party we need we must first of all recognize that previously we were the state party, and the party was set into the state and bureaucratic system. The party made a decision and all the rest complied with it; it was the party that selected cadres, the party that decided literally everything; and today we are paying for that. Neither the Council of Ministers nor the Supreme Soviet had total independence. Now, when the administrative command system is being dismantled, we must decide what kind of a party we want. For there is a diversity of decisions. But if we speak on the large scale, then we will create a new party! A real political party!

Let us try to model it by taking into account the conditions in our republic. The first thing that we must take into account is that we can no longer command. There will be no return to the old "state" party. And to those who say that the communists will again come to power and that everything will be as it was before we say this: Yes, the communists will come to power, but in a new capacity! They must gain an overwhelming number in the parliament and in the organs of soviet power, in management organs, and so forth. Today many people are saying that our party should become the opposition to the organs of power, and are urging us to do this. To criticize the parliament and the government and so forth. But we will not take that kind of position. It is, of course, the simplest thing to do what the People's Front did—become an opposition, criticize everything, and bear responsibility for nothing. And it should be remembered that we have many communists working in state organs, and that they constitute a majority in the parliament. And so, I.T. Gutsu said, we cannot be an opposition to the official organs in the republic. Yes, we will be in opposition, but at this moment, when the organs of soviet power have not yet been formed, when they need our support, when we as the former ruling party bear the blame for many of the failures in the recent past, we cannot move to confrontation. But of course, we will criticize the government. We will not be answerable for government actions with which we disagree. But the main task is to exert a real influence on the processes that are now taking place in our lives. There is more: a policy of national consensus. This is, to put it graphically, the forward front for the communists in our republic. We must also be involved in the resolution of questions

connected with stabilizing the national economy. One serious problem is explanatory work among the masses. We no longer have the institutions of agitation or the political information workers and propagandists that we had earlier. And today, people are complaining and saying that no one is there, no one is explaining what is happening in the party and what its position is on particular issues.

That is, proceeding from real and vital needs and analyzing the processes taking place in society, we must help people understand everything correctly.

We advocate a party of the new type, flexible and realistic. We no longer ourselves call ourselves the vanguard party; let the people do that if the communists deserve it. And if you and I build a rule-of-law state then we will also become a parliamentary party. Accordingly, said I.T. Gutsu, already today we must prepare ourselves for the upcoming elections, even if they are not to take place soon. We must continue to create party sections in all the electoral districts. At the same time we must be the party around which the various democratic movements whose goals do not diverge from our aims consolidate.

Today, however, many comrades want everything to be depoliticized and stripped of its party content... In general, I consider this terminology incorrect, I.T. Gutsu stated. Abroad you will find nothing that stands entirely outside politics. If one party departs, another, with its own ideology, appears in its place. So that the question of removing the party factor contradicts world practice. Notwithstanding, this idea has even been seized upon by a number of communists. They are now saying that party organizations must be removed from production facilities... And this is already being done. Accordingly, we must have communists registered not with the housing maintenance sections but in the rayon sections of the Moldovan Communist Party.

We must give due consideration to the fact that today there is also a liquidationist trend within the party... On the one hand people are trying to persuade Moldovans to leave the party since they cannot be in the same party as Pologov, Smirnov, and the others. And they are trying to persuade Russians to leave the party so that they do not have to be with Luchinskiy and the others. And entire primary party organizations have already ceased to exist.

In short, there are many dangers. Nevertheless, the party does still enjoy authority. When the plenum was taking place an emissary came to us in the hall from the "people's parliament"—that mob that has been blocking the Central Committee. And he said this, quite correctly: You should be pleased that we have come to you. And we have come because we believe that the Moldovan Communist Party is the most important political force capable of preventing the dismemberment of the republic.

We are now choosing delegates for the upcoming conference. The task of the conference is to provide an accurate

analysis of the situation and find a solution to the crisis. The conference is also to adopt the Moldovan Communist Party Rules. Incidentally, we are adopting our own rules not because we do not like the CPSU Rules but because we have specific conditions. The party will have to carry out a registration, and without an independent set of rules we will be unable to do that.

We have put forward a project for civic consensus. We will insist that it be adopted by the parliament. And it is not happenstance that the first secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee has now become the chairman of the conciliation commission. This is our real platform for achieving civic consensus.

* * *

After I.T. Gutsu's speech many questions were asked of the comrades sitting in the presidium. Communists expressed doubts about the need to adopt new rules, and there were many questions on the future law on citizenship and the Union treaty, and there were many complaints that the situation is not being clarified and that the position of the Central Committee is not always made clear to people. Everyone, however, was unanimous that the opening of a party club is a matter of extraordinary importance and urgency, and that these kinds of clubs should be set up everywhere, and that their recommendations should be considered in practical work.

Without considering that we have any right to "insert an evaluation," we nevertheless must raise several puzzling questions.

—If the Moldovan CP Central Committee believes that organizing the work of party clubs is such an important matter, why at the first organizational meeting was only one member of the Bureau present, who, moreover, was in a great hurry to go off to some other meeting?

—If the role of some kind of unique tactical laboratory is being assigned to the party clubs, what would stop them from being legitimized by making a proviso in those same Moldovan CP Central Committee Rules or in some separate provision concerning the rights of such formations and their status.

—If we are about to restructure the party or even set up a new one, then it is probably not worth starting work with steps that use the old and not always justified methods, for example, instead of lively debate "as equals," making people listen to some factual report or presenting speeches prepared beforehand when it is obvious to everyone that they are not needed, and so forth.

A new enterprise must be tackled in a new way. And it is probable that new people are needed for that.

Ukrainian View of Moscow Congress

91UN0640A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKAYA ZNAMYA
in Russian 18 Dec 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by parliamentary correspondent KOMSOMOLSKAYA ZNAMYA V. Dolganov: "What About the Congress?...: Unorthodox Thoughts at the Threshold of the Kremlin"]

[Text] Something that is a paradox at first glance—this USSR Congress of People's Deputies has had practically no influence on the usual workday rhythm of the life of the capital. On Monday morning we talked on the street with many Muscovites and asked them all one and the same question: For what is this day noteworthy? There were many different answers, but only a couple remembered that in literally two-three hours the chords of the anthem of the Soviet Union would be sounding under the arches of the Kremlin hall—the congress would begin.

Will democracy develop further? Will the forces that wish to restore the old ways slow it down? These questions trouble many people's deputies as well as the majority of the country's population today. Will the consolidation of presidential power contribute to the development of democratic institutes? Yu.N. Shcherbak and S.M. Ryabchenko, USSR people's deputies from the Ukraine, probably argued heatedly about this when they flew from Kiev in the same plane with us. In any event, they conversed animatedly during the whole trip to Moscow. By the way, special limousines for people's deputies were not brought to the door of the plane in either Borispol or in Vnukovo.

Now, about what is being discussed in the corridors. It is presumed that the congress will last 10 days—that is how many days of per diem subsistence allowance the participants were given. There are rumors that, in addition to issues included in the agenda by the president and the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, other more private questions will also be examined. For example, the recent transfers to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. As for V.V. Bakatin, there is active discussion of his "banishment with honor" to the embassy in Canada. We will see, we will see...

Here is what People's Deputy Yu.P. Vlasov thinks about the long-term development of the political situation in the country:

"To enlist Gorbachev on the side of the democrats—this is currently the most fashionable idea. I say 'fashionable' because I do not take this idea seriously. I see its menace and danger for democratic transformations in the country. Yes, many people in society are talking about the need for reconciliation and national harmony. This idea is supported by prominent writers and many public figures; the president often talks about it. And in general the idea of reconciliation may seem attractive to our tormented and exhausted people... But there is no national harmony in society and cannot be inasmuch as

the goals of the two main forces—the communists and the democrats—are absolutely different and diametrically opposed. The communists wish to preserve their power and all the might of their repressive apparatus. Our goal is to deprive them of power and build a democratic society."

Gorbachev must be given his due: Thanks to him the Soviet Union has quit being the source of military threat in the world, our society has become more open, and the world has begun to trust us. The West is grateful to Gorbachev and prepared to close its eyes to much that is happening inside our country. In general it must be said that in international and domestic policy there are two completely different Gorbachevs.

* * *

Who has looked forward to it with hope and who has been dreading it? What will the congress resolve? Will it come up with a way out of the crisis which is increasingly devouring society, will it make any fundamental, fateful decisions, and will it resolve longstanding and approaching conflicts or make them still worse?

Do you remember May 1989? How we all looked forward to the congress, how we relied on it and believed in the success of the great reforms! Now the pessimists and skeptics are clearly in the ascendancy. And millions of people are not going to wrench themselves away from their concerns in order to observe the discussions and debates in the Kremlin Palace as though they were a riveting drama. We are all tired. We are tired of endless chatter, drafts, and projects, of laws and edicts that do not work and that often are doomed ahead of time to be only "window dressing" and nothing more.

The center continues to play its political game. The progress of the game does not attract any new adherents and only repulses ever greater numbers of people. Because the scenarios repeat themselves. And the "cues" of the "actors" in this drama begin to remind one of a farce. The "intrigues of destructive forces" has changed into a "parade of sovereignty declarations." And how are we to figure out which is the parade and which is the sincere desire of the people to be sovereign? Sovereignty of Russia and the Ukraine is clearly not to the liking of the center. It is a "parade." But the "independence" of the Dnestr Republic and the "autonomy" of South Ossetia are "serious problems" which should be discussed.

Personally, I look forward to the congress with alarm. Because the results of this "great all-Union forum" (in the words of A.I. Lukyanov) have been determined in advance. Nor is it too difficult to guess the course of events. Doors will be slammed (by the Balts, the Georgians, and who else?), and there will be indignant speeches by official "parliamentary excavator operators":

"Like all the Soviet people and like all the voters, I deeply resent the unconstructive position..." etc., etc.

Then the voting will begin and the majority will get what they want. No, not the majority—the center. Just as before there will be applause from the “Central Asian sector” carried out at the command of the “directors”—the secretaries of the Communist Parties from that area. There is no doubt that this region has been elected the chief support of the center. And it is not that Nazarbayev is under consideration for the post of vice president or prime minister, nor is it that Kirghizia and Turkmenia unreservedly support the Kremlin’s interpretation of the new Union treaty. Central Asia is a sure bet. There are still a hundred years to go before they begin perestroika.

The USSR Supreme Soviet is also a sure thing. The words of Yuriy Afanasyev exploded like a bomb at the first congress, which elected the “Brezhnevist-Stalinist” parliament. But neither then nor later did anyone try to analyze why the leader of the “interregionals” rank such different epochs together. And there were grounds for it. Four sessions of the parliament have confirmed that the Supreme Soviet, just as in past decades, has turned into the submissive executor of the will of the presidium, uncomplainingly rubber-stamping the laws and approving candidates for various posts. And although, for example, the minister of railways “squeezed” into his office by hook or by crook on the third try, the latest shuffles in the cabinet took place quickly, painlessly for the candidates, and rather peacefully. No one asked V.F. Yakovlev how he dared, clearly having done nothing at the level of enforcing justice, to migrate to the post of chief state arbitrator. And a question concerning the transfers to the MVD, about which the president did not even inform the parliament in advance, was completely ignored.

Eighteen months ago even that parliament which was called “Brezhnevist-Stalinist” ceased to exist.

It lost its brighter representatives, who transferred to another side of the Kremlin square and took up posts in the government of Russia. It lost the Balts, who lost faith in the possibility of doing anything in it. And the “old guard” have increasingly set the tone in this dutiful assembly. See how Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov and Valentina Semenovna Shevchenko and less famous people from among the “cohorts of the stagnant area” have assumed primary roles. They have done much to bring the country to its present position. One of my colleagues does not like the songs of Igor Talkov at all. But in my opinion he is right on the money:

“The man who was on the throne yesterday / is still there today...”

Only the most naive people believe that power will be surrendered without a fight and that the black limousine will easily be exchanged for the blue wagon of the subway.

The further the Supreme Soviet goes, the more it disowns responsibility for the fate of the nation. At first it rubber-stamped the February governmental program which completed the collapse of the economy. Later it

gave away, one after the other, the majority of its powers to the president, simultaneously “blackballing” the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy market concept. And for all practical purposes it did not react to the appearance of interethnic enmity, making apparat-style decisions after the damage had been done.

What is the congress deciding? To allot the president such powers as even Gaius Julius Caesar never dreamed of? The president already has them—there is nothing more to be done in that direction. To permit him to introduce arbitrary rule in “disobedient” regions? But what is that going to change, judging by the Ukraine? It is even possible to introduce a curfew and other such attributes of a “state of emergency.” For how long? How will the people view this? For the time being the eastern section of the Ukraine is gravitating toward Moscow, not Kiev. The western section has leaned toward Lvov. This is a fact. But neither the one nor the other will accept a “state of emergency” for one simple reason: There is practically nothing for the center to offer the Ukraine. The “Basic Directions” for a transition to a market only put the prospect of a market further off. And it is difficult to force someone to work for a “thank you” and an award certificate for shock work. It is possible, of course, to use the knout. It is possible to introduce moratoriums on rallies and strikes and prohibit the activities of new public organizations. But it was not these associations, generated by Gorbachev’s perestroika, that adopted, for example, the infamous Council of Ministers Decree No. 608, which still has not been carried out. And it is not their fault that the shelves of the stores have been emptied, and the word “famine,” so terrifying and horrible, is not associated with 1929 or even with 1947, but with 1990-1991. One ardent adherent of the “strict course” from among the all-Union parliamentarians recently tried to convince me that a strong authority always feeds the people. Malicious tongues are proposing (I do not answer for these rumors) that the conservatives have actively been filling the warehouses of the NZ (reserve stocks), and at the necessary moment basic food goods will appear in the stores. Who knows, such a thing may happen. But an alarmed people, buying up everything they can get their hands on “to stock up,” will sweep up these poor leavings all too quickly. And afterward? There will be nothing to eat, but the “emergency measures” will remain.

What is the congress preparing for us?—this is not at all a rhetorical question. While it may be clear to the majority of USSR people’s deputies, something very different has become clear to many in the republic. The rebirth of the nationalist consciousness of the peoples is an historical process. And they can only join the Union voluntarily. Only when they feel the economic, political, and moral need for such a Union. Even now we feel it and understand that each will fail on his own. But the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics as it is currently proposed is not in fact appearing. Because they are again telling us from the Kremlin how we must live and build

relations with one another. Because we ourselves do not allot powers to a center that is so necessary to any association of states, but rather it personally (like God) determines what remains "on high" and what to hand over to the "plebeians."

They tell us to develop entrepreneurialism, and they tax enterprising people to death. We should not take part in military adventures like Afghanistan, they affirm from the high tribunals, and they speak about dragging the Union into the Persian conflict... And so one and so forth. And after this a high Army bureaucrat reproaches the Ukraine severely; how, he says, did the Ukraine dare to make a decision on the service of youths on its territory. The chief of the KGB is concerned that certain political associations are fighting for power undemocratically. Just as the current ruling party, which initially won power with demands for convocation of a Constituent Assembly, the transfer of land to those who work it, and power to the soviets, came to that same power by parliamentary methods.

Yes, Academician Dmitriy Likhachev is right four times over: First and foremost the people do not have enough culture, morals, love for their neighbor, and ability to share his burdens and cares. Look around: The adherents of Polozkov are demanding "expropriation of the expropriators" and the "democrats" are hurrying to get hold of the cushy spots and push away from the feeding trough those who have grazed beside them for decades.

One cannot envy the president in this instance, trying to reconcile the irreconcilable and harmonize what cannot be harmonized. One gets the impression today that his fund of patience is running out and that he is counting on a last chance—a strong central authority. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet demands ever more insistently that the provisions of the existing Constitution be carried out. But should it be forgotten that only those things that do not contradict the goals of the communist system in the USSR are acknowledged to be necessary and correct in those provisions?

The rabbits in Iskander's tale believe in the colorful cabbage sewn on their banner. Shall we continue to set our hopes on a "bright future" when the rule will be "from each according to his means, to each according to his needs"?

People are increasingly saying that it is not enough to build for their great great grandchildren but that they themselves want to live. Even if it is in "decaying capitalism." Worse yet, how is it possible to believe that our children will have a good future if we have no faith in the future itself? God forbid that weapons will thunder and tanks will crawl along the streets of cities in that future. But there is another negative version of the development of events whereby, under the drum roll of biting deputies' speeches, the democratic victories of perestroika will be eliminated step by step. Everything is possible.

In a recent interview with KOMSOMOLSKAYA ZNAMYA one of the leaders of the Ukraine tried to insist that in the near future the opposition between the center and the republic will be resolved in favor of the latter. But the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies which has begun will hardly help that process. And that means that we can look forward to even more difficult and vague times.

When you have nothing left to give, give vent to your grievances. It was not I who said that but Svyatoslav Fedorov, USSR people's deputy. But for the time being one cannot even count on doing that.

Weaknesses of Ukraine's Rukh Examined

91UN0689A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 1,
Jan 91 p 5

[Article by Professor I. Khmel, doctor of historical sciences and member of the Ukrainian Republic Council of Veterans: "Rukh: Drifting Toward Which Bank?"]

[Excerpts] *Many of our paper's readers are disturbed by the policy being pursued by the Ukrainian Rukh [People's Movement for Perestroika]. Talking today about its second all-Ukraine assembly, which was held in October, we say: Let that which was positive, for whose sake Rukh was formed, be manifested in the activity of this social and political movement in the new year of 1991.*

The Second All-Ukraine Rukh Assembly (Congress) was held at the end of October last year in Kiev. The assembly took place over four days in the prestigious "Ukraina" Palace of Culture. The 27th Communist Party of the Ukraine Congress had conducted its business in this palace three months earlier, and the Rukh leaders did not pass up the opportunity to make meaningful mention of this as some kind of "portent" and evidence of "change in the political situation".

[Passage omitted]

It was heard from the rostrum continually that the Soviet Union was a "neocolonial superpower" and "giant GULAG," that the Union center was a "nationally featureless exploiter," and that the CPSU and the Communist Party of the Ukraine were "colonizers and fellow countrymen collaborators," "frenzied international imperialists"....

The opinions sustained in such malicious cliches were subsumed in the uniform conclusion, brooking no alternative, formulated by I. Drach: "Only the complete sovereignty of the Ukrainian people and a fully independent Ukrainian state correspond to the current development of world civilization." In the words of S. Konev, people's deputy of the USSR, "the removal of the Communist Party from power at all levels" was defined as a principal direction of struggle for the achievement of this goal. Ya. Chernovil, people's deputy of the Ukrainian SSR and chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, shared his experience of how this

should be done. "We have for the first time," he said, "decisively removed the Communist Party from power and banned it from interfering in economic, administrative, and personnel affairs and for the first time legalized national symbols together with the so-called official symbols, which still exist."

Denying the CPSU any role in society whatever, the same I. Drach, in the same terms in which it defined itself earlier, ascribed to Rukh the "organizing and directing role." He maintained that "there is in the Ukraine no force other than Rukh that could consolidate within it all democratic trends and act as the main weapon against the authoritarian power that exists in the republic currently."

It would, of course, be an oversimplification to underestimate Rukh, as I. Plyushch, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, observed, addressing the assembly on its second day. Rukh emerged on the wave of politicization of broad strata of the population brought about by the restructuring processes and emerged objectively, and it has to be reckoned with.

The profound crisis in which our society had found itself sharply posed questions concerning its causes and solutions. And Rukh synthesized a particular vision of entirely real problems by particular, entirely real categories of society.

Representatives of the artistic intelligentsia, persons of the "free professions," as they say, became the pioneers of Rukh and in Rukh. The most bombastic of them were certain writers, those who, what is more, however paradoxical, at the time of stagnation extolled more colorfully and loudly than others both the party and its deeds, "earning" the titles and decorations of prizewinners. Given perestroika, they began with the same zeal to denounce all that had gone before, counting on making political capital in bids for election as people's deputies. Their position became particularly hard-line when they quit the CPSU and became renegades.

Who, however, accepted their vision of the situation and constituted their social base? To some extent those who have suffered from our economic disorders, permanent shortages, and crime epidemics. But Rukh's main social base is composed of the following: first, the descendants of the formerly expropriated classes who have lapsed into the consciousness of the "gene pool" of their forefathers; second, children and grandchildren of the victims of Stalin's terror, with whose traumas we cannot help but sympathize; third, persons who were punished for their collaborationism during the war and participation in the terrorist activity of the OUN-UPA [Ukrainian Nationalist Organization-Ukrainian Insurrection Army] after the war; fourth, part of the generation that actively became a part of life at the time of the "Khrushchev thaw," but which in the stagnation years was subjected to all kinds of persecution as "dissidents"; and, finally, renegades who quit the ranks of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in the course of perestroika.

As we can see, these are heterogeneous categories meriting a far from unambivalent attitude toward them, but they all have that common feature of their fate having been—justly or unjustly—tortuous, and many of them are endeavoring to settle scores with the current system and exact social and political vengeance. Membership of Rukh has grown from 270,000 at the time of the first assembly to 633,000 currently, and this in a year of clamorous propaganda campaigns and political actions. True, for greater show the figure of five million sympathizers was cited. V. Yarovskiy, a sponsor of the creation of Rukh and people's deputy of the USSR, evidently knew what he was talking about when he declared: "But, hand on heart, let us tell ourselves how many real ones (members and sympathizers of Rukh) there are. After all, four million and more, perhaps, are making themselves scarce...." We would note, what is more, that, for understandable reasons, the western oblasts account for the bulk of them. A. Shevchenko, editor of *NAROD-NAYA GAZETA*, which is published by Rukh, complained in his supporting report at the assembly: "A disturbing symptom: the five western oblasts have produced as many subscribers as the 20 eastern oblasts." Is this not indicative?

There is another warp in Rukh also. It is predominantly an intelligentsia movement, urban intelligentsia, what is more. Among the delegates to the assembly only one out of every five was from the countryside, and only one out of every 100 employed directly in agriculture. The representation from the workers was the same also. It was not fortuitous that N. Pokrovskiy, a member of the Rukh leadership, reproached himself for the fact that, "relying on the effect of mass activities, articles in the press and leaflets, we have performed insufficient work at the plants and on the collective farms directly among the workers and peasants." But would it have helped?

Things are no better in Rukh when it comes to inter-ethnic relations, about which its leaders had given the utmost assurances. These assurances were repeated on this occasion also. "Never," D. Pavlychko, people's deputy of the Ukrainian SSR, "will the thinking Ukrainian, a member of Rukh all the more, descend to the national socialist 'Ukraine for the Ukrainians' call." But in reality? Here is an answer from the speech at the assembly of A. Burakovskiy, Pavlychko's Rukh colleague: A year has elapsed since the first congress; parties have come to be formed on Rukh soil: Republican, Democratic, Green, Social Democratic, National, Christian Democratic, Peasant Democratic and others; but, unfortunately, Rukh is not expressing its attitude toward this current or the other within it. Yet, Burakovskiy testified, some parties are in one way or another declaring the "Ukraine for the Ukrainians" proposition, not to mention the avowedly chauvinist appeals appearing in places in the press organs of some nondemocratic currents.

Something also is indicated by the fact that at the assembly almost nine out of every 10 delegates were Ukrainians and that, of the 128 nationalities living in the

Ukraine, there were delegates from only 12. And the representation of Russians, who constitute more than one-fifth of the population of the republic, numbered only three percent at the assembly.

Mention also has to be made of the unscrupulous and even provocative behavior of Rukh's leaders in respect to the religious situation in the Ukraine. An expression of this was the fact that at their first assembly they had emphatically flirted with the Greek Catholic Church, but at the second, switched their favors to the Autocephalous Orthodox Church headed by Mstislav.

After all that has been said about the Rukh assembly, the reader could not fail to ask: But what was said there about what is the main and most painful issue today—emergence from the economic mire in which society finds itself? In practice, nothing or almost nothing, other than claims that the way to the Ukraine's prosperity lay via state independence and the market economy. A person presenting a supporting report on this matter, A. Savchenko, gave the assurance that the Ukraine's secession from the USSR and the creation of its own army would give the economy 15 billion rubles [R], and R6-R7 billion would, allegedly, be obtained as a result of the establishment of its own money and financial and credit system. That is Rukh's whole economic program.

As far as the political system in the republic is concerned, Rukh has set itself the following assignment: forming a coalition government that enjoys public confidence, reelection of the parliament on a multiparty basis, and the election of a president of the Ukraine by public ballot. Rukh sees itself in the role of "laboratory of the future political system of the Ukraine." It sets the goal of the establishment together with the current organs of state power of its own structures at all levels.

There remains, however, the question of the content with which the leaders of Rukh will invest the social and political system that they are planning. If capitalism, as ensues from the material of the Second Rukh Assembly, the vast majority of the Ukrainian people, workers and peasants and working people particularly, will have to give it some serious thought. For the working people this would result in a double noose, domestic and foreign. There is for mankind en route to its social progress no alternative to socialism. Proceeding from this, the Ukrainian people will decide their fate correctly and will defend their socialist choice against all tempters and seducers.

Veterans—the living exponents of the continuity of the times and society's values—should have a telling say also.

Mood of Ukrainian Opposition Characterized

91UN0724A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 2, 16 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by M. Podgorodnikov under the rubric: "Life of the Country": "The Boiling Cauldron—The Ukrainian

Democrats Desire Self-determination"; passages in italics published in Ukrainian]

[Text] Ditches in the Roads

The crowd is stormy on the boulevard across the street from the Chernigov City Soviet. A loudspeaker is sending a hoarse drone above the people's heads—a deputies' session is being broadcast. But nobody is listening to the radio. The people are more involved in pondering: "*What have we done over 70 years?*" More concrete subjects also arise.

"Well, Lisovenko took our buckwheat to Kiev. And what are our children going to eat? Radionuclides?"

"We should not have shot Beriya. He should have lived on our ration cards and suffered."

"You, man! How many years have you been drinking already? So, who is to blame for that?"

The tall, red-nosed man answers unemotionally: "*The system.*"

The city population is upset at the decision of V. Lisovenko, first secretary of the Chernigov CPSU Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] and chairman of the oblast soviet. He decided to sell locally produced food in Kiev. Lisovenko appeared on TV and said that the time had come to stop talking and do business. Had he not said this publicly, the Chernigov people would not have felt so annoyed. But now they got down to business; angry slogans were displayed and rallies started.

The deputy chairman, V. Kovalev, thinks that all the noise is in vain: the idea to have a bazaar in Kiev was suggested by many of the enterprises themselves; this idea emerged from below and it was a very good idea. But who is making the noise then? He smiles condescendingly. We know these people—they all have previous convictions. This idea is correct. Lvov is sending tanker trucks of gasoline to Kiev and we are sending sausage and honey.

This bomb-like image of a tanker truck haunted me for the duration of my trip. I was imagining vicious "westerners" driving the heavy automobiles, full of fuel, out of Lvov to kindle even stronger souls already burning with injustice. The Lvov poison of a wish for independence is spilling over the entire Ukraine, and this should be stopped by any means.

There were efforts to stop it. In mid-September, A. Lysenko, chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], read a statement on the radio. He announced that guests were coming from Lvov to the celebration of the city day. However, it was undesirable to socialize with these malicious people in any way. It was decided to consider the folkloric group "Gomin" a politicized organization and a police checkpoint was set up by the village of Kopti, on the border of Chernigov Oblast: "We are not allowed to let you pass." The buses

of the guests were forced onto the road shoulder, surrounded by "RAF" minivans, and the blue and yellow flags were torn off the busses. An emotional confrontation followed, the guests displayed their indignation, then came a fight and a protest which took the form of bodies blocking all traffic on the road.

The same happened to a Ternopol group as they were approaching Kherson during the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Zaporozhskaya Sech. People who went on that trip told stories about local residents closing their gates in fear: "Bandera is coming!" They also described ditches dug in country roads as a result of somebody's authoritative instructions.

S. Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, complained:

"It seems that communists are not ready to withstand brute force, a game without rules; they give up when faced with such facts."

Judging by appearances, they do not give up but dig ditches in the roads.

A Quarrel in Church

"You see, everything is quiet here. Have you heard anywhere that a "Muscovite" or an "easterner" was insulted?" they asked me in the Ternopol area.

I did not hear, I did not see. However, this does not mean that everything is all that wonderful in the western Ukraine. The cauldron is boiling on an even, muffled note but you can feel the heat.

In the east of the republic they blame "the system," in the west—"Moscow's despotism." In the east they scare children with the name of Bandera, but in the east they propose to change a street name from Lenin to Bandera. The situation related to churches is comparatively quiet in the east, but in the west a conflict is going on among them.

There are seals on the locked doors of the Trinity cathedral in Berezhany, and that is one result of the conflict. Last year an agreement on the joint use of the cathedral was reached. It did not work out. Members of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches could not conquer the devil in them. So, they started to scream hysterically, to capture churches, to go to ispolkom [executive committee] buildings and declare hunger strikes there. The authorities responded by sealing the doors: If you cannot coexist in peace, have no church then.

The authorities failed to make any fundamental decision last year concerning the rehabilitation of the Greek Catholic Church or the rights of the Orthodox Church. And here is the result—an endless war in which the sympathies and purposes are obviously political. Should they lean toward Rome or Moscow? The fight is going on for spheres of influence, and such politicking on the part of churches could mean, it seems, their moral death.

Smart priests already understand this as they try to prevent any substitution of purposes or any humiliation of the Christian doctrine. They do not always succeed; they are hindered by a lack of attention from the "parocrats" and by the bias of the "democrats."

The Rukh of Ternopol is full of unquestionable sympathies toward the Greek Catholics and some of its people's deputies, when asked by the city residents about their attitude toward the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, say composedly: "Just kick them out." It is a striking declaration for a democrat, especially so because the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church is a people's, ethnic church with deep roots. Rukh is so concerned with ethnic origins, but it forgets about them the moment it catches a glimpse of its own, political goals.

In Ternopol, however, the Rukh is doing fine. People crowd by its doors, they are reading avidly the notices, slogans, and posters displayed on the boards. There is also the program of the Ukrainian nationalists authored by Stepan Bandera. I am sure you will be puzzled if you read it. It seems to me you would subscribe to most of its proclamations: workers' self-administration, land to peasants, respect for ethnic rights. We are used to bad language which does not explain much.

"How do you assess your program?" I asked Ivan Golo-vatskiy, leader of the Berezhany Rukh.

"We are creating an anticommunist bloc."

"Do you not have communists inside your movement?"

"Yes, we do. We do not have anything against rank-and-file party members. We are fighting against the Leninist and Stalinist ideology. We reject class-oriented morality and dictatorship of the proletariat."

When it comes to slogans, the Rukh members appear to be ardent democrats. But their democratic stand ceases to be consistent when they get down to business. The moment Igor Melnik, deputy chairman of the city soviet, spoke against the slogan of the nationalist-radical party "Freedom or Death!" he was denied the opportunity of a newspaper publication. Siding with one or another group? But why is this better than class-oriented morality?

During a Rukh rally in Chernigov a woman shouted: "Bandera was a murderer!" The democrat who was chairing the rally countered: "It is a provocation!" and did not give the floor to the woman. She was elbowed into a corner somewhere, into the crowd hollering at her.

Dissent is unacceptable for a mentality educated by the totalitarian regime.

Levers of Power

Now there are factions in the city soviets: Communists are in the majority, democrats in the minority, and the city mayor has to put an immense effort into filling these

diverse factions with some viable meaning. The tenseness of the situation engendered a new type of a leader—a large-scale, democratic, and endlessly patient one. The chairmen renounce their party affiliations (communist V. Melnichuk in Chernigov, Rukh member Ya. Korpyak in Ternopol, nonparty member Z. Migotskiy in Berezhany). They bravely navigate their ship among the fractional reefs. They have to yield sometimes too and seek cooperation. "I have no right to ignore those in the minority," says Melnichuk.

He is cheerful, active, and smiles as he encounters the endless blows coming at him. But the situation is dramatic—an obvious crisis of the executive power. Ispolkom officials suffer from a deputy-phobia, they refuse to cooperate. "Don't take us to the deputies," they would implore Melnichuk, as they felt mortal fear of the deputies' extensive and audacious criticism. Ispolkom employees do not have any social protection, which means they do not have any power.

The city is also defenseless. The oblast bureaucracy dominates it as a dictator. If they want to, they can cancel meat allocations; if they want to, they can hand an ancient, unique cathedral over to believers; if they want to, they can stop supplying the city with bricks which later trickle away to the construction of personal dachas.

The city is located on land, but it does not own it. It is allowed to drink water as if it does not belong to the city. Berezhany has been fighting for the right to own the city lake for many years now, but the decision gets bogged down somewhere in the ministerial offices. Chernigov aims to own some municipal property, but the law is in no hurry to help in this respect.

Democratic forces came to power in some cities of the western Ukraine, and communists lose no opportunity to mention that this was the root of all evil. S. Tokarskiy, secretary of a Berezhany Raykom [Rayon Party Committee], said: "They are good and smart guys, but there are no results. They have a lot of good ideas but... they blew the residential program." The heating mains were out of order in Berezhany and half the city residents started to freeze when the cold weather came—an obvious shortcoming of the democracy. But then a miracle happened: At the critical moment a raykom secretary showed up near the mains and made the people warm. "No, you have dismantled the administrative system too early," was his conclusion, on a somewhat triumphant note.

Who Holds a Grudge Against Solzhenitsyn

With all the attractiveness of the ethnic idea, it is more and more often now that it turns into something grotesque when put to practice. In the village of Baturin, Chernigov Oblast, Razumovskiy palace has been decaying for decades for lack of a caring master. Recently one Murmansk enterprise undertook to restore the palace. The restoration work was going full speed until a Lvov writer yelled: "What is this? Are we squandering our national heritage? We will not allow any

foreign enterprises to own the palace!" There was a rally by the walls of the palace, with blue and yellow flags displayed; the "foreign" workers from Murmansk who were denounced by the patriots left their trowels and went home. The ethnic idea has triumphed, and the palace continues to fall apart.

In Ternopol the name "Moscow" disappeared from a hotel sign and was replaced by another one: "Galichina." There is talk about moving the monument to Pushkin, who was guilty of presenting a wrongful image of Mazepa in his poem "Poltava." Slogans of "The Ukraine is for Ukrainians" are unfurled at rallies.

I am not going to defend official Moscow, which is guilty of many things. The policy of excessive centralization did not and does not bring good results. When Ternopol wants to sell its raw waste lumber and sawdust to any country, the city representatives have to go to Moscow to humbly beg for that trifle. The flood of names like "Russia", "October", "Moscow", etc. annoys people also for reasons other than the previous leaders' lack of taste.

The heated ethnic passions, nevertheless, alienate a lot of people. A considerable part of the intelligentsia abhors the frenzied slogans and the affection for Bandera. The local authorities are worried by this, and chairman of the soviet Ya. Korpyak reproaches them: "The Ukraine is marching ahead, but the intelligentsia is asleep."

The intelligentsia is not asleep, it is making money. Thousands of cars are lining up at the country's borders. They are carrying various goods—sausage, children's balloons, mousetraps, canned food, scythes—anything that can get a higher price for in Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey. The difference in prices gives birth to real fortunes. The intelligentsia is not asleep, it is disappointed, and realistic business lures it anew.

History has deeply scarred the ethnic conscience. When the Red Army entered the western Ukraine in 1939, it was met with flowers and bread and salt. Stalin responded with terror. They did not forget it.

But any pain can be intensified to the extreme, which some people are doing with pleasure. How can we kill the pain? "Could we use Solzhenitsyn's idea of the Union of three equals?" I asked. "No, we could not," was the answer. "Solzhenitsyn sticks to imperial positions, he considers us a second-rate nation. But is it Moscow who is the successor of Kievan Russia? The Ukraine is such a successor. Moscow as an elder brother? This is ridiculous." "All right," I agreed, "let us transfer the capital to Kiev but preserve the Union. Moscow will become your obedient sister." I received puzzled looks...

Should we argue about who is the eldest in our Union? One thing is clear: The Ukraine and Russia make up the backbone of the country. If we break this backbone, will the state mechanism remain flexible?

Ukrainian Communist Party on Socioeconomic Policy*91UN0639A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
18 Dec 90 p 1*

["Resolution of the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Second Stage): On the Present Situation and Socioeconomic Policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party"—PRAVDA UKRAINY headline]

[Text] The period which has followed the first stage of the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party has confirmed on the whole the correctness of the analysis made by the congress of the sociopolitical processes, the correctness of its principled assessments and conclusions. Diverse and profound changes are taking place in all spheres of the republic's life. An important event has been the adoption by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, which is to a significant degree the result of the practical exercise of legislative initiative by communists.

The 28th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party has opened up new opportunities for intensifying political and socioeconomic transformations, for improving and perfecting intra-party relations. It has preserved the CPSU as the party of socialist option, a party internationalist in nature. The way is open for the achievement of real independence by the republic Communist Parties under a commonality of organizational principles and program goals.

However, political and socioeconomic transformations are being carried out under conditions of an increase in crisis phenomena which has brought society to a critical stage. Anticommunism has become a dangerous element of social life, acquiring crude and aggressive forms here and there. Political forces opposing the Ukrainian Communist Party, primarily such anti-socialist, separatist formations as the Ukrainian Republican Party and SNUM [Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth], have shifted over to open attacks, not only against communists, but against constitutional state structures as well.

Taking up openly anticommunist positions is Rukh, where the most extreme elements have gained the upper hand and are pursuing the aim of removing the Communist Party from the political arena, seizing power, shifting the Ukraine over to the capitalist path of development, and extracting it from the Union of Soviet Republics. Attempts are being made to revitalize the Bandera movement, reengendering it under new conditions. Interethnic and interdenominational conflicts are being kindled. Acts of vandalism are being carried out against monuments to V.I. Lenin, other political and state figures, and Soviet fighting men who have perished. Strikes and unauthorized rallies are being organized. Picketing and the seizure of party committee premises and state institutions are taking place. Hunger strikes and other acts of civil disobedience are being organized. These culminated in attempts to disrupt the celebration

of the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. People are losing peace of mind and their confidence in tomorrow. They are alarmed by the real threat of bloodshed.

The opposition minority in the republic parliament is constantly resorting to forceful methods of inter-party struggle. It is using non-parliamentary methods to exert pressure on deputies, blocking the resolution of important issues, striving to discredit the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet in the eyes of the population or effect its self-dissolution. The situation in Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol Oblasts is becoming especially alarming. Anti-communist forces there have obtained a majority in their local soviets and are carrying out a single-minded dismantling of the foundations of the socialist system. With the clear connivance of the leadership and a portion of the deputies of the city soviet, destructive forces in the city of Kiev are carrying out illegal acts.

Political sentiment in society is to a great degree determined by the exacerbated socioeconomic situation and the painful processes of transition to the market. Volumes of production and national income are being reduced, economic ties are being severed, discipline is dropping, and normal labor rhythm is more and more being interrupted. We see an increased threat of chaos and anarchy in the country, increased contradictions between legislative and executive authority, between central, republic, and local organs of government. Growth of deficits and inflation, rampant activity in the shadow economy, and increased speculation and corruption are leading to a substantial drop in the standard of living of the bulk of the population.

Notably reflected in the situation in society are the complex, contradictory processes underway in the Ukrainian Communist Party. And although party organizations are gradually overcoming their confusion and dismay, communists still do not have adequate unity and solidarity; a significant portion of them still cannot understand the situation and have taken up a wait-and-see position. This undermines their authority and influence in the labor collectives and within the population. Party committees demand less of communist leaders of state and economic organs, and as a result the government has often lagged behind in developing effective programs with respect to the most pressing questions of development of the republic and accomplishment of current economic aims. At times political initiative has been lost as important legislative acts are examined and adopted by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and as a result, these have not always reflected the socialist nature of our society. A sharp drop in party discipline is significantly reducing the capability of the Ukrainian Communist Party for organized action, and this is frequently evaluated as yielding positions to other political forces.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee, its Politburo, Secretariat, and party committees have not yet been able

to change the situation for the better. They have not yet been able to initiate effective, aggressive, organizational and political work in the practical implementation of decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress.

The congress believes that inconsistent and contradictory positions and actions of the CPSU and USSR leadership have seriously undermined the people's confidence in the party. This leadership has not undertaken decisive measures in timely fashion to avert destructive processes, and in this regard we see the threatened collapse of the Soviet state. Decisions on questions of principle, affecting the fate of the country and of socialism, have been made practically without CPSU participation. Nor has the Ukrainian Communist Party determined its position on these questions in timely fashion.

The congress reaffirms the policy drawn up in its first stage directed towards renewal of society in the framework of the socialist option and towards exposure of the democratic and humanistic nature of socialism, its creative potential. In their practical activity, party organizations and all communists must proceed from the fact that, having won a majority in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and become the ruling party, the Ukrainian Communist Party has taken upon itself responsibility for the state of affairs in the republic.

I.

The congress emphasizes that current efforts of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, of party committees at all levels, and of communists in organs of state power and government, local self-government, labor collectives, and social organizations, should be directed towards accomplishing the aims of the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress, towards halting the dangerous course of events and setting the republic on a path of dynamic development.

The 28th Ukrainian CP Congress supports measures proposed by the USSR president in the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet to effect political, economic, and legal stabilization of the situation in the country. The congress believes that their realization is possible only with presidential reliance on the party and precise implementation of the political policy determined by the 28th CPSU Congress. It must be added that confirmation of the state sovereignty of the Ukraine has become a factor of consolidation. The congress is advocating conclusion of a new Union treaty in accordance with the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine and formation of a new state structure for the country—as the Union of sovereign Soviet socialist republics with equal rights. Party committees and organizations will actively facilitate—through the soviets of people's deputies and party groups in them, as well as directly through labor collectives and communists in trade unions and social organizations which espouse constructive positions—practical realization of provisions of the Declaration on State

Sovereignty of the Ukraine, and will use every variety of diversified activity to support the full-fledged political, socioeconomic, and spiritual development of the republic and its establishment as a true entity of international relations. They will promote the preservation and future flourishing of culture and language, the affirmation of the national worth and originality of the Ukrainian people and of representatives of all nationalities which inhabit the Ukraine. The congress condemns any intentions to change existing borders or violate the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Central Committee, obkoms [oblast committees], gorkoms [city committees], and raykoms [rayon committees] of the Ukrainian Communist Party will consistently seek work forms and methods which will allow them to successfully fulfill a consolidating role under multi-party conditions. In order to retain political initiative, there should be a constant analysis of the situation and the correlation of political forces, of changes taking place in the workers' and peasants' youth movement and the intelligentsia milieu. Predictions must be made of the development of events. We must expose the true goals of our political opponents and the insidious methods of struggle they are using, which are incompatible with the goals of humanizing and democratizing society. We must reveal the danger of national extremism and neo-Bandera activity. We must also react immediately to steps taken by other political parties and formations—which are trampling upon legality and ethical norms, disorienting public opinion, and increasing tension.

The congress attaches special significance to the consolidation of communists in all levels of the soviets of people's deputies. Party committees are called upon to reinforce ties with their representatives in organs of power, to assist them in organizing training, preparing legislative initiatives, and working on draft laws and resolutions. Communists must effect broad interaction and cooperation with other parties and social organizations which espouse positions of the socialist option. This should be oriented on the creation of a left-centrist bloc encompassing both the mechanism of soviets of people's deputies and the political life of society in general. At the same time, the congress demands that state organs cease their arbitrariness in the treatment of communists, arbitrariness executed in the name of Soviet authority in a number of oblasts—in Lvov, Ternopol, and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts, in particular. The Central Committee is directed to promote an initiative on the adoption of legislative acts which will guarantee protection to citizens from politically motivated persecution, which will prohibit activity on the part of parties and political entities which are inflaming ethnic strife and calling for violence. In protecting the interests of various categories of workers, a unification of effort should take place with trade unions on an equal, partnership basis. We should cooperate with the workers' movement, the Peasants' Union, veterans', women's, youth, and children's organizations.

We must support the efforts of the Ukrainian Leninist Communist Youth League (MDS) [Youth for Democratic Socialism] in the organizational and political solidification of their ranks, and support the efforts of youth formations of the socialist option to consolidate.

Party organizations must participate in strengthening law and order, must promote practical measures in the fight against crime. In this regard, we should revive on a widespread basis the finest traditions of the people's voluntary militia, operational Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] detachments, and people's participation in law enforcement organs on the recommendation of labor collectives and primary party organizations.

We must focus our attention at all levels on the needs of servicemen and their families, provide them assistance and moral support in every conceivable way.

We must form a respect in public opinion for USSR law enforcement organs and the USSR Armed Forces, debunk unjust and unfounded accusations leveled against them, and defend against unjustified interference into their activity.

We must improve the organization of international and patriotic indoctrination of our youth, prepare them for defense of the Motherland.

II.

The congress emphasizes that the main aim of the socioeconomic policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party remains enhancement of the well-being of our people, their improved standard of living.

In supporting efforts of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the government of the republic directed towards stabilization of the economy and consumer market, the congress considers it necessary to take more effective measures towards consolidating and developing economic ties, observing contractual discipline, reducing the budget deficit, and restoring the vitality of monetary circulation. With the aim of accelerating reorientation of the republic economy to the benefit of the individual, we must review our investment and tax policy and supervise the conversion of defense enterprises on the basis of our own republic program. The congress obligates the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, party committees, primary organizations, and every communist to do everything within their control to ensure normal functioning of the economy, locate opportunities for sharply increasing the production of food products and consumer goods and services, and for constructing housing and sociocultural facilities, to ensure the efficient and conservative utilization of all varieties of resources. Communists should mount a resolute offensive against speculation, dealers in the shadow economy, poor economic management, and abuses.

An important aim in the economics sphere, accomplishment of which is the focus of attention of communists

and all people of the Ukraine in our current stage, is preparation for the transition to market relations. Sharing the anxiety of many people elicited by the aspirations of various radical elements to bring capitalism to our society—with its exploitation and unemployment, unjustified social stratification and spiritual impoverishment, the Congress obligates the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, communist people's deputies, government leaders, and all structures of executive authority to struggle actively against these attempts, to be persistent and unwavering in their fight to achieve the socialist ideal, and to more actively promote the party line in the adoption and implementation of appropriate legislative and normative enactments. They must respond to the hopes and aspirations of the majority of the Ukrainian people, assist in emancipating people's initiative and productive activity, afford them the opportunity to be masters of production, provide the necessary social guarantees, and envisage compensation by the state for basic losses connected with transition to the market. The congress supports the creation of conditions allowing everyone to improve his well-being by virtue of his own labor. It maintains that unemployment should not be permitted and that population segments incapable of providing labor should be afforded special protection by society and the state.

Supporting a policy of a multi-structured economy and diversity in forms of ownership, the congress advocates priority of its collective forms and the retention of state influence in the most important spheres of the economy and fundamental science. Together with trade unions and councils of labor collectives, party organizations must actively participate in the process of de-state-ization and democratization of ownership, must help workers in choosing organizational forms and methods of management, and must oppose attempts to legalize shadow capital and sell assets in circumvention of existing legislation.

The congress obligates party committees, primary party organizations, and all communists to actively facilitate practical implementation of the Ukrainian SSR Law on Priority of Social Development of the Village and Agroindustrial Complex. In conducting land reform, we must ensure necessary conditions for the independent and effective activity of kolkhozes and sovkhozes—the main producers of agricultural production. We must ensure the development of individual and lease forms of ownership, peasant farms, branch and regional associations, firms, and cooperatives, joint enterprises, and other formations.

One of the most important tasks facing communists of the republic is to do everything possible to protect people from the aftereffects of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The package of measures on state regulation of the economy must provide for implementation of programs to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, improve the ecological environment, resettle Crimean Tatars, and form a republic fund to narrow the gap in levels of economic and social

development of different regions—first and foremost mining settlements and rural population centers.

Transition to the market must not bring about any restriction in the most important socialist achievements of the Soviet people—the right to work and right to health care. The congress attaches priority significance to the development of science and culture for a renewal of society, and to augmentation of the intellectual and creative potential of the republic. Communists are resolutely promoting renovation of finance policy in the spheres of culture, public education, and health care. They support a comprehensive stimulation of expenditures to these ends on the part of enterprises, social organizations, creative unions, and sociocultural foundations and oppose unreserved commercialization of culture and the entirety of our spiritual life.

The congress believes that a deciding factor which can and should reduce losses of the transition period to a minimum consists of retention of the all-Union market and a unified economic space, coordination of interpublic activities in the introduction of market relations, and the observance of a unified pricing policy and foreign economic strategy.

The congress attaches great significance to broadened participation of the Ukrainian SSR in the international division of labor and to development of direct foreign economic ties by enterprises, while providing guarantees for the interests of the republic and the population.

In fighting for republic independence in the formation of finance-budget and banking systems and taxation policy, the congress opposes a hurried introduction of the republic's own currency without preliminary assessment of the consequences of this, and of the establishment of the republic's own army and customs service. The efforts of collectives must be directed first of all towards achieving a balance in interpublic and foreign trade operations, and towards enhancing the competitiveness of goods produced in the republic.

The congress believes it will be impossible to achieve success without a strong executive authority and it expresses support for extending to the Ukrainian Government a universal vote of confidence for the transition period, for endowing it, under procedures envisaged by law, with expanded powers in the sphere of economics, the social sphere, and the sphere of law and order.

III.

The congress directs the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, to do everything in their power to support an increased understanding by communists of the vital necessity for the party's ideological and organizational unity, democratization of intra-party life, and consolidation of party discipline. The responsibility of each party member for his conduct and his attitude towards party obligations must be enhanced. Reaffirming the spirit of party comradeship and unity, we must struggle to see to it that the

Ukrainian Communist Party retains every honest and decent communist. At the same time, party organizations must decisively rid themselves of those who are attempting to disrupt the party from within.

The congress considers one of the most important spheres of renewal of party life to be the consistent implementation of policy directed towards expanding the rights of primary organizations, enhancing their authority and independence, and increasing their active participation in formulating policy and constituting higher party organs.

The congress rejects the very idea of "depoliticization" and "de-party-ization" of production, of scientific, educational, and cultural establishments, and of state and law enforcement organs—this idea being contradictory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee will create within the party a mechanism for the social and moral protection of communists.

The congress considers intolerable the dissolution of lower party echelons—party groups and shop organizations. The elimination of party cells in work brigades, divisions, and shops will lead to a weakening of ties with people, and the vacuum will be filled by other political forces.

The congress emphasizes that the most important factor in restoring party authority is specific deeds of every party organization in resolving the problems of everyday life which people face.

The Central Committee, obkoms, and the Kiev Gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in reorganizing and reducing the apparatus of party committees, will proceed primarily from the consideration that ties between party committees and the primary party organizations should not become weakened—much less severed. A council of secretaries of primary party organizations will be created under the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

It is important from this time forward to train cadres for all divisions of party, ideological, state, economic, and social work, to recommend workers for positions, to make every effort to facilitate their selection or confirmation, and to defend them from attacks and defamation by our political opponents. We must make more effective use of the capabilities of scientific institutions, in particular, institutes of political science and social administration, political research institutes.

The situation demands a radical revision of approaches to the organization and content of mass-political work. Party organizations must fully utilize the entire arsenal of methods of effecting political influence—from rallies and other mass-popular events, assemblies and meetings of workers, to individual and group discussions, political information gatherings. Special attention must be devoted to setting up mass agitation work by place of

residence, in public areas, and on the streets, and to distributing brochures and leaflets, etc.

The potential of the party's mass media must be utilized significantly more effectively. We must enhance operational effectiveness in reacting to political events, increase the conviction and reasoned argumentation of material appearing in print and being transmitted, master journalistic skills. We must be more resolute in getting rid of illusions regarding the "democratism" of enemies of the Ukrainian Communist Party and must overcome the inertia of impartiality and flirtation with extremists.

Recognizing the absolute criticality of the moment for the present and future destiny of the Ukraine and the USSR, the congress calls upon communists, upon all workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia, upon all honest people to unite their efforts in consolidating civil peace and calm, in stabilizing the sociopolitical environment, and in accomplishing the most pressing tasks of the political, socioeconomic, and spiritual development of the republic.

Ukrainian CP Official Examines Political Parties

91UN0553A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian, 11 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with O.P. Smolyannykov, CPSU Central Committee chairman of the division for contacts with the Soviets of People's Deputies, political, and community organizations; by D. Ivanko, RADYANSKA UKRAYINA correspondent: "A Multi-Party Structure: Declarations and Actuality. Politics Does not Tolerate a Vacuum"]

[Text] Conditions within the republic today have brought about a true multi-party system. Parties supporting a variety of political tendencies are being formed and are already active. But the majority of our readers are not well acquainted with them to date, or perhaps have no idea of their existence: their names, their social foundations and ideological platforms, their goals, what they oppose, how they stand in regards to the CPSU and restructuring. In order to answer these timely questions at least briefly, our correspondent met with O. P. Smolyannykov, the CPSU Central Committee chairman of the division for contacts with the Soviets of People's Deputies, as well as political and community organizations.

[Correspondent] First of all, we should probably clarify - how many new parties or people's movements are already registered, whether any non-legalized groups are active, what names have they adopted, what is their political direction, on whose support do they depend. It is especially necessary today that this political vacuum be filled. Please tell us, Oleksiy Petrovych.

[Smolyannykov] Let me emphasize at the outset, that most of the existing political parties made themselves

known this year. Several of them have already implemented their organizational structure, others are still formulating their political orientation and social basis; this is a natural process.

Thirteen parties held organizing conventions: the Ukrainian National Party, the Republican Party of the Ukraine, the Union for "Ukrainian State Independence", the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Social-Democratic Party of the Ukraine, the United Social-Democratic Party of the Ukraine, the Ukrainian Rural-Democratic Party, the Ukrainian People's Democratic Party, the People's Party of the Ukraine, the Green Party of the Ukraine, the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Ukraine, and the Party of Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine. Conventions of the Democratic Party of the Ukraine and the Party of Slavic Rebirth are to be held soon. Attempts are being made to create other political organizations as well.

Besides the named parties of the republic, several union-wide parties are also active in the Ukraine. Only one of them is registered - the Ukrainian Republican Party. The rest, although they exist legally, as yet have no judicial acknowledgement.

The program goals of the parties vary: from moderate general democratic ones to openly antisocial, anti-Soviet.

[Correspondent] What is the societal base from which the new political groups are being created? In other words, whose views and aspirations do they reflect?

[Smolyannykov] It is too early to conclusively define the societal base of the newly-created parties. Still it is true that none of them reflect the interests solely of any one class, or even stratum or group of the population.

Their main support comes from people who, first of all, strive to attain, under the new conditions, their unrealized potential. Second, those who to date have not found themselves in life and are today looking for social revenge. Last, those irreconcilable opponents who are unhappy with the Communist Party. They, in fact, hold great potential for anger, and know how to consolidate and unite on this basis.

In other words, there is a visible "erosion" of the societal base of the new political organizations. Taking this into account, even the founders of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party found it necessary to state in its program documents: "the USDP is being created as a party not just of one class or social stratum, but as a political representative of all the Ukrainian people." An analogous position is being adopted, in essence, by most of the new parties.

[Correspondent] What is the basis of their programs: creative, constructive principles, in keeping with the tasks of restructuring and renewal, or are they negative, destructive?

[Smolyannykov] This is the way I would answer that question.

The programs of almost all the parties have their strong aspects and to a certain extent call for relinquishing documents of membership in the Ukrainian Communist Party. Currently characteristic and common for all of them are: rejection of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the desire to remove it from the political arena and "rewrite" our history, a path toward full independence of the Ukraine outside the borders of the USSR, and an orientation toward capitalization of society. Also typical is the lack of well-established socioeconomic chapters.

It is worth keeping in mind that the program documents are put together to meet the requirement of registering the party. Therefore, based solely on their program and charter, it is impossible to determine fully which is uppermost in them: constructive or destructive tendencies.

Only experience can give a thorough answer. To date it shows that in the period of their creation, most of the political organizations concentrated their efforts on total criticism of our party and the governmental structure. Such conditions of political activity reek of parasitism and indicate an attempt at all costs to keep afloat on a wave of the people's social discontent.

While proclaiming their support of acting within the bounds of the law and parliamentary structure, parties such as the Ukrainian Republican Party instead accentuate extra-parliamentary actions - as far as to boycott the governmental and Supreme Soviet decisions, organize strikes and acts of civil disobedience, whose goal - is to paralyze the republic's economy and achieve a change in leadership. You be the judge - who benefits from this!

[Correspondent] The main indicator of political principles today is the attitude towards the Ukrainian Communist Party. Do these new parties show a desire to compromise, to work together to meet the needs of the people? Or, perhaps, at this stage the functions have separated: for us - to hold meetings, for you - to feed the people... This is based on the observation that the noisy "troops" of the western region were visible everywhere, except in the fields where the harvest was being gathered...

[Smolyannykov] Let me emphasize again, that some new political parties and groups are guided in their activities first of all by confrontational motives. The wave of anti-Communism has risen to threatening heights. A violent attack against the very values and ideals of socialism is being waged, establishing the goal, essentially, of turning society back to the lifestyle which existed before October 1917.

Naturally, the Communist Party stands as a barrier to fulfilling these intentions. So it is not surprising that demands are put forth to prohibit, dissolve, or even - to prosecute it. For example, the program of the Ukrainian Republican Party denounces Communist ideology as

"anti-humanitarian and unnatural in its essence". Declaring that "all political parties and organizations have constitutionally guaranteed freedom", the Ukrainian Republican Party "denies" this only to the Ukrainian Communist Party, demanding its prohibition and the nationalization of CPSU properties in the republic.

Rukh deserves a separate mention. After its second congress it became completely obvious: this is a political entity, whose leaders at first hid behind the phraseology of restructuring, which has moved far to the right, openly and finally taking shape as an anti-Communist organization, opposed to the Ukrainian Communist Party. In fact, the highest Rukh leadership body has been titled the Central Leadership, following the Banderite example. A special decree rehabilitates the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurrection Army (UPA) and their leaders, who are declared national heroes.

Rukh has become somewhat of an "umbrella", uniting and bringing together various opposition forces. It is relevant to remember that the delegates of its second congress represented over 40 community and political organizations of the republic.

The costs of staff and materials for Rukh are covered to a great extent by funds from outside the borders, which is, first of all, contrary to USSR laws "regarding community associations", and, secondly, is absolutely unacceptable from a moral point of view. To justify these financial "injections" and material donations, the leaders of Rukh organize highly visible activities. At their instigation, there are endless meetings, pickets, human chains at the slightest opportunity, warlike and noisy "troops" sent to eastern regions to "reawaken the national self-awareness of the people" and speed up the secession of the Ukraine from the USSR Union.

It is also worth noting that the most populous of these actions took place at the time when hard-working people, with sweat on their brows, worked at gathering the harvest. The great majority of the republic's population was thus convinced, with its own eyes, of the destructive actions of these newly-appeared "saviors of the nation" and saw who, in practice, "strives to pull the plow, and who to tear at the throat". It is because of this that the popularity of Rukh has declined sharply.

The people have always oriented themselves around sound minds, judiciousness, and moderation. The Ukrainian Communist Party, as emphasized in its platform, is open to cooperation with political forces which hold positions of non-coercion, national harmony, and the achievement of a consensus on all important problems of sociopolitical life.

We support consolidation with all those who truly support the interests of the people. But our principle position states that consolidation is impossible without a sharp separation from those who strive to push the nation towards the abyss.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will resolutely rebuff all mad anti-Communist, nationalist groupings, which currently constitute the greatest danger for the society and community peace in the republic.

[Correspondent] Which of the parties could already be called a realistic political force today? Are there any alternatives to the Ukrainian Communist Party? How should their existence be accepted?

[Smolyannykov] None of the above-mentioned parties is as yet a significant force, for now they influence only limited groups of people. It is necessary to consider that since the basic system of these formations has been established, in time some of them may "stand on their own two feet"...

We can confirm that the viability of many of these newly created parties to a great extent will depend on the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Communist Party in influencing the solution of complex socioeconomic, political and other problems today and in the future.

As to the question of how to accept these new political parties, let me say that they are a real part of the development of our society. And realities must be taken into account.

Yukhnovskyy Addresses New Ukrainian Party

91UN0654A Kiev LITERATURA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 13 Dec 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "New Parliamentary Party"]

[Text] Kiev was the site of the Party for Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine's Founding Congress, at which a charter and program theses were ratified.

As is evident from the Declaration approved by the Congress, this is a democratic-type parliamentary party without monopolistic centrism, founded on the principle of sovereignty of its members. They are free to create their own associations, including factions.

The new party was founded mainly by former members of the Communist Party who once supported the Democratic platform of the CPSU. There were joined by a significant number of non-partisan individuals.

Over 20 percent of the delegates (they numbered 324) were Deputies from various Soviets, 43 delegates were members of Rukh.

The program theses indicated that the Party for Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine supports the realistic actualization of the Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Ukraine. It defends the right of the Republic to regulate economic relationships in its territory, including the establishment of its own currency, bank and fiscal - budgetary systems, pricing policy and taxation, and external economic policies, including a customs service. The Party supports the realization of individual economic

freedom, their rights of ownership and proprietorship, and for the legal equality of all forms of ownership.

The coordinating council of the part is headed by seven co-chairmen: Ukrainian SSR Peoples Deputies O. I. Yemets, V. B. Hrynov, V. F. Filenko; Doctor of Philosophical Studies M. V. Popovych, Director of the Ukrainian Sociological Association's Republican Sociological Center and Doctor of Philosophical Studies V. Ye. Khmelko, instructor at the Donetsk National University A. F. Bazylyuk, and instructor at the Lvov Polytechnical Institute C. V. Lylyk.

At the reader's request we are publishing the speech read by State Soviet Chairman and academician I. R. Yukhnovskyy.

Speech of Academic I.R. Yukhnovskyy, head of the People's Council to the Founding Congress of the Party of the Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine

2 December 1990

Honorable Delegates of this New Party!

I heartily greet the respected Presidium, and heartily greet all those present.

I wish you clarity in your program and accord in your work.

I have read your declaration, program theses and program principles carefully. All these documents are very progressive. I would especially like to commend your program theses and congratulate messrs. Popovych, Khmelko, Paskhaver, as well as Lylyk, Lartsev, Karbetsky and Linchevskyy for a job well done, and also Alekseyev for the program principles. I am very pleased with the good start in this work by my constant brothers-in-arms in our tasks as Peoples Deputies, Filenko and Yemets. May God grant you success.

Still, I would like to make a few friendly suggestions. Throughout the document, like a bright red thread, extends the idea of equal opportunity for all, of tolerance for all opinions and cultures. This stems from the historical background as such, created by past events. We ourselves confirm that it was the senseless economic and political system which brought the country to total collapse and led to terrible deformations in the economy, the psyche, and the national life of the country. So how can we accept these deformed relationships, put in place by force, as the starting point from which to begin introducing liberalism and equal opportunity? This is a small inconsistency, but such are not permissible in strategic documents. Nature, the land, and the nation are tightly interconnected - essentially these comprise one totality. For the nature and land of the Ukraine, the Ukrainian nation is dearest. Just as Russian nature is for Russian natives, and Estonian for Estonians. Given equal productiveness, working with the same equipment, the local resident will cause less harm to the natural surroundings than will an outsider. Why am I saying this. By now, most likely, everyone agrees that the break-up of

the Soviet Union into cooperating independent states is the only possible economic and political way out of the crisis. But these states must be created on a natural basis. The nations of which the Soviet Union consists provide just such a basis. Therefore, the creation of the Ukrainian state as a result of the self-determination of the Ukrainian nation is a natural phenomenon and therefore a strong one, and this position is one of the basic statements of the Declaration of Sovereignty. This principle, I believe, should absolutely be included in your program; I agree with all the rest of it. The people of the Ukraine include all the people of different nationalities living within the country, and the people together hold the true power to rule, and all are equal under the law.

But the state language and culture are Ukrainian, the same as Russian in Russia or Georgian in Georgia. Of course, many Ukrainians in the east have forgotten their native language, and speak Russian, so that only the songs, melancholy and melodic, touch their souls. But with time historical justice will prevail, and they will again begin speaking their native language.

Economic and political decentralization of the Soviet Union implies, especially for the Ukraine, a most intelligent sovereignty of its component parts. You speak of federation - I can accept that, although I cannot yet feel it "in my fingertips".

The program does not clearly approach the question of the Soviet Agreement of Unity. So I would like to explain my understanding of this most fundamental question. Is there a need for Gorbachev in the creation of a network of friendly independent states? Actually not in the network of friendly independent states, because this will not come about very soon, but in the process of creating such a system of friendship. The completion of such a project could be his life's work, and Gorbachev would become a great player in world politics. The problem of denationalization of Soviet properties is crucial here. Everything within the borders of our nation is ours: the transportation lines, and energy carriers, and military manufacturing. Without transportation we cannot live, and a central bank should assist in the formation of national banks in the republics.

As to the army: there should be an army of the republic, and an army of strategic protection for the cooperative nations. Problems of ecology are also common for all of us. In order to accomplish all this with the smallest losses, with the greatest gains, we need Gorbachev. But all this that I am saying counters what is written in the proposal for a new Soviet Agreement.

You, especially, demand that there should be a series of agreements, rather than a Soviet Constitution. I believe this is correct. There remain three questions which I would like to address.

1. The current parliament and Fokin's leadership. I spoke with Fokin. If he intends to create an independent Ukraine within a network of independent Soviet states, then the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine will help him, we

could again try to form a majority in parliament for this purpose. If only our republic's leaders were sincere.

Presently there is a counterreaction taking hold. I believe we should wait it out, maintaining our willingness to work and our dedication to the idea of sovereignty for a democratic Ukraine.

2. Regarding the mutual prejudice between Eastern and Western Ukrainians. Here I wish to bring up a topic which is painful for all of us. The subject of Banderivshchyna. At the beginning of the 1930, Bandera was the leading activist of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which upheld the principles of terror. This was a very limited movement. During the German occupation this movement changed character and became generally a liberation movement. Banderites declared war on Germans and "Soviets". When the Fascists were chased out, Soviet rule prevailed, and collectivization was introduced. Within five years the Banderite movement in Western Ukraine was completely annihilated. Let us examine this period: this is a tragic period for the Ukrainian nation. In Western Ukraine most of the NKVD members and administrators were sent in from Eastern Ukraine. The Famine of 1932-33 was also inflicted by the hands of young Ukrainians on their fellow villagers. In the same manner, during the war in 1914 the Volyn regiments of the Russian Tsarist Army fell upon the bayonets of the Galician regiments of the Austro-Hungarian Kaiser. Beginning long ago, imperialism aimed us - brother against brother. But I would like to ask you, where are those Banderites, about whom so much is written today? All of them have been convicted and shot, their ten times removed relatives sent to Siberia. From the viewpoint of Soviet jurisprudence they were punished by the Soviet government, including Bandera himself, and the proceedings were concluded. How about the lawlessness of the NKVD and the party apparatus, whose victims among the peaceful citizens exceeded by ten times the crimes committed by the Banderites? No, they were not convicted. Nor were the Bolsheviks for their other terrible transgressions, beginning with the October Revolution itself. As the chairman of the Lvov "Memorial" organization, I do not call for judgment, I ask that we set aside the past, reach agreement. I wish that in your hearts you would not carry scorn toward the radicalism of my countrymen - the residents of Western Ukraine. They, more than any other section of the Ukraine, strive for unity and cooperation.

3. I have already mentioned that the party apparatus is currently strengthening and leading a resolute attack on the democratic forces of the republic. We can survive only with truth as our defense. The creation of your party is an important event. All the strong young forces which are still within the ranks of the CPSU should include themselves in your party. I would like to support this individually. Therefore I am announcing my official resignation from the CPSU. I will remain non-partisan. And I would like to advise those Communists who turned to me for advice on how to honorably continue

serving their fatherland, to join the ranks of the parties of the Democratic Bloc - especially your Party for the Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine. This is a beautiful name. May you be successful.

Constituents Critical of Ukrainian Reform Deputy

91UN0600A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 12 Dec 90 p 4

[Open letter to Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy A. P. Kotsyuba from persons who sponsored his nomination as people's deputy and members of the coordinating council for his election campaign organization]

[Text] Dear Alexandr Pavlovich,

The following appeal is addressed to you by persons who, acting out of faith and trust in you, unreservedly affirmed this faith among the 34,000 voters of Radyanskiy Rayon in the city of Kiev. The changes that have occurred in public opinion within this constituency compel us to write to you.

We can all remember that late evening of 18 March 1990 when we celebrated together your election as deputy, hailing it as the latest victory of the Ukrainian Democratic Bloc. Little did we realize that after your rapid adaption to parliament we should be ashamed to look the people in the eyes. Possibly, your deputy immunity and peculiarly legalistic sense of optimism prevents you from sensing the mounting dissatisfaction. We can state as a fact, however, that there has been a spate of criticism, accompanied at times by accusations of political shortsightedness and naivete. Worst of all is the realization that those responsible for this criticism represent former followers from your constituency. We do not have the moral right to ignore their opinions regarding your actions as deputy in the Ukrainian parliament and in a broader context—all the more so in view of the fact that they have clearly expressed their doubts about the sincerity of our as well as your intentions, particularly as displayed in the course of the election campaign. That is, we are referring to a crisis of trust. In order to make clear where we stand, we should like to take this opportunity to set forth our views.

The criteria of our trust at the time of nominating candidates for Ukrainian SSR people's deputy (in December 1989) were well known, and they were almost universally recognized for all candidates representing the Democratic Bloc. Among these criteria an important place is occupied by the political position of candidates with regard to the national revival and the "conquest" of the bureaucratic and totalitarian party system. In our particular case, a major role was assigned to your enterprise in offering alternative legislative programs.

In our view there was ample justification for forming a group to support the nomination of A. P. Kotsyuba as Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, as borne out by your checkered career, including your separation from the CPSU (1976-1980); a prolonged period of work as a

lawyer and legal adviser; your involvement in the processes of democratization (as a member of the judicial commission of the Ukrainian SSR Deputy's Club, one of the co-authors of a draft law on the election of deputies, and the author of numerous articles expressing criticism of the party bureaucratic system, as well as a speaker at meetings of the Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika (Rukh); and, finally, the positive reactions of respected public leaders. So, on your behalf, and with the blessing of the Democratic Bloc, we mounted the barricades of the election campaign.

And what happened then? After establishing your credentials as deputy, and particularly after you were elected chairman of the Commission on Legal and Legislative Matters, your relationship with the group of your supporters formed a pattern of capricious and unilateral action. We for our part tried to act in accordance with the scheme you had proposed for achieving government by the people, built upon the principle of deputy interaction in soviets at all levels as well as on mutual cooperation between the deputies and the electorate. Incidentally, we had been perfectly sincere in assuring the electorate that your victory would bring about a concerted consolidation of efforts. We rang doorbells—we made public opinion surveys among the voters. Meanwhile, imperceptibly, the springs of public discontent with those who had been elected were being placed under increasing tension by the "apparatus" (wherever it served their purposes). A pattern of opposition between rayon soviets, village advocates of old dogmas, and the potentially democratic Kiev Soviet developed into open conflict. Your authoritative intervention was of the utmost importance. But you were already engaged in playing the role of arbitrator—a peacemaker among bureaucratic rivals.

We could end this grim story at this point, but civic duty, together with a natural desire to discover even a glimmer of hope, compels us to press on in our search for the truth. In our opinion, your responses to a number of questions could assist us in this endeavor. In order not to draw you away unnecessarily from important matters of state, we are accompanying the questions with certain supplementary information regarding matters of fact in order to place the desired responses in context. With this in mind, let us turn to the following questions.

1. Have you made any efforts to reconcile your present stand as a deputy with the following characterization, which you personally published in a leaflet? It is still in the possession of many of the voters. It says: "Alexandr Pavlovich is a man of both word and deed—a staunch, committed, and intransigent fighter for perestroika. Spinelessness and political compromise are alien to his nature. Such a person is precisely the man we need under current conditions in the Ukraine."

2. In your public utterances you have often cited the opinions and will of the voters in Radyanskiy Rayon. Clarify, if you please, which group of voters you have in

mind. The 34,215 people who cast their votes for you? Or the 35,621 who were either against you or who failed to register any opinion?

3. Have you changed your mind about those persons, such as Lukov, Nikitchenko, and Azisov, who, in your phrase, "trampled on the dignity" of the illustrious Arsenal collective in behind-the-scenes intrigues at the time of your nomination as Ukrainian SSR people's deputy? What specific actions have you taken to uphold the honor of the collective and to have the degrading decision of the district commission dated 11 January 1990 revoked? (See MOLODAYA GWARDIYA, dated 17 March 1990.)

4. It is common knowledge that the Soviet of People's Deputies [Narodnaya Rada] has dissociated itself from you. The Ukrainian Communist Party has excluded you from its Democratic platform. The agrarian faction does not recognize you. Nor are you a member of the "group of 239" (in your own words). Yet in the Conciliation Commission you represent the parliamentary majority. All things considered, just what political views do you share with what political party?

5. During the election campaign you devoted a good deal of attention to the problems of youth. In particular, you were seeking a way to free 19 students arrested in February 1990 near the Kiev City Soviet. You explained their "youthful maximalism" as a sincere attempt to come to terms with the complex process of perestroika. (See the commentary entitled "Femida and the Students" in VECHERNIY KIYEV, dated 2 March 90.) The starvation that occurred in 1990 and the student strikes in October, which broke out throughout the Ukraine, even forcing the parliamentary majority to submit to the will of the people, elicited from you a stormy condemnation. You gave such a cynical assessment of events that in the student tent city this slogan could be seen:

"Rukh, you made Kotsyuba—Better if you would..." [Ukrainian]

Can you now subscribe to the thesis that "the truth comes from the mouths of babes"? And how can you expect to get along with "our kids" in the Komsomol?

6. On 11 February 1990, at a meeting on the Square of the October Revolution attended by a hundred thousand people, you gave assurances "to those who voted for me and to all the residents of Kiev" that you would present to the first session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet your own draft of a Ukrainian Constitution.

Tell us, if you will: To whom did you deliver the draft? And in what respect did you contribute to the renown of the Ukraine, whose representatives you addressed on the square?

7. In your election literature you often criticized the Central Electoral Commission for a lack of competence and for being biased, and you promised, if you won, to

straighten everything out. You did not even refrain from criticizing the commission chairman, V. F. Boyko.

Are we to assume that you fulfilled your promise when you delivered in sessions fiery speeches in defense of the new minister of justice as a member of the inner circle of former Prime Minister V. A. Masol?

8. In your statements and speeches you endeavor to show that you endorse the independent judgments of the constructive center. However, an analysis of the voting records of Kiev deputies reveals a startling discovery. Your judgment coincides with the collective "opinions" of the group that includes Dukhov, Kondratyev, and Mokroysov.

Who are we to believe—you or your voting record?

9. Have you aligned your political compass with the opinions of your Democratic Bloc colleagues A. V. Savchenko and A. V. Lavrinovich from the 16th Electoral District? Or with the opinions of your progressive colleagues from the political bloc endorsing the RDK [expansion not given] platform? These include I. V. Volkov, scholar; N. P. Dvorkovyy, worker; S. S. Zabelin, director; V. L. Karlash, scientist; V. A. Mikhaylik, designer; S. A. Fedoriv, technician; O. F. Chernogyz, writer; and B. G. Sharvarko, film director.

We wish to thank you in advance for your answers to this letter and to express our willingness to discuss them with you publicly at meetings with the voters of Radyanskiy Rayon, on the radio, or on television. At the same time, we invite your participation in conducting a review of the draft Law on the Recall of Deputies at the earliest opportunity.

Signed by the following voter representatives:

Yu. P. Sakhno, junior scientific adviser, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Hydromechanics; **V. L. Palamarchuk**, engineer, Arsenal Plant; **V. S. Timoshenko**, engineer, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Semiconductor Institute of the Special Technical Design Bureau.

Sponsors of your nomination as Ukrainian SSR people's deputy in the labor collectives:

From Radyanskiy Electoral District No. 16: **V. M. Parkhisenko**, junior scientific associate, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Hydromechanics.

From Pecherskiy Electoral District No. 13: **L. T. Bezko-robaynaya**, engineer, Arsenal Plant; **A. I. Fesenko**, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Problems of Tensile Strength; **V. P. Sherstyuk**, chief scientific associate, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Physical Chemistry; **A. S. Shpot**, senior scientific associate, Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of the Timber and Wood Processing Industry; **L. T. Yatsenko**, chief designer, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Special Technical Design Bureau Plant.

Members of the Election Organization Coordinating council:

A. P. Zakharchuk, people's deputy, Radyanskiy Rayon Soviet; V. V. Kirsia, people's deputy, Kiev City Soviet; V. V. Krakovetskiy-Kocherzhinskiy, chief scientific associate, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Superhard Materials; V. V. Levchenko, senior scientific associate, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Mechanics; I. I. Litvinov, engineer, Kiev Machine Manufacturing Association; P. D. Malyarchuk, head specialist, Spektr Scientific Production Association; V. V. Melenevskiy, Plant Division, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Hydromechanics; A. V. Minchenko, engineer, Kiev Machine Shop imeni O. K. Antonov; N. A. Muzhilkov, bureau chief, Kiev Machine Manufacturing Association; V. A. Poyarkov, metal worker, Elektroni-pribor Scientific Production Association; V. N. Prokhorov, people's deputy, Radyanskiy Rayon Soviet; N. N. Puzik, pensioner; M. B. Strikha, people's deputy, Kiev City Soviet; A. S. Stoyka, maintenance chief, Kievenergo Power Line Network; N. S. Shchepets, people's deputy, Kiev City Soviet.

EDITOR'S NOTE: In publishing this open letter to A. P. Kotsyuba, the editorial staff once again finds it necessary to stress that it has the right to print materials without necessarily sharing the opinions of their authors. In the tradition of welcoming differences of opinion, we are prepared to provide A. P. Kotsyuba an opportunity to express his own views with reference to the issues addressed.

Odessa Executive Power To Be Strengthened

91UN0717A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 91
Union Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy: "Odessa: The End of Dual Power"]

[Text] Odessa—The Odessa City Soviet session adopted a resolution on strengthening the executive power in the city.

The wording is simple, but there are serious things behind it. First of all, it means that the presidium of the city soviet, as well as the post of city soviet chairman, in its former role as representative of legislative power, will be abolished. The new leader of the soviet will also be the head of the executive committee, that is, the era of dual power has come to an end, and the two posts are now combined in one.

Academician Boris Burkinskiy, the soviet chairman, resigned. It appears to me that he did so without visible regrets. He did not have to go back to his Institute of Economics, since he had never left it in the first place. One of the initiators of creating the all-encompassing free economic zone in Odessa, he continued to work on this idea while continuing to sit in his two chairs.

To be frank, one thing that sincerely pleased me about Boris Vladimirovich's resignation was that it took place calmly, without dramatics and hysterics. A professional, caught between the power and the cause, chose his professional, "shop" interest, which only added to his authority and his ability to command respect.

Naturally, the merging of two powers is not a mechanical combination. It will lead to structural changes in the executive committee. But this is not the main point. The soviet faced a particularly complicated issue at this session. From the outside it could be compared to this: It had a watch movement that was out of whack, and it needed to find a master who could fix it. They needed a professional who knew all the fine details of managing a city. They needed a person who knew how to use power but would not abuse it. And, finally, they needed an Odessa native, somebody, who was in love with this city and would take its pain and its problems as if they were his own. But that is on the outside. In substance, the session faced the problem of choosing a qualitatively new form of city government.

The candidate list at first included about 15 people. After several withdrawals, nine candidates remained for consideration. Four of them, having used their legitimate ten minutes for philosophic soliloquies, stepped down from further competition for power. Four more presented their programs knowing for certain that they would not be elected. The first name on the list of candidates for the post of soviet chairman was Valentin Simonenko, chairman of the city soviet executive committee under the old structure for the past seven years.

Simonenko was nominated by the communist faction. It is interesting, though, and, if you wish, quite significant that he was supported by the representatives of the Democratic Platform and other political movements. None of the competitors cast a stone at him. Was he criticized? Yes, without restraint. But at the same time it was no secret to anybody that there was no alternative to Simonenko, and that he would be elected. Jumping ahead of myself, I will say that this is exactly what happened: Valentin Konstantinovich received about 150 votes, leaving about 70 votes for all other contenders.

It has become obvious by now that what is needed are the professionals, the people who can not only enunciate programs and ideas, but who are also capable of implementing them in real life. It is important to finally understand that there is not only a collective irresponsibility, but also a collective responsibility. If a collective organ of power, on any level, makes mistakes and is no longer able to control the situation, whether it is on a single homestead or the entire country, it should have enough courage to resign, just like a single person holding a specific post would. By the way, I have heard from the soviet's deputies that the city's condition is such that either cardinal changes should be made, or the leadership should resign.

Valentin Simonenko assumed not only the full extent of power, but also a burden of great responsibility. The first issue the new chairman will have to tackle is how to fix the huge hole in this year's budget. Right now it is a hole to the tune of 18 million rubles [R]. How to get out of it? I would like the people, and not only Odessa residents, to think about this.

In the recent referendum Odessa residents voted for a decision to regenerate the city by their own efforts and resources. The creation of a free economic zone, formed on the basis of scientific methods, will relieve the country's government of one of its many headaches—where to get R5 or 6 billion to bring back the robustness and flourish to the city that has done so much for the Fatherland. The only thing that is left to do is for the Ukrainian parliament and government to pass a law giving Odessa free economic zone status.

A courageous and well thought-through action by the Odessa City Soviet toward strengthening democratic power may still encounter, as has happened in our Fatherland so many times in the past, an unforeseen obstacle: the indifference of those who hold power at the higher level towards the city's problems. There is hope, however, that the new chairman, being also a Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deputy, will be able to defend the city's interests. That has been taken into account, too...

Caucasus

Azeris in Georgia Form Society

91US0216A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
14 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by K. Mskhiladze under the rubric "Information": "The 'Geyrat' Society Is Created"]

[Text] A constituent conference of the "Geyrat" people's movement, representing the interests of Azeris living in Georgia, took place in the Marneuli Palace of Culture imeni Merab Kostav.

Acknowledging Georgia's desire to build a democratic and independent state, which should guarantee equal rights to all its residents independent of nationality, the conference's participants adopted a program for the society with regard for the realities of the present. This program is founded on the fact that "Geyrat," which does not aspire to political power and is not creating additional administrative formations, undertakes to assist in developing the culture, spiritual values, and sociopolitical views of Azeris residing in Georgia.

The structure of "Geyrat" envisages the creation of equal primary organizations of that society in all the rayons of Georgia where the Azeri population lives. The conference elected the board of directors of the society and its chairman—Alibala Gasan-ogly Askerov, a priest from Damia-Geurarkh. Accountable to the conference are the editorial collegium of the society's newspaper and

the commissions working in different fields of activity: law, medicine, ecology, socioeconomic problems, and land use, as well as a committee of interethnic relations and a rights committee.

The conference adopted appeals to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet and the National Congress, to the population of Georgia, and to the organs of power and the community of Azerbaijan.

Taking part in the conference were representatives of various sociopolitical organizations of Georgia and Azerbaijan and deputies of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet and the National Congress. Now the next task of "Geyrat" is to undergo registration as a new public organization of our republic.

Georgian Deputies Meet With Congressmen

91US0215A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
14 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by M. Yeligulashvili under the rubric "Information. Commentary.": "The Commission Has Been Formed. No Agreement Has Been Reached"]

[Text] A delegation of the National Congress of Georgia met with the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia representing the "Round table—Free Georgia" bloc. The meeting took place in a building of the Union of Writers of Georgia.

It seemed for a while that the meeting would be disrupted, practically before it started. Irakli Batnashvili asked a rather neutral question: whether the deputies' group was authoritative enough and whether it came to negotiate on behalf of the Georgian Supreme Soviet or of the Round Table alone. This question caused a rather unexpected countermovement. Deputy Georgiy Khavtasi asked, in his turn, who the other party was representing. After being told that they were speaking officially on behalf of the National Congress, he declared that the Supreme Soviet did not recognize the National Congress and, therefore, no negotiations could be conducted given such a status of either delegation.

They managed to overcome this contradiction. More conflict situations arose in the course of the discussion. It is not surprising if one remembers that the relations among the people and organizations—members of the National Congress and the Supreme Soviet—are far from friendly. One should not deceive oneself and claim that the meeting in the Union of Writers brought those elected bodies closer. They managed to agree on one issue only. However, this is already a lot as the issue in itself is very important and quite critical.

The hunger strike of the "Sakartvelos mkhedrioni" members, as well as the situation around this action (the counter-hunger strike by the House of Government, etc.) is a realistic fact. It could not last for ever, at least

because of the specific character of this kind of a protest and because its participants were prepared not to give up for anything.

An acceptable solution was needed and they found it—in the form that satisfied the “mkhedrioni.” They decided to set up a commission on the informal armed units in Georgia. The commission will be made up of five representatives from the Supreme Soviet and from the National Congress each, apart from five people not related to either of these bodies. This composition makes us hope for an objective character of their actions. Among other things, the commission will look into the accusations against the “Sakartvelos mkhedrioni” members. The commission will have the opportunity to study all the materials of their case investigations.

No other mutually acceptable decisions can be mentioned. The sides were too rigid in their positions. At some points even the proposals to discuss one or another issue were drowned by the desire of every participant to say something of his own. The Round Table members hold a major trump card at present—a landslide victory at the elections that showed the support given to them by the majority of the population. This circumstance is indisputable and it cannot be doubted. However, the desire to present this trump card as an argument in every debate that occurred during the meeting only helped to confuse the discussion or make it impossible altogether. This fact, as well as the unyielding stances of the delegations members, resulted in their failure to conduct any discussion at all on issues such as the definition of Georgia's status or of the troops located on its territory and some other ones.

The excited crowd by the Union of Writers building did not disperse for a long time. But it was not so much the negotiations that they were discussing heatedly, as it was the appearance of Teymuraz Koridze [chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Culture, Education, and Science] who came to the meeting surrounded by a considerable number of bodyguards. The congress representatives came to the Union of Writers building separately, one by one. This is understandable: Ours is not a peaceful time. But these were parliamentary negotiations and, what is more, they dealt with the problem of armed groups. Was it really necessary to stir up the crowd once again?

American Reporter Interviews Gamsakhurdia

91US0227A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
8 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[“Replies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, to Questions by American Journalist Edmund Stevens”—ZARYA VOSTOKA headline]

[Text] [Stevens] On the eve of the elections scheduled for 25 March 1990, a special conference of Georgia's national liberation movement was held at which you called for a boycott of the elections and the Georgian

Supreme Soviet and the creation of an opposition National Duma, and in the event of elections to the Supreme Soviet, it would have to go into self-liquidation (this was published in the newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA of 13 March 1990). Now, however, you have not only participated in the elections, but have become chairman of that same Supreme Soviet for whose liquidation you were calling just a few months ago. How can you explain such a transformation of your position? The more so in that, in accordance with a decision of that same conference, it was decided to expel from the national movement the public associations that took part in the elections.

[Gamsakhurdia] The one-party elections scheduled for 25 March 1990, were based on antidemocratic principles and could not have expressed the wishes of the Georgian population, and for this reason we boycotted these elections. But when, by the efforts and protest actions of the “Round Table—Free Georgia” bloc, a new election law was enacted and free multiparty, not soviet, elections became possible, only after this did we participate in these elections and deservedly win. So I have not become chairman of “that same Supreme Soviet for whose liquidation I had been calling” but of a new multiparty Supreme Soviet, which is no longer a soviet structure and which is deservedly called the national parliament of Georgia.

It should be mentioned that, as distinct from previous elections, the elections to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet took place without the regimentation of the Soviet Constitution, where various parties were registered not by the governing soviet authorities but the Central Electoral Commission. Foreign experts were invited as observers. Under these conditions free elections, which were the sole spokesmen for the wishes of the population of Georgia, were held.

[Stevens] Your political opponents—Chanturiya and Tsereteli—staged elections to the National Congress. How, in your view, will relations between essentially two power structures in Georgia take shape? The more so in that both you and your opponents intend organizing elections to local authorities. The newspapers are frequently writing about the conflict between the leaders of the Round Table and the supporters of the National Congress, and it has reached the point, what is more, not only of verbal crossfire but the use of violence, including armed violence. How do you conceive of continued coexistence with the National Congress?

You see Georgia's future, as perceived from your election program, in total independence and self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, your opponents from the National Congress are unambiguously advocating the creation of a militarized state akin to Israel and the joining of the NATO bloc. What is your position on this issue?

[Gamsakhurdia] As far as my political opponents are concerned, they have conducted no real elections; these elections were falsified, and not even two percent of the

Georgian population took part in them. They did not publish detailed figures by district and precinct, and foreign experts did not verify them, so the self-styled "National Congress" represents no political force, even less is it a "power structure," as you call it. They are sponsoring armed gangs of criminals in the districts, which are robbing and terrorizing the population—this is the sum total of their "activity." And our conflicts with them are occurring exclusively on this soil. Continued "coexistence" will also depend on whether they abandon or not their ties to the criminal mafia, which is committing so many crimes in Georgia. The political "ideas" of the Congress, which is calling for Georgia to be declared a colonial country, are unacceptable to us since we believe that a colonial country is legally deprived of the right to hold free, multiparty elections in its own country, whereas in Georgia it was official multiparty elections, at which victory went to the democratic and national forces, that were held. The so-called National Congress does not enjoy the support of the people, and we consider it a fiction devoid of political maturity and competence. Testimony to this is their attitude on the question of Georgia's entry into the NATO bloc—this at a time when progressive integration processes, the building of a common European home, and the achievement of all-European military security are under way in Europe.

[Stevens] What type of statehood will be built in Georgia and what will the form of government be? This matter is illustrated ambivalently in your recent speeches.

[Gamsakhurdia] A parliamentary democratic republic will be built in Georgia, and I have always adhered to this idea in all my speeches.

[Stevens] The supporters of the Round Table sponsored and pursued a policy of the withdrawal of the "forces of occupation" from Georgia and the creation of its own army. What is your position on this question at the present time and how, generally, do you conceive of relations with the Army subunits stationed in Georgia?

In the event of the creation of your own armed forces, border forces, and custom houses, from what sources will these programs be financed and where will the personnel be trained?

[Gamsakhurdia] The legitimacy of the presence in Georgia of the Soviet forces of occupation should be decided by international law and such authorities as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and others when Georgia achieves full independence and creates its own national army. Until then the Army units in Georgia should change their status and be the representatives of a foreign state.

We reject all reckless ideas of physical struggle against them as being fraught with great danger for Georgia. The new national army of Georgia will be financed from the Georgian budget, and the personnel will be trained by local and foreign specialists, as is the case in all other countries.

[Stevens] It follows from your interviews that you intend to reorganize the state security authorities. In which direction will this reorganization take place, what functions will these authorities perform, and where will the employees of these authorities undergo training if you reject possible ties to the Union?

[Gamsakhurdia] We will reorganize the state security authorities in the direction of a national orientation, and the personnel also will be trained by our specialists.

[Stevens] There are, in our view, contradictions in your speeches on the nationality issue. Thus, on 1 November 1988, you declared at a meeting in the Writers Union that you had information concerning the Georgian Government's intention of transferring Eastern Georgia to Azerbaijan and you raised the question of the need for the eviction of the Azerbaijanis from land that they were occupying illegally.

On 11 November 1989, you declared at a meeting at Motion Picture House that the Ossetians would be told that "if they do not wish to live in peace with us, let them leave Georgia."

At a meeting on 6 December 1989, at the Art Gallery you called for restraints on the Adzhari separatists.

The appeal to the Georgian people on the question of the Meskhetian Turks on behalf of the Helsinki union declared that you would prevent the settlement in Georgia of a single ethnic Turk or a citizen acknowledging himself to be of Turkish nationality. In addition, they (the Georgian people) would fight for the repatriation of such people to Turkey.

However, in other statements for the official press, you say that ethnic hatred is alien to the Georgian people and speak of your devotion to the spirit of the Helsinki Accord, and you yourself were for a long time the leader of the Helsinki group in Georgia. How might you comment on such polar statements of yours?

[Gamsakhurdia] I see no contradictions in my statements. When certain of the newcomers from Azerbaijan and Ossetia and other foreigners behave aggressively and flout the rights of the indigenous Georgian population, discriminating against it, and also when they attempt to encroach on the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia and the life of the citizens, all this is then seen as an act of aggression and discrimination.

The oppression of the Georgian population on its own land could be evaluated in accordance with all international rules of law as an international crime.

Respect for the law is required not only of Azerbaijanis, but also of the representatives of all nations. Land that is unlawfully occupied should be liberated by all, among them also Georgians. However, in Georgia the illegal homes of Georgians are being demolished while the homes of the non-Georgian population are inviolable.

We are opposed to such discrimination. As far as separatists of all stripes are concerned, we will fight them since their claims to the breaking up of Georgia into parts are illegal.

As far as the Helsinki Accord is concerned, it does not call on states to admit unchecked to their territories hundreds of thousands of foreign citizens for permanent residence. All democratic countries have a citizenship law, Georgia as yet does not. For this reason we cannot prior to the enactment of this law admit foreigners in such enormous numbers to our small, land-hungry country, where foreigners constitute 35 percent of the population as it is. In such cases we once again proceed from international law, on which the Helsinki Accord is also based. The states subscribing to the Helsinki Accord also have laws restricting the unlimited influx of immigrants to their country, manpower particularly.

[Stevens] Even under the previous regime Georgia was being abandoned by people of Dagestani origin, and Greeks are leaving also; who will be next? Are there any assurances that in the renewed Georgia there will be peace between the representatives of different nationalities?

[Gamsakhurdia] When the outside interference ceases, all ethnic problems in Georgia will gradually disappear. The history of Georgia is confirmation that there has been a traditional peaceful and equal cohabitation of many centuries standing of different ethnic representatives. As far as migration is concerned, there has always been such in any state. We cannot prevent people from voluntarily leaving for their historical homeland.

[Stevens] If it is not a secret, what kind of package of legislative instruments does the newly elected parliament intend considering on the question of the normalization of interethnic relations in the republic?

[Gamsakhurdia] The status of citizenship of an independent Georgia will be a guarantee of equality and the normalization of relations between representatives of different nationalities.

[Stevens] Will not the abolition of the autonomy of the Adzharia cause complications in relations with adjacent Turkey? After all, the Adzharia confess a different religion. In addition, approximately 2 million ethnic immigrants from Georgia reside in Turkey, as is known.

[Gamsakhurdia] The solution of internal problems legally is the prerogative of the Georgian people. In addition, it should be noted that it is not a majority of Adzharia who confess a different religion. We are abolishing the autonomy of Adzharia only with the consent of the Adzharia, that is, by way of referendum. As far as the Georgians living in Turkey are concerned, they would like to see Georgia united, not fragmented into autonomous entities. No one approves of the autonomy of Georgians in Georgia other than the communist mafia of Adzharia.

[Stevens] Considerable numbers of Georgians live outside of Georgia itself, overseas included. Will the newly elected Georgian parliament implement measures for their return to the motherland, and if so, will this not give rise to new complications with persons of other nationalities who live in the republic? After all, Georgia's land reserves are not great.

[Gamsakhurdia] The return of Georgian emigres to the motherland would not harm the living conditions of the representatives of other nationalities; besides, our people living overseas are not that great in number, and only some of them want to return home.

[Stevens] The idea of the need for the return to Georgia of some territories that belonged to it earlier and that are at the present time part of other republics—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia—has filtered into certain articles. What are the territories in question? And how does the new Georgian Government intend settling this tricky question?

[Gamsakhurdia] The Government of the Republic of Georgia will not examine these matters at this stage of government.

[Stevens] Following your election as chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, you proclaimed a three-year transitional period. What reforms do you intend accomplishing in this period and then what?

[Gamsakhurdia] Our task is the speediest elimination of the consequences of Georgia's annexation, complete suspension of the USSR Constitution on the territory of Georgia, the preparation of new legislative instruments and economic principles for the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Georgia, and the creation of a new Georgian Constitution.

[Stevens] It is known that at the present time Georgia's economy is built primarily on imported raw material. A substantial proportion of the food, petroleum products and fuel, and lubricants is also brought into Georgia from other regions of the country. Considering your proclamation of a policy of total independence of the Union, you obviously have expectations of something or other. From where will you get the raw material for industry and how will you tackle the food program?

[Gamsakhurdia] Georgia has sufficient natural resources to make good the shortfall that it is experiencing in other spheres.

The fact that the Georgian economy is dependent on the Union economy is a result of the fact that Georgia has been an inmate of the prison of the peoples—the Soviet Empire—and has been isolated from the rest of the world, not only politically but also economically. The question of raw material for industry and the food question will be resolved when Georgia switches to a free market economy and becomes a full member of the world market, to which it will be able to export its

resources and abundant agricultural produce, develops tourism, and becomes the owner of its own splendid resorts.

[Stevens] In the economic sphere the election platform of the Round Table speaks of the need to obtain from the Union that proportion of Georgia's national property that, in the opinion of the Round Table, was taken out of Georgia in the period of Soviet power. How does the new Georgian parliament intend evaluating the amounts that were exported and against whom specifically will suit be brought: the Union as a whole or Russia?

[Gamsakhurdia] The financial and economic experts have sufficient methods for estimating the amounts that will be presented to the so-called center for the long colonial plunder of Georgia.

[Stevens] Even prior to your election to this position, calls were heard in your speeches for the need to adopt the most important decisions for Georgia by way of referendum. Does this hold true, and how do you intend accomplishing this and in respect of which issues?

[Gamsakhurdia] The elections to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet have assumed the force of a referendum, and a special referendum law will be introduced by our parliament.

[Stevens] It can be seen from your numerous speeches that you consider Georgia a victim of Russia's colonial policy, and it is difficult to disagree with you here. At the same time, however, among the peoples of the Union the greatest sufferings were caused by the Georgian Stalin. Despite this, many Georgians revere his memory as a great figure. What is your attitude toward Stalin, and how would you comment on the ambivalent attitude in Georgia toward the "father of the peoples?"

[Gamsakhurdia] Stressing Stalin's Georgian nationality is unjustified. Stalin was a creation of Bolshevik totalitarianism, and when he became dictator and tyrant, nothing Georgian remained in him, as even his daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva observes. It is true that he caused the peoples of the Union the greatest sufferings, but, nonetheless, it was Georgia itself that suffered from him most, since he always endeavored to prove his internationalism. He is revered merely by a negligible part of the Georgian population, people who are at a low level of political awareness. This was shown by our elections, when no one supported the claims of the "Stalin" society to participate in the elections and when, in accordance with the law, it was removed from the list of parties that took part in the elections.

[Stevens] It would be interesting, as a parallel, to know your opinion of Gorbachev, whose reforms essentially opened to Georgia the way to independence.

[Gamsakhurdia] Georgia's way to independence was opened by the progressive and creative forces of the West who made and continue to make the policy of a dismantling of the totalitarian empire, into which Gorbachev

was drawn willy-nilly. We would like his actions to be more in keeping with his verbal statements and programs.

In conclusion, I wish the peoples of the world, the British and Italian in particular, universal true human happiness. I would like them to treat with even greater understanding the oppressed peoples of the USSR fighting for independence and democracy.

Opposition Among Georgian Organs Viewed

91US0229A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
8 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by Eka Akhalkatsi: "Is There Opposition? There Is"]

[Text] Member of the National Congress of Georgia Dzhaba Ioseliani was the initiator of the "Mkhedrioni" and "Georgian Eagles" hunger strike in Tbilisi on Rustaveli Boulevard. A few days later "Round Table members" started a hunger strike. Meetings were organized by turn at intervals of about an hour or an hour-and-a-half. The paradox is that both sides oppose destabilization. In Ioseliani's words, their "main demand is not to impose a curfew; it is to generate calm." Representatives of the official authorities are also calling for calm. Thus, in his recent statement on Georgian television, republic procurator Vakhtang Razmadze appealed for peace and harmony and expressed the apprehension that otherwise it will be necessary to resort to the emergency measure of... imposing a curfew. Several days before him, in the "Moambe" program Colonel General Valeriy Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, cited instances of attacks on servicemen and theft of weapons, which evoked the indignation of the republic's inhabitants (see ZARYA VOSTOKA 29 November). As far as the weapons are concerned, Dzhaba Ioseliani believes that if "these are a few pistols, then it means nothing. Each Georgian should have a weapon." The chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Commission for Defense, National Security, and Law and Order, Vazha Adamiya, is calling on "all citizens of the Republic of Georgia to remain calm and not yield to any kind of provocation. Destabilization of the situation is of no advantage either to the Georgian people or the government. All issues should be resolved only by legal means." In his words, Dzhaba Ioseliani's action was provoked by slander against him and his children, but he had not resorted to the courts in that matter because they are "Soviet, with the same laws, the same corruption, the same protectionism, and the same sense of party-mindedness."

One way or another there is a certain opposition now in Georgia. Hopes that the Supreme Soviet elected on 28 October and the National Congress elected even earlier would cooperate peacefully have started to fade. One resolution recently adopted by the Second Session of the National Congress states as follows: In order to have dialogue between these two bodies it is necessary to

answer a number of questions raised by the congress. They are interested in the following: Is the Supreme Soviet ready to define Georgia's status as an annexed country? Will the Supreme Soviet declare itself an organ of self-government in a country that is occupied and virtually in the position of a colonial country? Does the Supreme Soviet intend to de-occupy [deokupirovat] Georgia? Is it prepared before that to declare "independence"? Is the resolution on not signing the Union treaty acceptable to it? Will the Committee for State Security be liquidated as a criminal organization or will the Supreme Soviet limit itself to renaming it? Will the Supreme Soviet recognize the need for noninterference by censorship in the work of the mass media and will they be freed from official diktat, and when does it intend to do that? Does it recognize the freedom of the individual regardless of religious belief and party affiliation? Will it refrain from interference in the creative activity of cultural and scientific institutions? Does the Supreme Soviet deem it necessary to engage in dialogue with the National Congress and coordinate its actions with it along the path of restoring independent statehood?

In line with the same resolution, the National Congress deems itself the "sole body that is the spokesman of the will of the people of Georgia," but the National Congress cannot recognize the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet (elected, let me remind you, by an absolute majority of voters) "as the national parliament because an annexed state cannot have a true supreme body under conditions of occupation, no matter what laws are invoked for elections."

As he himself recently stated, personally Dzhaba Ioseliani "is not against sitting down at the negotiating table with the Supreme Soviet." The leader of the National Democratic Party of Georgia, Georgiy Chanturiya (see NOVOYE VREMYA No 46), says that "... our people have always been able to fight and have loved to fight. This is a part of the Georgian national character that has been manifest. Georgians have always needed an enemy in order to feel that they are a nation, and Georgians have always needed opposition."

The representatives of the St. Ilya the Righteous Society (the "Round Table—Free Georgia") who started an indefinite hunger strike in response to the action of Dzhaba Ioseliani, are demanding an opportunity for normal work by the people's choices; one of the aims of their action is also to abolish unofficial, illegal, and unconstitutional military formations.

The views of the authorities and the National Congress are diametrically opposed with respect to the presence of troops of the Soviet Army on Georgia's territory. Whereas the Supreme Soviet believes that they do not interfere with the restoration of independent statehood for our republic, and representatives of the Republic of Georgia's officer corps believe that they should gradually be transformed into republic troops, in one of its resolutions the National Congress deems it expedient to start

negotiations with the Union government on the following issues: the organization of and time periods for the withdrawal of occupation troops, the legal liquidation of military bases on the territory of Georgia under international supervision, and so forth.

And there is one other resolution—"On Legislation"—according to which the National Congress recognizes as legitimate only the 1921 Constitution of the Georgian Republic, which will acquire legal force with the acquisition of independent statehood, and according to which the highest body of the Republic of Georgia is the parliament. Under conditions of occupation, any legislative enactment passed by local supreme soviets or the Union Supreme Soviet are unlawful; according to the resolution, those laws of the Georgian Supreme Soviet that are not at variance with Georgia's interests and the interests of the Georgian nation, and also the 1921 Georgian Constitution, and that have as their aim restoration of independence, will be supported by the National Congress of Georgia. For in material published on 6 July 1990 in MOLODEZH GRUZII entitled "What Can the National Congress Offer Us" the following is stated: "Let us underscore once again that there will be no place for competition and rivalry: no one is about to encroach on the legislative powers of the Supreme Soviet, and indeed could not do so even if they wanted to since executive power remains under its control. The National Congress is the political and consultative body of the national liberation movement, and it is designed to bring proper order to our sociopolitical life and raise it to a higher level."

Cooperation Among Georgian Organs Possible

91US0229B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by Ivlian Khaindrava, member of the National Congress from the Union of Free Democrats of Georgia: "On the Question of Opposition"]

[Text] 13 December 1990—On 8 December an article by E. Akhalkatsi with the somewhat melancholy title "Is There Opposition? There Is" was published in the newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA. The author, as it were, hurls out the reproach "I told you so..." The object of this reproach becomes clear thanks to a reference to material in the newspaper MOLODEZH GRUZII on 6 July this year—"What Can the National Congress Offer Us?" Since I happen to be the author of this latter material, let me try to introduce some clarity into the essential nature of the issue.

In her article Eka Akhalkatsi writes: "Hopes that the Supreme Soviet elected on 28 October and the National Congress elected even earlier would cooperate peacefully have started to fade." In confirmation of this pessimistic prediction, the author of the article cites in detail (but not fully) the text of three resolutions adopted at the Second Session of the National Congress. It is obviously the author's idea that they will become insurmountable

obstacles on the road to mutual understanding between the Supreme Soviet and the National Congress, and that responsibility for this should be laid at the door of the uncompromising and unappeasable National Congress.

There is no need even to analyze the National Congress resolutions in detail in order to show the groundlessness of these misgivings. I think that all that is needed to respond to the points made in the National Congress resolutions is to cite the position of the ruling bloc of parties and sociopolitical organizations on a similar issue. It turns out that there is something in the nature of a dialogue, which I hope will be of some interest to the reader. Thus, the National Congress: "Is the Supreme Soviet prepared officially to define the status of Georgia reflecting its actual condition as an occupied, annexed country?"

From the speech delivered by Z. Gamsakhurdia at the First Session of the Supreme Soviet: "Thus, it is our opinion that Georgia is an annexed country where the process of liquidating the consequences of annexation and restoring independent statehood has been initiated."

From the platform of the "Round Table—Free Georgia" bloc: "We deem it essential that the newly elected Supreme Soviet immediately initiate talks with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on recognizing as a gross violation of the Russian-Georgian treaty of 7 May 1920 the occupation and actual annexation by Soviet Russia in February 1921. In parallel, talks should be held with the USSR and other states on the recognition of Georgia as an annexed state." The National Congress: "Does the Supreme Soviet intend to de-occupy Georgia, and how?"

From the speech of Z. Gamsakhurdia at the First Session of the Supreme Soviet: "Another issue is the recognition of Georgia as an occupied country and conferring on Soviet troops the status of an army of a foreign country, and raising at the level of international law the question of the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from Georgia, for which it will be necessary to initiate talks with the center and countries in the West."

From an interview given by A. Asatiani to the newspaper *VECHERNIY TBILISI* on 1 December 1990: "But the fact is that our republic is de facto and de jure an occupied country. And I stated this from the dais of the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow. You cannot escape the historical and legal fact."

The National Congress: "Will the Committee for State Security as a criminal organization be liquidated or will the Supreme Soviet limit itself to renaming it?"

From the platform of the "Round Table—Free Georgia" bloc: "... The Supreme Soviet should during the transitional period immediately make the following legislative enactment: ... 7. On the national security service."

From an interview given by Z. Gamsakhurdia to the American journalist E. Stevens: "We shall carry out a

reorganization of the organs of state security by means of national orientation, and personnel will also be trained by our own specialists."

Fragment from a news conference of Z. Gamsakhurdia, *MOLODEZH GRUZII* 2 November 1990: "In the form in which the Committee for State Security now exists it is a subdivision of the Union Committee for State Security and is not bound by Georgian jurisprudence. We are trying to make it truly national."

The National Congress: "Is the Supreme Soviet prepared to declare 'independence' before de-occupation?"

From a speech presented by Z. Gamsakhurdia at the Supreme Soviet First Session: "As you are aware, despite the victory in the elections, the national opposition is still not proclaiming full state independence for Georgia, and this is because of the political realities existing in Georgia and in the world."

Fragment from a new conference given by Z. Gamsakhurdia to *MOLODEZH GRUZII*, 2 November 1990: "Question: You have said that your bloc's winning a majority in the legislature is a first step toward independence. What is the second step?"

"Z. Gamsakhurdia: To issue a declaration of independence."

The National Congress: "Is the resolution that the new 'Union' treaty will not be signed under any condition acceptable?" From a statement issued by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet on 22 November 1990: "Under these conditions the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet does not consider it possible to sign a new Union treaty and thus assume any kind of political-legal obligations."

The National Congress: "Will the Supreme Soviet declare itself an organ of colonial self-government or an organ of self-government for an annexed and occupied country?"

Fragment from an interview given by Z. Gamsakhurdia to the newspaper *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA* on 28 November 1990: "Do you believe that Georgia is now a colony?"

"Of course! It does not have its own state."

"But surely Georgia is a Union republic, one of 15 equal republics of the Union. So who is oppressing and enslaving?"

"This is just pro forma. No republic can exist when the state does not have an independent government, an independence army, an independent money-and-banking system, an independent economy. You are an educated person and you are aware of all this. How can Georgia be considered a state when it does not have those attributes?" From the platform of the "Round Table—Free Georgia" bloc: "We believe that the conclusion of any state Union treaty is the prerogative of the

national parliament of Georgia, which will be elected immediately after the conclusion of the transitional period]" (my boldface—Ivlian Khaindrava).

The National Congress: "Will the Supreme Soviet recognize the need for noninterference by censorship of the mass media and their freedom from official diktat, and when does it intend to do this?"

The National Congress: "Does the Supreme Soviet recognize the freedom of the individual regardless of religious belief, party affiliation, and world outlook, and also noninterference in the creative activity of cultural and scientific institutions?"

From the platform of the "Round Table—Free Georgia" bloc: "Within Georgia, during the transitional period the equality of all citizens must be guaranteed. Proceeding from the above, we deem it essential to adopt and implement the following legislative enactments: 1) On the Official Status of the Georgian Language; 2) On Citizenship; 3) On Legal and Political Guarantees for Citizens; 4) On Political and Legal Guarantees for National Minorities; 5) On Immigration; 6) On Freedom of Conscience; 7) On Religious Organizations; 8) On Political Parties; 9) On the Mass Media."

T. Koridze, ZARYA VOSTOKA 11 December 1990: "Let me remind you that we have appealed to journalists not to ignore any political force in Georgia."

The National Congress: "Does the Supreme Soviet deem it necessary to engage in dialogue with the National Congress and coordinate its actions with it on the path toward restoring independent statehood?"

From the "Appeal to All Georgia" issued by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet: "At this time in Georgia, which is moving toward independence, there are virtually no serious reasons for enmity and mutual opposition." The National Congress: "The National Congress of Georgia considers legal and constitutional the enactment of the 1921 Constitution of the Republic of Georgia (adopted before the seizure of Georgia—Ivlian Khaindrava), which will truly come into force with the restoration of state independence. In accordance with the 1921 Georgian Constitution, the parliament is Georgia's highest legislative organ.."

The National Congress: "The National Congress cannot recognize the Supreme Soviet as the national parliament since an annexed and occupied state cannot have a true highest organ no matter what laws are invoked for elections under conditions of occupation." (The citations above already provide a partial answer on this subject. Nevertheless, let me quote two more).

From the platform of the "Round Table—Free Georgia" bloc: "The act of independence for Georgia proclaimed by the constituent assembly of the National Council of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 26 May 1918 and 12 March 1919 remains in force and has not lost its legal significance, and even today it is still the legal

foundation for the restoration of Georgia's independent statehood since the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia did not sign the capitulation and neither the government nor the Constitution of the republic were abolished by legal means, since an independent Georgia continues to exist even today and the force of its Constitution was temporarily suspended by the legal government in 1921."

Fragment from a news conference given by Z. Gamsakhurdia to MOLODEZH GRUZII on 2 November 1990: "... the newly elected parliament is an interim parliament for the transitional period and is not the subject of international law..."

I think we may end our imaginary conversation here (or perhaps it is time to start it?). Thus, it becomes clear that there should be virtually no fundamental disagreements in the positions of the National Congress and the "Round Table—Free Georgia" bloc, whose representatives constitute the majority in the Supreme Soviet and totally decide its policy. But in this case, a reasonable question is posed for the National Congress: What exactly do you want if everything is so clear? Let me explain. National Congress resolutions have been adopted as the result of lengthy and heated debate and a far from simple agreement of viewpoints at the Second Session of the National Congress, and are official documents that express henceforth the viewpoint of the entire National Congress rather than the viewpoints of individuals or parties. The National Congress is waiting for a similar move from the Supreme Soviet, since the above citations are taken both from the official documents of the Supreme Soviet and the speeches and interviews of its leaders, and also the election platform of the "Round Table—Free Georgia" bloc. Accordingly, the desire of the National Congress to hear an adequate response from the Supreme Soviet is quite justified, the more so since the objective reader's attention has probably been drawn to particular contradictions in the content of the above citations. In reality it would be possible to cite many more, but today's author does not intend to do this. On the contrary, he is trying to show that a basis for mutual understanding and coordination of actions by the National Congress and the Supreme Soviet undoubtedly does exist. But here it is necessary to emphasize that they are possible only given good will and a desire for cooperation from both sides. The National Congress has taken the first step, and it has been quite fruitful. And so, at the risk of being immodest, let me cite another phrase from the above material in the newspaper MOLODEZH GRUZII on 6 July 1990, with which, incidentally, E. Akhalkatsi also concluded her article: "The National Congress is the political and consultative organ of the national liberation movement, and it is designed to bring proper order to our sociopolitical life and raise it to a higher level." And there is more. The National Congress has not and does not lay claim to being some alternative to the Supreme Soviet as an organ of power. It is high time that this be explained to everyone.

Central Asia

New Role of Turkmen Communist Party Outlined, Sovereignty Underscored

91US0204A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 14 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Text of draft Turkmen Communist Party "action program:" "Toward the Real Sovereignty of the Turkmen SSR and Renewal of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan"]

[Text] The Communist Party of Turkmenistan notes that, under the influence of the October socialist revolution of 1917 and Leninist nationality policy, the Turkmen people, having dreamed for centuries of unity and freedom, have been freed from the colonial yoke of the Russian empire, have attained statehood, and have come to recognize the value of friendship among peoples. The Turkmen SSR has accomplished indisputable achievements in socioeconomic and cultural development.

At the same time, crude violations and deformations have been permitted at many stages of socialist construction, which have caused the Turkmen people, as well as other peoples of the USSR, a great deal of suffering and loss. Without considering the needs of national development and to the benefit of the centralized administrative command system and to the detriment of federalism, a unitary model of state structure has been imposed and, in many respects, the sovereignty of the republics has been a formal one. As a result, problems in economic, social, and intellectual life have been laid bare.

Perestroika has laid a basis for deep, democratic transformations within the country. Reforms are being carried out in the economy, politics, and the Soviet federation, and broad prospects have been opened for free national development and the economic independence of the republics. Today, the Turkmen SSR is reviving real state sovereignty. We are discussing all the deformations and mistakes of the past and are supporting a correct analysis of the historical past and of the present. We are rendering, and will render, what is due to the creative labor and self-sacrifice of our fathers and grandfathers, of all generations, in the name of the prosperity of our native land.

Proceeding from a recognition of its role and responsibility for the future of the republic, the Communist Party of Turkmenistan proposes a system of political guideposts and practical actions for ensuring preservation of a socialist way of life, true political and economic sovereignty of the Turkmen SSR, and renewal of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan.

Toward Ensuring the Political Sovereignty of the Turkmen SSR and Harmonization of Interethnic Relations

The Communist Party of Turkmenistan supports the self-determination of the Turkmen people, the freedom

of the national-state development of the Turkmen SSR, and the right of choice of form of life structure and of the institutes and symbols of statehood in accordance with national and historical conditions. The Turkmen Communist is carrying out this policy, based on the fact that the sovereign right of the people is the sole source of authority within the Turkmen SSR. In accordance with the desires and interests of the Turkmen people and with existing diverse economic and human ties, it sees the present and future of the republic to be as a member of an integral, renewed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, involving voluntary delegation to it of a part of its rights for the sake of achievement of common goals, and supports unconditional observance of the rights of citizens of all nationalities within the territories both of the republic and the country as a whole. The Communist Party believes that it is necessary to develop the contractual principle in the structure the USSR and stands decisively in opposition to separatist slogans and movements.

The Turkmen Communist Party stands for further development and perfection of the national statehood of the Turkmen people, for the guarantee of real sovereignty, political and economic independence of the Turkmen SSR, for the integrity of its territory, and for the inviolability of the republic's state borders. An important safeguard of the sovereignty of the Turkmen SSR is the introduction of a presidential form of state government within the republic.

The Turkmen Communist Party considers that the most important guarantee of political, legal, and economic sovereignty and development and of democracy must be a new constitution of the Turkmen SSR, which should be developed on the basis of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. A new republic constitution must secure the national statehood of the Turkmen people, a fundamental renewal of the political system of society and of the structure of state organs, a delimitation of legislative, executive, and judicial authority, a democratic delimitation of the powers and functions of republic and of local authorities, a guarantee of the precedence of the laws of the republic, further improvement of the election system, and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens.

The Communist Party of Turkmenistan will strive for the creation of a socialist state based on law, the guaranteed supremacy of law in all spheres of life, and guaranteed access by all citizens to participation in state affairs. It favors consistent development of legal reform, considering at the same time that, at the present stage, the strategic line of development of the political system of society lies in uninterrupted perfection of soviet democracy, in real participation by all citizens in state and public affairs. Statehood and self-government must be based upon sovereignty of the soviets of people's deputies.

Supporting an election system based on the principles of general, equal, direct voting rights, the republic Communist Party will pursue its policy while ensuring its vanguard role within the life of society and winning the votes of constituents in elections so as to obtain the mandate of the people to form leadership organs within the republic parliament and at the local level. The Communist Party will strive to ensure that workers, peasants [daykhan], representatives of the intelligentsia, women and young people, veterans, and other social strata and groups are suitably represented within the corps of deputies and in state organs.

While facilitating in all ways the democratization of social life and recognizing political pluralism, the Communist Party of Turkmenistan firmly maintains the position that democracy must stand not only for rights and freedoms, but also for civic responsibility, strict observance of the law, and self-control. The Communist Party believes that urgent measures are needed to strengthen legality and law and order within the republic. Observance of the law must become the unalterable norm of all citizens of the republic. It is necessary to halt the tendency toward increased violations of the law and to ensure the inevitability of punishment of criminals. All the healthy forces of society must take an active and interested part in this struggle. A strengthening of legality and law and order must be supported by raising the role and authority of law-enforcement organs while simultaneously ensuring the social protection and the increased professionalism and responsibility of their workers, an improvement of legislation, and strict observance of the principle of the presumption of innocence, the right of defense, and norms of justice. The most important task is to improve the entire system of legal education of the population. The Turkmen Communist Party supports preservation of party organizations within the armed forces, organs of state security, and law enforcement organs, proceeding from the position that membership in the party must not hinder the performance of their functional obligations.

In its nationalities policy and supporting the course of the 28th CPSU Congress, the Turkmen Communist Party sees its task in strengthening a healthy sociopolitical and moral and psychological situation within the republic, in ensuring further harmonization of interethnic relations, an organic combination of ethnic and interethnic values and interests, the creation of just and equal conditions of life and labor for all nationalities living within the republic, respect for their national dignity and satisfaction of their national needs. Striving to maintain its political leadership and initiative, the Turkmen Communist Party will to the greatest degree reflect and in all ways support the interests of all working people.

In implementing its nationalities policy, the party organization is orienting itself toward an improvement of state and socioeconomic mechanisms that ensure prevention of ethnic conflicts and the negative actions of destructive forces. Viewing the USSR as a union of

equal, sovereign states, the Turkmen Communist Party supports the utmost expansion of collaboration between republics, the development of close and varied ties between them. It is convinced that the mixed composition of the population of contiguous republics creates an urgent need for political coordination of the processes of national development. The Turkmen SSR must have an active influence on satisfaction of the national and cultural needs of Turkmens who live in the country's other republics. On the other hand, such influence may be exerted on the part of other union republics, representatives of the indigenous peoples of which reside within Turkmenistan. The Turkmen Communist Party considers it necessary also to develop ties with the Turkmen diaspora abroad.

Active use should be made of inter-republic ties and of an exchange of experience and spiritual values in the aims of further improving the patriotic and interethnic education of the population. As a basis for carrying out this and other types of work, the republic party organization intends in the future as well to rely upon the wisdom and authority of the aksakals [aksakaly], to consult with them on urgent questions of social life.

The republic party organization sees its task in the creation of favorable conditions for the national-cultural development of the Turkmen people, for the functioning of its language as the state language, and for a fundamental improvement in the training of ethnic cadres of the working class and of the technical intelligentsia.

The Turkmen Communist Party will give maximum consideration to the national factor in its organizational and political and ideological work. As consistent internationalists, Communists are called upon to defend the rights of citizens of all nationalities living within the territory of the republic to free national-cultural development, particularly in those regions that are heavily populated by national minorities and ethnic groups. It is necessary to create all conditions for satisfaction of their national-cultural needs, free development of national languages, cultures, and traditions. The Turkmen Communist Party is striving for a situation where a solicitous attitude toward nationalities with small populations is organically combined with a manifestation on their part of respect for the history, culture, language, and traditions of the Turkmen people.

The Turkmen Communist Party, though the political and ideological methods distinctive to it, will oppose any actions which could destabilize the healthy moral and political situation that has developed within the republic. In resolving practical questions of interethnic relations, it intends in the future as well to take into consideration the good traditions of the people of Turkmenistan. All the activities of the republic party organizations in this direction must contribute to formation of a high culture of interethnic relations among working people, to a consolidation of the entire population of Turkmenistan on the basis of deep mutual respect for individuals irrespective of their national affiliation.

**Toward Economic Independence, the Creation of
Normal Conditions of Life for All Residents of the
Republic**

In the area of socioeconomic policy, the Turkmen Communist Party declares that it considers its main task to be reorientation of the economy toward maximum satisfaction of the social needs of the population and ensuring reliable social safeguards for the working person. The basis for achieving this is economic sovereignty of the republic, the tool for it is transition to regulated market relations, and the criterion for it is the labor character of appropriation, i.e. an absence of exploitation.

The Turkmen Communist Party rejects direct interference by party organizations in the management of economic activity and will concentrate its own efforts on developing a strategy and tactics for solving the socioeconomic problems and satisfying the entire spectrum of social and everyday and economic interests of the citizens of the Turkmen SSR under market conditions, in which levers are introduced that will restrain unjustified social stratification of society and guarantee conditions for growth in the standard of living and the intellectual and spiritual and the moral potential of the people.

The social policy of the Turkmen Communist Party is directed at achieving normal conditions of life and creating firm social guarantees for all residents of the republic.

Among the problems facing us here, the most urgent is that of food. Therefore, the Turkmen Communist Party considers its most important task to be to ensure dynamic development of the agroindustrial complex. Priority is being given to the development of food sectors and the processing industry. The goal—to achieve their development to a new qualitative level in every oblast, in every rayon, and at every farm, having precisely defined a complex of organizational measures aimed at solving the problems of satisfying the population's demand for food products. In this matter, the Turkmen Communist Party supports consistent realization of the following measures:

- An increase in the share of raw material resources processed at their place of production, improvement of the work of industrial processing sectors aimed at introducing modern, resource-conserving technologies and increasing the volume, improving the quality, and broadening the assortment of food products, an increase in the relative share of products manufactured from local types of raw materials;
- Optimization of the volume of raw cotton production within the republic;
- Activization of a transition to new, progressive forms of organizing labor and production—leasing, the family contract, peasant [daykhanski] farms, cooperatives and associations, to free production involving the use of various forms of ownership;
- Creation of conditions for accelerated development of the individual subsidiary farms of the production, and also of reliable guarantees and incentives of

all-around state support, and the production of food products in the private sector.

In connection with transition to a market economy, the Turkmen Communist Party insists upon acceleration of the development of a mechanism for radical transformation of economic and financial relations that is capable of supporting the necessary price parity in commodity exchange between industry and agriculture.

No less urgent than the food problem is the housing problem. The republic's Communists see its solution in a sharp increase in the volumes of housing construction based on a reallocation of funds from republic and local budgets, more active use of all possible sources of financing, including personal savings of citizens, along with a simultaneous acceleration in the development of the building materials industry and a strengthening of the base of construction organizations. It is precisely from these positions that the Turkmen Communist Party supports the introduction of corrections to the "Housing-2000" program. At the same time, the Turkmen Communist Party is devoting required attention to the complex development of a humane architecture for the republic's towns and villages, taking account of national tastes and traditions.

The supply of nonfood consumer goods to the population is an urgent problem. The Turkmen Communist Party supports the priority development of this sector and creation of the most favorable conditions for it.

With regard to environmental protection, the Turkmen Communist Party sees its duty in awakening within people a concern for their native land, in decisively barring the way to incidents of a callous attitude toward nature, and in creating an atmosphere of public disdain of violators. With the goal of achieving, already in the very near future, positive shifts in the matter of protecting nature, the republic party organization will work for the development of a system of legal and economic measures aimed at the solution of ecological problems as a whole, an intensification of attention to land protection, the restoration of its fertility, purity of foods and of the environment, restoration of forests, protection of the plant and animal worlds, rational utilization of water resources, restoration of the ecological balance in a number of regions, particularly in the Turkmen Aral Sea zone and the Caspian coast, the city of Bezmein, and the resorts of Bairam Ali, Archman, and Molla-Kara.

The Turkmen Communist Party expresses its firm intention to activate to a maximum degree work on improving the social development of rural population centers and will endeavor that, by the end of 1995, all of them will be converted to natural gas and will be provided with running water and uninterrupted electric power.

Considering that it is necessary within the shortest period of time to solve the problem of effective employment of the entire work-capable population—an extremely urgent one for the republic—the Communist Party of Turkmenistan will consistently strive to

improve the distribution of productive forces, having in view the orientation of structure and investment policy toward the development of labor-intensive production facilities, first of all for the production of consumer goods, processing of agricultural raw materials, and also the services sphere. Necessary support will be given to measures aimed at introducing levers into the practice of economic management that will stimulate the development of such flexible and special forms of employment as home labor, the shortened work day, and production of products on the basis of contracts,

One of the most important directions of the work of republic party organizations continues to be strengthening the family and extending assistance to it. This involves a complex of social and economic measures for improving the cultural and everyday living conditions of families, increasing their real incomes, and complex development of a social infrastructure of population centers. The Turkmen Communist Party will take a direct part in work related to creation of family support services, will conduct a consistent policy in protection of the rights of the woman within society and the family, her social safeguards, raising the authority, role and responsibility of the woman as the preserver of the family hearth, and in improving her general education, cultural, and professional level.

The principal measures whose resolution the Turkmen Communist Party is working to achieve also include the following:

- Carrying out a complex of scientific and technical, economic, and social measures ensuring profound transformations in labor, in its content, an increase in labor productivity, a limitation of the use of female labor on night shifts and of manual and unskilled labor, improvement of the system of distribution and redistribution of cadres;
- Formation of an accessible, flexible, modern system of professional training and retaining of management cadres and labor resources, also including training abroad;
- Abolition of all kinds of privileges not stipulated by the laws of the republic and the USSR;
- Ensuring for each person a share of the public wealth corresponding to his labor and social contribution, consistent realization of the principles of social justice in distribution of social and material benefits, while at the same time not permitting levelling;
- Strengthening the material and technical base of the social and cultural sphere in order to achieve scientifically justified levels in the consumption of social benefits;
- Strengthening the material base of physical culture and sports, all-around encouragement and support of a healthy life style.

The Turkmen Communist Party will pay special attention to questions of public health. Among the most important problems here are realization of the special-purpose complex "Health" program, ensuring accessible

and high-quality medical assistance to the population, carrying out urgent measures to protect mothers and children, reduction of infant and maternal mortality, development of specialized medical assistance, improvement of the material and technical base and the supply of medicine for public health services and increasing their preventive orientation, introduction of progressive forms of work, including cost-accounting and advanced scientific elaboration into practical public health services, and expansion of the network of medical institutions, especially in rural areas;

Since successful solution of problems in the social sphere and improvement of the well-being of people are possible only through effective economy, the Turkmen Communist Party sees the following ways of reforming the system of economic management within the republic:

- Carrying out a structural restructuring of industry aimed at its reorientation toward the needs of the republic, seeing to it that raw material resources, for the most part, are processed within the territory of the republic;
- Increasing the economic independence of the administrative and territorial formations of the Turkmen SSR by means of a delimitation of authority with regard to management of the economy and the social sphere between republic and local organs of power;
- Democratizing economic relations, securing a true emancipation of people's initiative and practical activity of people, introducing incentives for highly productive labor;
- Creating concrete conditions in all spheres of economic production activity, providing all-round support of those economic and entrepreneurial activities that will most fully utilize their production and technical potential, expanding labor- and science-intensive production, ensuring maximum resource conservation, encouraging the activities of small enterprises and joint production facilities with foreigners.
- Creating favorable conditions for further development and improvement of foreign economic activities within the republic as an important factor for intensification of social production;
- Expanding the independence of enterprises and ensuring equal economic conditions of management for all forms of commodity producers, defining the permissible limits of private enterprise and control over these on the part of the state and public organizations;
- Securing a real acceleration of scientific and technical progress and introducing its achievements into production, developing new technologies, instruments, equipment, and mechanisms, and improving the provision of information to the population;
- Fundamentally reorganizing the price mechanism on the basis of a balance of commodity and money circulation and of purchase, wholesale, and retail prices; ensuring state regulation of prices, their stability, for goods of prime necessity during the transition period;

- Improving the investment process, while concentrating capital investments in the decisive sectors upon which the effectiveness of social production as a whole depends and in development of the social sphere.

For achievement of these goals, the Turkmen CP Central Committee will make active use of its right of legislative initiative, proposing in the first instance laws for the social protection of working people.

At the same time, the Turkmen Communist Party believes that the economy will become efficient only when a decisive struggle has been launched to prohibit possible nonproductive costs, losses, and wastefulness, when a stop is put to the squandering of national resources at all levels. Therefore, in the future as well, the republic party organization will work to overcome, as quickly as possible, production that operates at a loss, for reduction in the number of unprofitable enterprises and farms, and for a concentration of effort on ensuring full implementation of measures that have been worked out for financial renewal and strengthening monetary turnover within the Turkmen SSR. Attention will also be given to such important questions as limitations on the construction of objects designated for production purposes; the attraction of free monetary funds of the population for the development of leased and cooperative production, and also of individual construction; intensification of the influence of financial and credit levers on strengthening a regime of economy. As formerly, the Turkmen Communist Party will steadily implement the principle: "Each ruble must come from labor. Each labor collective and individual member of society must live on earned funds."

Toward a Fundamental Renewal of Ideological Education Work, the Spiritual Renewal of Man, an Increase in the Intellectual Potential of the Republic.

The Communist Party of Turkmenistan considers the development of a concept of an ideology of renewal on the bases of Marxist-Leninist methodology and of thorough study, generalization and utilization of our historical heritage and of the realities of modern life to be a first priority task.

It is a principled position of the Communists of Turkmenistan that it is necessary to strengthen, among the workers of the republic, socialist ideas and an orientation toward a communist future as well as a solicitous attitude toward the memory and heritage of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and outstanding figures of the October Revolution and the Soviet State. Communists will struggle decisively against a discrediting of their theoretical heritage and for the establishment, throughout the entire, multifaceted system of education, of truly scientific foundations and of a purposefulness in the influence of its means, forms, and methods, creating in these aims various clubs, lecture bureaus, and courses within labor collectives and at the population's places of residence.

The republic party organization considers the main goals of all political work to be the formation of a harmoniously developed, socially active individual, combining within himself spiritual wealth, moral purity, and physical perfection; the education of working people in the spirit of high communist ideological principles and loyalty to the Soviet fatherland, internationalism, a conscientious attitude toward labor and public property, and an ever increasing familiarity of the masses with the treasures of national and world culture.

The creation of a humane, democratic, socialist society within Turkmenistan is inseparably connected with the development of national culture, with the realization and enrichment of the very rich spiritual heritage of the people. From these positions, the Turkmen Communist Party will facilitate the establishment of true independence in solution of questions of the cultural and spiritual development of the republic, will actively participate in the creation of its own system of education, science and culture, and will strive with all decisiveness for affirmation of priority for these purposes in the distribution of financial, material, and other resources.

For the realization of fundamental changes in the sphere of popular education, it is proposed to promote the creation of an integral system of education and upbringing that will organically combine within itself a concern about the national and cultural renaissance of the Turkmen people, about the development of its national self-consciousness, a solicitous attitude toward special cultural and ethnic characteristics and national spiritual values, toward the unique way of life, the make-up and character of progressive popular traditions that have developed over the centuries, and about the development of a national psychology and of the Turkmen language as the state language, while striving to ensure for all peoples and nationalities residing within the republic the right to free self-determination in the spiritual sphere, the right to their free national and cultural development.

The development and introduction of innovative methods of education and upbringing, of new forms of organization and administration of education will receive utmost support. Concrete measures will be taken toward broadening possibilities for obtaining education in other republics and abroad. The Communist Party believes that, under conditions of stormy growth of national self-consciousness, we cannot ignore the necessity of educating true patriots and internationalists, of forming a respect for the culture, national traditions, and language of the Turkmen people, of all nations and nationalities of the USSR, of teaching the young generation to perceive our great country as an indivisible whole, to sense a responsibility for the common destiny of the Soviet peoples, of the socialist motherland.

In the opinion of the Turkmen Communist Party, for solution of the tasks of a qualitative renewal of the entire system of popular education, it is necessary to ensure:

- The development and passage of a special Turkmen SSR law and state program for development of the system of popular education, raising the intellectual and professional level of teaching cadres, and fundamentally improving their material situation and level of social protection;
- The bringing of the structure and content of specialist training in higher and special secondary schools into line with the long-term tasks of the republic's socioeconomic development, the creation of an effective system for improving the qualifications and retraining of cadres, oriented toward the basic changes within the national economy under conditions of a regulated market economy;
- A restructuring of the ideological and moral and physical upbringing of children, pupils, and student youth, in order to bring it into agreement with the processes of democratization and humanization of society, with an increase of the role of the family in bringing up the rising generation;
- The development of a new pedagogical thinking within society, called upon to raise education and upbringing to a qualitatively higher level and, at the same time, to make the goals and tasks of educational and child-raising institutions more realistic and more precisely responsive to the dynamic demands of the republic's present situation.
- The development and realization of a program of restructuring organizational structures and management mechanisms in the sphere of scientific and technical and production activity on the basis of various forms of ownership, of a concentration of scientific forces by means of optimizing scientific institutions and increasing their independence;
- Direction of the efforts of social scientists toward qualitative renewal of the party's theoretical baggage and accelerated comprehension of the real processes of development of perestroika, of the approaches to study of the natural processes of social development that have outlived themselves, toward the development of solidly-based prognoses, of constructive recommendations for social practice;
- The development and implementation of a complex program for perfecting scientific research and improving the material base of the humanitarian sciences—history, philosophy, jurisprudence, logic, psychology, history, and the theory of religion and atheism, etc., increasing the level of their teaching, disseminating historical and legal knowledge among broad strata of the population, having given special attention to scholarly understanding of the republic's historical development during the 20th century and the place within it of the Communist Party and other social and sociopolitical organizations.

An important task of the Turkmen Communist Party continues to be the orientation of public opinion toward the provision of all-round assistance to children's homes and boarding schools for orphans.

The intellectual potential of Turkmen science will consistently be concentrated on solution of the key problems of developing the republic's economy and culture and on improving the well-being of the population. The Communist Party will participate actively in formulation of the republic's scientific policy, following the principles of its full democratization and of combining the scientific and pedagogical potential of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences and higher educational institutions in solution of the principal economic, social, and scientific problems and in the training of qualified specialists.

While advocating the development of cost-accounting relations in the scientific sphere, the Turkmen Communist Party will at the same time stand decisively in opposition to a total transfer of science to a commercial basis.

Also among the most important tasks that the Turkmen Communist Party will strive to solve are:

- The development and passage of a legislative act with regard to raising the status of science, the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, and the prestige of scientific work within the republic, to the development of freedom of scientific creativity in combination with the moral responsibility of the scientist for the socioeconomic, spiritual, and ecological consequences of introducing the results of scientific developments.
- Developing and improving legislation about culture, which guarantees legal and social protection of cultural values and of those who create them, development of a national culture, and all-round growth of the creative talents and capabilities of the individual;
- Working out and implementing state programs for the development of culture and the aesthetic education of the republic's population on the basis of popular creativity and national traditions, development of

One of the most important priorities in the activities of the Turkmen Communist Party continues to be a concern about the all-round development of culture, the preservation of its national originality, the revival of progressive popular traditions, ceremonies, and customs, an intensification of attention to the study, restoration, and propaganda of the meaning of unique historical, cultural, architectural, and archeological monuments, and an expansion of cultural cooperation with our countrymen living abroad.

The Communist Party of Turkmenistan intends to manifest its attitude toward culture, the cultural role of literature, the theater, graphic art, music, film-making, and museum, library, and club affairs, as its ideas as a whole, only by means of democratic propaganda and discussion based on equal rights, while taking a tolerant attitude toward differing views.

It is the opinion of the Turkmen Communist Party that, during a time of renewal and radical political and democratic changes, there is an urgent need for:

literature and art, of inter-republic cultural collaboration and cultural ties with foreign countries, protection and development of the cultural history complex of the republic, an increase in the role of the local budget in financing cultural development, utilization of new economic possibilities for strengthening and developing the material and technical base of cultural institutions;

- Expanding and improving the free interaction of cultures, establishing conditions for the formation of national cultural centers and various creative associations, of creative freedom, for an encouragement of talent that is not impeded by competitive development of various cultural trends excluding the unification of culture, its disengagement from national roots.

Necessary attention will be paid to progressive popular traditions and customs connected with marriage and childbirth, to the opening of universities for parents and of health and young-family clubs.

The Turkmen Communist Party strictly adheres to the opinion that the utilization of commercial principles in culture should not run counter to its moral line.

The Turkmen Communist Party, acting in accordance with the USSR press law, will pay particular attention to implementation of an effective information policy directed toward the formation of a renewed consciousness of the masses, toward the consolidation of Communists and their allies in the matter of perestroika.

Viewing the mass information and propaganda media as an important channel for communication with the working people and the population, for informing them on a timely basis with regard to all burning problems, the Communist Party of Turkmenistan will exercise party direction of its own press organs, concerning itself in all possible ways that journalists be well-informed and extending them assistance in mobilizing Communists and of all the republic's working people for the fulfillment of tasks set by the party. At the same time, it intends to build its relationships with newspaper, journal, and radio and television journalists and with the creative workers of book publishers on the basis of active partnership, on the principles of respect and comradeship and of equal rights and collaboration in carrying out the political line of the CPSU. Interested in the participation of journalists in the work of its elected organs, the republic party organization is prepared in all ways to facilitate the professional growth of workers of the mass information media and publishing houses, and improvement in their working and living conditions.

The Turkmen Communist Party will also stimulate the search for new forms of editorial and publishing and economic management activity, including the creation of joint enterprises and joint-stock publication companies co-founded with soviets, social organizations, and movements that share Communist program goals; it will do everything possible to facilitate the development of film production within the republic, to overcome the lag

behind central regions of the country in this question, to carry on constant work with the creative workers of publishing houses with regard to increasing the quantity and improving the quality of book production, to orient them toward the publishing of books related to the history of the national culture of the Turkmen people and realization of the state "Language" program.

Toward Renewal of the Turkmen Communist Party

The political sovereignty and economic independence of the Turkmen SSR demand a definition of the place and role of the Turkmen Communist Party within the political system of the republic.

The Turkmen Communist Party is independent and, at the same time, inalienable part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In its activities, it is guided by the present action Program within the framework of the program and normative documents of the CPSU. On this basis, the Turkmen Communist Party independently decides political, organizational, personnel, and other questions, carries on publishing and economic activities, conducts its own line in the sphere of state construction and the socioeconomic and cultural development of the republic, and maintains contacts with other parties and social movements, including foreign ones. Creatively developing Marxist-Leninist teachings, basing itself on progressive social thought and accumulated experience, and giving maximum consideration to local conditions and traditions, the Communist Party of Turkmenistan sets as its goal the creation within the republic of a humane, democratic socialist society, the establishment of social justice in the interests of all social strata.

The Turkmen Communist Party, while decisively freeing itself from the dogmatism, administrative command methods of work, and an obsolete style of activity, is transforming itself into a true political party that expresses and defends the interests of the working class, peasants, intelligentsia and other social strata that are dedicated to the socialist choice and is striving for civic consensus and consolidation of all the peoples of Turkmenistan. The Turkmen Communist Party will attempt to earn a right to the role of the political vanguard of society in free democratic elections to the organs of administration of state and social organizations, through the primary party organizations, party groups within the soviets, Communists working in soviet, state, and economic organs and labor collectives, and by means of expanding organizational and educational work among the masses. In cadre work, the Turkmen Communist Party decisively rejects a formal, nomenklatura approach. The authority to approve personnel decisions within the organs of state power and administration belong to these organs and, within the party itself, is passed on from higher authorities to the party organizations, to all Communists. The Turkmen Communist Party reserves its right, within the framework of democratic procedures and political consultations, to advance its own proposals with regard to candidates to republic

and local organs of authority and administration, economic organs, and social organizations.

The Turkmen Communist Party will be able to solve the large and complex tasks it faces only under conditions of broad democratization of its own life, of a restructuring of intra-party relationships. It considers that the most important task is to ensure the democratic unity of CPSU ranks, to guarantee the participation of every Communist in the development and implementation of its policies.

In this connection, the Turkmen Communist Party upholds the following democratic principles:

- Electivity and replacibility, glasnost and accountability, subordination of the minority to the majority, the right of the minority to defend its own views;
- Approval of decisions concerning the most important questions only after their thorough discussion in the primary party organizations, with full freedom of intraparty criticism and consideration of the opinions of labor collectives;
- Free expression by Communists of their views, broad intra-party discussion of the most varied questions of social and political life, a revival of the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism: "Freedom of debate at the stage of discussing questions and unity of action after the approval of decisions by a majority, a strengthening of its democratic essence by means of exercising control from bottom to top";
- Fullest democratization of election practice within the Turkmen Communist Party on the basis of an affirmation of direct, equal, secret elections based on a choice of alternatives;
- Participation by Communists who are not members of elected organs in the work of the commissions of party committees;
- Development of public, nonstaff foundations for the work of party committees;
- Implementation of a policy aimed at consistent and planned optimization of the numerical size of the apparatus;
- Provision of broad information to the population with regard to all intra-party affairs, including the earnings and expenditures of the republic party organization.

The basis of the Turkmen Communist Party is its primary organizations. Independently and taking account of concrete conditions, they decide questions of their own structure, programs, and forms of activity, of the frequency and procedure of holding meetings, of political actions, and of formalizing final acceptance into the party. While preserving party organizations in labor collectives, the Turkmen Communist Party considers it necessary to increase its attention to developing the work of primary party organs at the population's places of residence.

Under conditions of assertion of the independence of all its elements, the Turkmen Communist Party ascribes special significance to strengthening party discipline, to increasing the responsibility of every party organ, party organization, and Communist.

At the same time, the Turkmen Communist Party will create everything needed for a manifestation of creativity, initiative, and independence and, with these goals, will operate first of all using methods of explanation, persuasion, democratic agreement, development of practical recommendations, and winning people over to its side.

The Turkmen Communist Party considers an important factor in its renewal to be constant replenishment of its ranks with fresh forces with energetic, enthusiastic people from among the workers, peasants, and creative intelligentsia, who will bring with themselves a spirit of positive concern about common interests and a search for and original approaches to solution of various problems.

The new role of the Turkmen Communist Party presupposes a basic change in the character of its mutual relationships with the entire system of social organizations. The republic party organization will adhere unswervingly to the position that relationships with these can be structured only upon a basis of equal rights and dialogue, while at the same time Communists reserve for themselves the right, within social organizations, to support unified positions regarding the political strategy of society.

In carrying out its policy with regard to the trade unions, the Turkmen Communist Party proceeds from the fact that these are independent mass social organizations called upon to protect the interests of the working people, to prevent labor conflicts in production, and not to allow group egoism in solution of the problems of some categories or workers at the expense of others.

The Turkmen Communist Party considers it necessary to carry out an effective state youth policy. It sees within the republic's Komsomol an independent social and political organization that stands on a unified political base with the Turkmen Communist Party and is capable of providing real assistance in the accomplishment of designated actions. On this basis, the Communist Party will seek new ways to influence the activities of the Turkmen Komsomol, without at the same time allowing interference in its internal affairs.

The Turkmen Communist Party supports the activities of women's organizations and advocates collaboration with veterans' societies, the development of all-round, productive contacts with the creative unions and with scientific, scientific and technical, cultural and educational, athletic, defense, and other voluntary societies.

Collaboration with the party organizations in units of the Soviet Army and border troops must be raised to a new

qualitative level. The republic's party organs will continue in the future to carry out measures aimed at instilling in the citizens of Turkmenistan a respectful attitude toward the country's armed forces and to render them necessary assistance.

The Turkmen Communist Party policy toward civic consensus envisages new relationships with the faithful. While maintaining materialist world-outlook positions, Communists are prepared to direct their efforts, jointly with the faithful, toward the spiritual and cultural elevation of the peoples of Turkmenistan.

The Turkmen Communist Party comes out against the imposition upon people of ready-made models, schemes, and forms of life and work, considering that the socialist choice will be come to be a reality only as a result of the natural-historical movement of society.

Such are the fundamental positions the Communist Party of Turkmenistan Program of action for fulfilling the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and the 24th Turkmen CP Congress.

During the entire period that it is in effect, it is open for any constructive proposals and will be amended and changed in accordance with the development of society and of the party itself.

The draft Statutes and Program of the Turkmen Communist Party were approved and recommended for broad discussion by the Second Plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee.

Proposals, Comments, and views concerning the documents that have been prepared should be addressed to the Turkmen CP Central Committee, and also to the editorial offices of the newspapers SOVET TURKMENISTAN and TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA and to the Turkmen SSR State Committee for Television and Radio [Gostelradio]. All of them will be relayed to the editorial commission and will be utilized in further work on developing the Turkmen CP Statutes and Program of action.

Niyazov Addresses Turkmen CP CC Plenum, Appeals to Party Unity

*91US0160A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 30 Nov 90 pp 1-2*

[Report by S. A. Niyazov to 2nd Turkmen CP Central Committee Plenum]

[Text] Comrades!

As you are aware, the 28th CPSU Congress and the 24th Turkmen CP Congress confirmed the need to stay the course toward democratization of intraparty affairs and the leading role of the Communist Party as the principal means of renewing the party under present-day conditions; this course is intended to correct accumulated

administrative-bureaucratic deformations and ensure compliance with the political and strategic line under democratic conditions.

Affirmation of intraparty democracy as the main guarantee that perestroyka goals will be realized is prompted by the fact that the CPSU was built by V. I. Lenin as an organization of like thinkers whose fundamental law should be free discussion of all problems with unanimity of action once decisions are made. However, during the cult of personality and in the subsequent period these principles were distorted into command-administrative methods of leadership, one-man command and subjectivism and resulted in weakening of party discipline and violations of the principle of equality among communists. At the 24th Turkmen CP Congress we, as you recall, stressed that even though from time to time we have recognized the intolerable nature of this situation, in actuality there have been no visible changes. Leninist standards and principles of leadership have been violated. There has been a substantial weakening in the role of party meetings and elective organs; this has virtually deprived communists altogether of the opportunity to be active participants in the discussion of vitally important issues and, in the final analysis, to have any real influence on the situation in their labor collectives or in society as a whole. This situation must be changed in a fundamental way, and the decisions adopted by the 24th Turkmen CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress are making it possible to implement our intentions within a fairly short period of time. However, everything is not so simple as it appears at first glance, and unfortunately the situation is changing extremely slowly.

In order to increase respect for the republic Communist Party as functions are delineated it is essential that we strive resolutely to eliminate command-administrative methods in the party's work. We need a new and systematic approach to party work which will encompass all of the party's structures. We can win people's support only through a clear and well thought-out position and a well-developed program of action. In this regard the new independent status of union republic communist parties within the framework of a single multiethnic CPSU is of fundamental importance; this has substantially expanded opportunities for the republic party organization to create the kind of system of party activities which will truly ensure that communists are fully empowered and that they are active participants in the business of their organizations and in the realization of party policy.

The Turkmen Communist Party's new status, along with its broad rights, places great responsibility upon us, political responsibility included. Specifically, it has become very urgent that we draw up our own programmatic and standardizing documents. This by no means indicates that we are rejecting the fundamental principles outlined in the decisions of the 24th Turkmen CP Congress. Our republic party organization has been and will remain an inseparable part of the CPSU, assuming together with it common political, ideological and organizational positions, and guided in its actions by the

CPSU Program and Charter. However, our programmatic and standardizing documents should give communists and all working people in our republic a clear idea of prospects for renewal of the Turkmen Communist Party and explain the specific nature of its approaches to solving its own problems, a nature linked to our objectively existing national-historical, social, cultural and economic circumstances.

As you are aware, immediately after the conclusion of the 28th CPSU Congress the Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro decided to establish a commission to be comprised of Central Committee members and leading republic social scientists, representatives of creative unions and party officials. It has prepared the first drafts of a Program of Action and Statute in the history of the Turkmen Communist Party. The prepared drafts, after preliminary inspection by Central Committee commissions, have been submitted to this plenum, and now it is up to us to define our position in regard to further work with them.

I have been instructed by the Central Committee Buro and the commission on preparation of Turkmen Communist Party programmatic and standardizing documents to direct your attention to their basic points and clarify the motivations behind the positions taken.

Regarding the draft Statute, first of all I would like to head off possible questions concerning the title of this document by saying that there are no essential differences between the words "statute" and "charter." Both mean "a compilation of rules, laws and regulations." But it is felt that the introduction of the new term will draw a boundary between the two documents. Let us decide how appropriate that is. No one and nothing is regulating us here today.

Now about the actual contents of the Statute. During its preparation we were guided by the principles that, firstly, the Turkmen Communist Party is an independent political organization uniting our republic's communists. As a component of the Turkmen SSR's political system it functions within the framework of the Turkmen SSR Constitution and all-union and republic laws. Secondly, the Turkmen Communist Party, as a genuinely political force, strives for political leadership in society through free elections to soviets of people's deputies and through other forms of expression of citizens' will. Yet at the same time it is also a strong adherent to the principle that politics is realized not only by elected organs of state, but also and primarily by the actions of the masses, labor collectives and social organizations. Consequently the Turkmen Communist Party should have the necessary structures at enterprises and in rayons, cities and oblasts. Thirdly, as we struggle for positions of leadership in society we must have a clear-cut and specific expression of the goal which defines the whole nature of party efforts. The formulation that communists' goal is to build communism suffers from extreme abstraction and as a result does not have the necessary emotional appeal; more importantly, it does not give any indication as to

the specific means which will be employed to attain this goal. Therefore the draft Statute states that "by creatively developing Marxist-Leninist doctrine, utilizing the achievements of progressive social thought and accumulated experience and defending internationalism, the Turkmen Communist Party strives for the goal of creating a democratic socialist society in our republic." Together with this there is an explanation of the means of achieving this goal: affirmation of social justice, elimination of alienation through elimination of accumulated deformations, concern for the interests of all citizens of the republic, and consistent efforts to ensure that each citizen feels himself or herself an equal human being not only in thought and in consciousness, but also in daily life. This interpretation of the goal in our opinion in no way rejects the communist nature of our party's efforts. For it becomes such when the party resolves immediate tasks yet does not restrict itself to them, instead coordinating its work with long-term program goals. Therein lies the fundamental difference between a party of revolutionary action and a parliamentary-type party. Thirdly, in the course of democratization of intraparty affairs and definition of party regulations corresponding to commonly accepted democratic standards it is essential that we utilize both already accumulated experience with organizational work and an effective structure for building. And, finally, the Turkmen CP Statute is being prepared under specific circumstances, in a situation which exists at this particular point in time. With a view toward changes in the situation and circumstances and accumulation of new experience we can improve the Statute at republic Communist Party congresses and conferences.

The nature of any party is most accurately expressed by its conditions for membership. The draft which has been proposed to you states: "Any citizen of the USSR and the Turkmen SSR who resides in the republic, is over the age of 18, accepts the party's programmatic documents, complies with the Turkmen CP Statute, works in a primary party organization and regularly pays membership dues may become a member of the Turkmen Communist Party." We feel that the proposed concept of Turkmen Communist Party membership most fully reflects present-day realities—republic sovereignty and independence for the Turkmen Communist Party—yet at the same time affirms our efforts to preserve unity both in our multiethnic state and within a genuine existing political force, the party of Lenin.

Other specific tasks connected with party membership should in our opinion be decided in a very simple manner, based on the principles of action set forth in the CPSU Charter. Specifically, it has been proposed that a statement be made that the Turkmen Communist Party will have membership cards in common with the CPSU and that record keeping on party members will be conducted following practices common to the entire CPSU. The candidacy period will be abolished. However, a trial period of one year may be established for an individual wishing to join the party, as well as tutorship

by two party members; this is to be done at the recommendation of the primary party organization. There are plans to establish a procedure under which a communist may be on the party rolls either at his place of employment or place of residence, with this to be based on personal preference and approved by the primary party organization.

For the first time it is proposed that if a party member cannot for reasons of health or age participate in party affairs, then that member may request that the primary party organization relieve him or her of regular party work and payment of membership dues; this right will also extend to mothers of large families.

One of the main issues which we had to resolve in the course of efforts to create a draft Statute and a program of action was the role and place of the Turkmen Communist Party in the life of our republic. Historically it has been true that it has relied in its work primarily on the working class and the peasantry and has been their vanguard. Today as well the support for the party from the working class and the peasants plays a certain role. Their support should be valued and everything possible done to strengthen their representation in the party and its elective organs.

But, as is clear from the events of the perestroika period, the Communist Party cannot be merely an advance unit. It should march together with the whole unit of working people regardless of whether they are workers, peasants or members of the intelligentsia. The difference between the vanguard and the remaining mass of working people, between party members and nonparty members cannot disappear until classes disappear, until the whole mass of working people become homogeneous and has been raised to the level of the vanguard. That is why in our draft we do not reject the need for a strictly individualized and extremely careful selection of a new generation of party members. This is dictated by logic; the Turkmen Communist Party cannot carry out its functions as ruling party if it does not maintain ties with the broadest masses, if those masses do not accept its leadership, if the republic party organization does not continue to enjoy the moral and political confidence of the masses.

In this connection we deemed it extremely important to set forth in the Turkmen CP Statute the right of party members to participate on a regular basis in the formation of Turkmen Communist Party policy and the making of basic political decisions. It was quite clear to us that a decision made by the majority should be binding for all communists. Yet by the same token it is also clear that the minority has a right to defend its views, including through reconsideration of these views within a party organization or higher level party organ and demonstration of the correctness of these views through tangible results. Toward this end provision has been made for the opportunity to conduct republic-wide discussions and referendums. Another proposal which seems very important is the one obligating party committees to consider within two months any proposal

submitted by a group of communists numbering not less than one-third of the total membership of the geographical party organization in question. We feel that these measures will help increase activism among party members, reveal their initiatives and heighten their sense of responsibility for the future of the party.

I will not comment in detail on all the principles contained in the draft Statute, as they are quite clear and are also subject to considerable further discussion. However, I would like to note that these principles reinforce and develop the most important organizational principles essential for intraparty activities: electability, accountability, self-administration and correlation of the interests of the party at large with those of the individual communist and conscientious discipline. The sections of the draft outline measures which provide dependable guarantees against bureaucratic dictates, "authority of position," the "armchair cult," imposition of candidacies and other relics of the command-administrative system. Thus, striving to ensure genuine compliance with the Leninist requirement that the work of elective organs and the party apparatus be carried out openly for all to see, in view of the masses, the draft Statute expands substantially the limits of party organs' accountability. Furthermore, communists are given the right to recall individuals from elective party organs in the event that they are incapable of performing their duties or have compromised themselves; if necessary it will be possible to elect a completely new set of members in an elective organ.

Another important aspect is Turkmen Communist Party structure. There are plans to separate the organs which decide political questions from executive organs, i.e. the party apparatus. In this connection you will probably notice that in contrast to the CPSU Charter the draft Statute defines in greater detail the functions of the party committee apparatus. There is a need for this, and it stems from the specific situation, from the unspoken question which has arisen since the congress.

I would remind you that today it is our task to define our position in regard to the staffing and structure of the party committee apparatus. Therefore I would like to digress a bit from the subject of programmatic and standardizing documents in order, based on the logic of this discussion, to set forth the Turkmen CP Bureau's position regarding the future structure of the apparatus. The Turkmen CP Central Committee and party obkoms will continue to have the following permanent commissions as set forth in a decision of the 24th Congress and our second plenum: ideological, party building, food and village restructuring, and party control. In connection with the process of further delineation of state and party functions and the need to focus the party on political and ideological work, plans have been made to eliminate the legal commissions (work with party organizations in law enforcement and administrative organs will be handled by the commission for party building and cadre work).

As you have pointed out, the draft Statute proposes preservation of the separation which exists between control and auditing functions. This is due to the fact that control functions as they presently exist in the party will undergo the most decisive changes and will gradually be levelled out. At the same time the significance of auditing work will increase in proportion to the expansion of entrepreneurial and commercial activities.

And another thing. One of the most important issues of concern to our republic's communists is the issue of future relations with communist parties in other union republics. Therefore the entire Section VII of the Statute is devoted to this question. I would like to add that we should as always follow a course aimed at the closest ties of cooperation. Common goals and a single direction on the road of our perestroyka are the best prerequisites for that.

Esteemed comrades!

I think you all understand that with the new status of the Turkmen Communist Party begins its practical implementation, based on the Turkmen CP Statute. This will be a complex and lengthy process of reorganization of our party organization. The success of this process will depend upon many factors, but most of all upon our own efforts. And in this regard the draft of another fundamental document, the Turkmen CP Program of Action, is of great significance.

During preparation of the Program of Action we also encountered many difficulties and problems. They arose primarily because the complex phenomena and processes of our times have not yet been subjected to comprehensive theoretical interpretation. Yet it seems to us that the Program, which is based on present-day realities, should be oriented toward the future and, most importantly, should help unite the greatest possible number of Turkmenistan's citizens around the Turkmen Communist Party and outline clear perspectives.

During development of the draft we were firmly guided by the principle that this is a program by which the republic can gain real sovereignty through the building of a humane, democratic socialism. Defining the aspects of this, and of party ideology in general, primary emphasis was placed on the Leninist concept of socialism. We are convinced that the renewed Turkmen Communist Party, like communist parties around the world, has something to learn from V. I. Lenin's theoretical heritage, especially his dialectical and theoretical approach to methods of building socialism.

Therefore the Program's preamble and its sections which discuss the general goals and principles of the Turkmen Communist Party's activities stress the priority not of ideology, but rather of the common human and humanistic goals of building a new society.

However, we also deemed it necessary to state that it was precisely through the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution and Leninist nationalities policy

that the Turkmen people, who had dreamed for centuries of unification and freedom, freed themselves from the colonial yoke of the Russian Empire, won their own state and learned the value of friendship among peoples. The Turkmen SSR has had certain accomplishments in its socioeconomic and cultural development. In our opinion this is very important to note, as there are differing assessments of the October Revolution and its effect on the fates of peoples. We do not deny that blatant violations and distortions were committed at many stages of socialist building and that these caused the Turkmen people and the other peoples of the USSR much suffering and loss.

Only perestroyka marked the beginning of profound democratic transformations in our country. Reforms are being carried out in the economy and the politics of the Soviet federation. Avenues are being opened for free national development and republic economic autonomy. The Turkmen SSR is now achieving real state sovereignty. We have condemned all the deformations and mistakes of the past and favor truthful analysis of the historical past and the present, and we give their due to the creative labor and self-sacrifice of our fathers and grandfathers and of all generations for the sake of the Motherland.

As the course of events has shown, one of the most timely issues today is that of the nation state. In view of this fact the draft Program of Action proposes a system of political guidelines and practical actions to guarantee genuine political and economic sovereignty for the Turkmen SSR and renewal of the Turkmen Communist Party itself. After affirming the republic party organization's course toward self-determination for the Turkmen people, free national-state development for the Turkmen SSR and guarantees of the right to choose the forms by which to organize our lives, institutions and state symbols according to our national and historical traditions, the Program states that the Turkmen Communist Party will carry out this policy based on the assumption that the people's sovereign right is the sole source of power in the Turkmen SSR.

It seems extremely important to set forth the thesis that in accordance with the aspirations and interests of the Turkmen people and in view of a multitude of well-established economic and human ties the Turkmen Communist Party envisions our republic's present and future solely as a part of an intact, renewed USSR, with voluntary delegation to the USSR of a portion of our rights in order to achieve common goals. Legal and unconditional observance of the rights of citizens of all nationalities within our republic and throughout the country should be immutable. The draft states the need to develop the treaty principle in the structure of the USSR and to resolutely oppose separatist slogans and movements, to defend the further development and existence of the Turkmen national state and ensure real sovereignty and political and economic independence for the Turkmen SSR, the unity of its territory and the inviolability of the republic's state border.

The Program notes that one important guarantee of Turkmen SSR sovereignty is the introduction of a presidential form of rule in the republic.

As you are well aware, this matter has already been resolved, so it would seem that there is no need for us to discuss it further. Nonetheless I deem it necessary to note that we are not talking about copying the structure of union organs. Above all we based this on the very nature of republic sovereignty, dictated by the need for an effective mechanism for strengthening the state system.

Let us be frank. The present situation, in which an ever greater lack of executive power is felt, results in this decision. A strong authority embodied in a president will allow us to create the proper conditions for further progress along the road to implementation of political and economic reforms, development of democracy and application of laws passed by the republic Supreme Soviet. Unwavering compliance with the law will be one of the president's most important functions.

On the other hand, creation of the institution of the presidency will make it possible to strengthen republic independence and establish a reasonable correlation between legislative and executive powers.

Also supporting this step is the multiethnic composition of Turkmenistan. Today it is particularly important to consolidate society. This process should be aided most of all by a renewed mechanism of state leadership. It is precisely the president who should serve as a guarantor of observance of the rights and freedoms of the peoples living in our republic.

In his practical work the president of the Turkmen SSR should maintain civil tranquility and interethnic harmony and be the supreme organizer and coordinator of actions in emergency situations.

In connection with the establishment of the post of republic president and the nomination of the head of the Turkmen Communist Party for this high post the question has arisen as to whether it is appropriate to combine these two duties. In principle this is normal and does not violate the standards of the civilized world. Yet to govern the republic and to manage all the ongoing work of the party organization at the same time is not only not feasible, it would be detrimental. Believe me when I say that this is not an attempt to abandon the party at a difficult moment. Communists have entrusted this job to me, and if they continue to entrust it to me in the future I will not quit the Central Committee leadership. I would like to note that the search for ways of resolving this problem has been a difficult one. Finally we decided to propose that you think about establishing the posts of Turkmen CP Central Committee chairman and deputy chairman. In our opinion, the party Central Committee chairman could carry out overall leadership and conduct Central Committee plenums as well as, if necessary, Bureau sessions. The deputy chairman, who would head the Central Committee Secretariat, would focus his

efforts totally on the day-to-day work of the Turkmen CP Central Committee. That is the proposal which has been submitted for your consideration. Let us discuss it as well.

In the version of the draft Program of Action submitted to the present plenum it is noted that in nationalities policy the Turkmen Communist Party, following the course set by the 28th CPSU Congress, regards strengthening of a healthy sociopolitical and moral-psychological atmosphere in the republic, efforts to ensure further harmonization of interethnic relations, integral combination of national and internationalist values and interests and creation of just and equal living and working conditions for people of all the nationalities living in the Turkmen SSR as being among its most important tasks.

At this very difficult and alarming time, when under the influence of tragic events in a number of regions of the country outbursts of panic have been observed, it is appropriate and essential to state firmly and unambiguously that as it works to realize its nationalities policy the republic party organization will be oriented toward improvement of state and socioeconomic mechanisms which will prevent ethnic conflicts and negative acts by destructive forces.

The people of Turkmenistan should know that the communist party totally rejects and will squelch any attempts to unleash nationalist hysteria in this republic. This is contrary to reason and modern political thinking. This is contrary to the vital interests of the Turkmen people and will lead to a split in the nation. We should not become disunited, we should become closer. Therein lies the guarantee that our republic will flourish and that the living standard of our people will rise.

The Turkmen Communist Party—and we felt it important to stress this in the draft Program of Action—envisions its future above all in terms of people. Therefore in the realm of socioeconomic policy it sees its task as reorientation of the economy toward maximum fulfillment of the public's social needs. The basis for performing this task is republic economic sovereignty. The instrument is transition to regulated market relationships. The criterion is the labor-based nature of acquisition, i.e. the absence of exploitation.

As we work to define ways of solving our current problems we are guided by the need to assess from a completely new standpoint the untapped resources and potential which Turkmenistan possesses. A concept of Turkmen SSR economic sovereignty has been drawn up and approved by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet. It contains basic goals defining an independent policy for the socioeconomic development of our republic's territory, with free selection of citizens' work and entrepreneurial activities and their social protection under a system of market relationships.

We assume that the establishment of Turkmen SSR economic sovereignty will ensure the supremacy of republic laws and legislative acts within the republic's

territory and realization of its own socioeconomic development policy and maximum fulfillment of the people's physical and spiritual needs and rational utilization of natural resources, as well as maintenance of an ecologically pure environment. The Turkmen Communist Party will strive to achieve these things.

Our republic possesses unique natural and climatic conditions which have as yet been utilized extremely inadequately. Great wealth lies hidden beneath the ground. Each year the quantity of chemical products produced using local raw materials increases as assortment expands: bromine, iodine, chemical fertilizers, sodium sulfate, bischofite, epsomite and household chemicals. There are adequate reserves of raw materials for the production of building materials. But the most valuable resource we have is labor.

We regard radical changes in the economic structure as the highway to improvement in the way we use our resources and riches. The party will support executive organs as they work to ensure that our raw materials resources are processed primarily within our own republic. This will create real preconditions for increasing national income, stabilization and growth in the budget and improvement of people's physical living conditions. We have all the proper conditions for elimination of the greater part of our republic's present consumer goods dependence. Therefore the Turkmen Communist Party should support immediate drafting of specific programs for the development of light industry and local industry which are based on import/export balance. It is essential that we produce what the customer wants and ensure balance between our abilities and our proposals.

Turkmen villages are still waiting for the fresh winds of perestroika. I think that communists should help agricultural workers truly become the masters of their native land. It was for that reason that we wrote in the following: "The Turkmen Communist Party regards guarantees of dynamic development in the agroindustrial complex as one of its most important tasks." In this area as well we face many difficulties.

Under the conditions which exist in our republic irrigation forms the basis for agriculture. The main untapped resource for increasing yield from each irrigated hectare is radical improvement in agricultural workers' level of skills and full utilization of the capacities which are available through mastery of scientifically-based crop rotation, fertilizer use, equipment, scientific advances, progressive techniques and economical use of water resources.

Another important area will be affirmation of diverse forms of property and forms of management in rural areas. In this connection, in order to avoid unnecessary debates, we deemed it necessary to confirm that kolkhozes and sovkhoses have been and will remain the basis for agricultural production in coming years as well.

Under new types of management they should demonstrate fully their tremendous potential for a marked increase in agricultural output.

Development of this complex should in our opinion go in these directions: in the public sector, production of cotton and other crops; in the individual sector, primarily food production. A broad road should be opened up for development of leasing, peasant farms, family farms and private farm plots for kolkhoz members and sovkhos workers. Allocation of additional land for private plots may be difficult, but it must be done, using local conditions as a guide. We feel that we are acting correctly by setting a goal of increasing the size of private plots in all areas over the next few years to 0.15 hectare in existing settlements, with a view toward raising this limit to 0.25 hectare, and setting a limit of as much as 0.5 hectare in virgin lands.

I am convinced that party assistance in development of private plots, family farms and peasant farms will help in the very near future bring about a radical turnaround in food production. This in turn will make it possible not only to feed our republic's population, but also to ship a substantial portion of our food production to areas outside the republic, increase the people's income and improve social services.

In the draft Turkmen CP Program of Action which we have proposed to you the particular urgency of the housing problem is noted. Those who wrote the draft feel that this problem can be solved through a sharp increase in housing construction through redistribution of funds from republic and local budgets and utilization of all possible sources of financing, including citizens' personal savings, combined with accelerated development of the construction materials industry and improvement of construction organizations' infrastructure. In addition to solving the housing problem we must tackle problems pertaining to social development of rural population centers. It is a matter of honor for communists to lend support to executive organs and ensure that by the end of 1995 all rural population centers have natural gas connections, adequate water supplies and an uninterrupted electric power supply.

Just as in the Turkmen Communist Party election platform we feel that it is extremely important for the Program of Action to contain the statement that one of the most important aspects of the republic party organization's work is its efforts to strengthen and assist the family. This work, in our opinion, includes a complex of socioeconomic measures aimed at improving families' cultural and domestic conditions, increasing their real income and bringing about comprehensive development of cities' and towns' social infrastructure. It is essential that the moral foundations of the family be restored and a consistent policy be carried out for the purpose of increasing the authority, role and responsibility of women as the guardians of the family hearth, as well as to raise women's educational, cultural and professional level.

The draft Program of Action also outlines specific tasks for party organizations in regard to environmental protection, efforts to improve the level of medical services and other tasks in the social realm.

Comrades!

Since only an efficient economy will permit us to resolve social problems and raise the standard of living, it is clear why the topic of the economy receives quite a lot of attention in the draft.

In this respect the key issue is transition to a market economy. In this respect our republic's position is special.

The transition to market-based relationships means guided expansion of free enterprise, transformations in regard to property and denationalization of the economy. Here the touchstone is the problem of property. Without defining our position on this issue it will be impossible to develop approaches to production relationships.

We support the view that in addition to state property and on an equal footing with it there should also be widespread development of collective, stockholder, family, personal labor and mixed forms of property. Yet at the same time we are firmly in favor of the process of denationalization, i.e. the transfer of certain production facilities from state ownership to cooperative, stockholder or other forms of ownership, being carried out in a reasonable manner.

The draft proposes a series of political measures aimed at demonopolizing the economy and developing competition. Above all this means creation of a broad network of small enterprises based on various forms of property. Their accelerated development could solve a number of economic problems in our republic, bringing about an increase in consumer goods production, resolving employment problems in labor-surplus regions, speeding up development of small- and medium-size cities and making fuller use of local raw materials and waste products.

Before we make the transition to a market economy it is essential that we draw up a system of social protection and compensation. This system should be developed and put in place for the least well-provisioned segments of the population in a timely manner. Much was said on this subject at the start of efforts to develop a market economy system. Now many people have begun to forget about this. In view of this I deem it essential that we once again direct attention to the problem of social protection for the people. We must do everything we can to ensure that such a program exists and, most importantly, that it works. Clearly it will be difficult to solve this problem apart from the rest of the country, but we must do everything in our power. I feel that it is my duty to affirm once more that we are not going to raise flour prices. The same guarantee applies to prices in student cafeterias. We will also seek means of providing cash compensation

to poorer segments of the population. The people of our republic can be completely certain that the Turkmen Communist Party will unfailingly strive to ensure them a guaranteed right to work and acquire a trade.

A highly important task for our party organization and for each communist, the Program notes, is to conduct broad informational work to prepare society to accept market-based relationships and extend public assistance to all undertakings intended to increase production efficiency and develop initiative, entrepreneurial skills in the best interests of the working people and active participation in realization of the party's economic policy under conditions of restoration of full powers to soviets.

Comrades!

One of the most important issues to which the people are not merely expecting but actually demanding a solution from us is that of how to combat speculation. There is no need to restate the responsibility which falls on internal affairs organs in the struggle against this ill, which is literally consuming the entrails of our society. In connection with that responsibility I would like to stress that the campaign to depoliticize the militia and the army which has been whipped up in certain regions is not the path which we are going to take. We do not intend either to open up a discussion of this nature or to reshape our lives in a form and fashion which are alien to us.

I would also like to express my attitude toward the processes which are taking place in our country with regard to the role of the army. There should be only one army in our country; under the conditions which exist in our state splitting it up is impossible, and we do not intend to do so in this republic. We regard any acts directed against military personnel or their families as illegal and anti-legal.

As we set forth in the Program of Action goals connected with radical renewal of ideological work, spiritual rebirth of the individual and greater intellectual potential in our republic we proceeded upon the assumption that the basis for this work should be the resolutions passed by the 28th Congress, which have a direct bearing on radical restructuring of such highly important areas of ideology as education, science and culture, nationalities policy, youth policy and the mass media. In formulating basic principles for realization of the communist party's ideological functions those who drew up the Program stated that they reject outdated, discredited formulations, canons and dogmas. Yet at the same time the party has no right to impoverish its own ideological and political arsenal. That is obvious.

Therefore emphasis is placed on the Turkmen Communist Party's intention to continue to reject anything that is alien to socialism, rejection of the ideals of the October Revolution or a nihilistic attitude toward the revolutionary achievements of the Soviet people. While condemning the deformations of socialism caused by

Stalinism and stagnation, the party nonetheless acknowledges the real achievements made in the building of socialism in Turkmenistan, where in place of a small-scale, primarily agrarian, semi-feudal economy we have seen the emergence of modern socialist industry and large kolkhozes and sovkhozes. We see evidence of a cultural revolution in universal literacy and the existence of our own national intelligentsia and scientific community. Thereby we pay tribute to the creative efforts and selflessness of all the generations of the native working class, kolkhoz peasantry and intelligentsia which have taken shape here under the Soviet system, as well as their feats of valor in defense of the republic.

The draft clearly and specifically reflects our position in regard to the socialist choice. The communist party has always considered and continues to consider that choice the sole natural and historical path of civilization's development. Hence our goal of laboring selflessly for the cause of complete triumph of humane, democratic socialism in Turkmenistan.

Without an integral link to real life affairs any ideological work is dead, reflects nothing and cannot become a means of ideological and political indoctrination. We realize that in addition to other connections ideological institutions should have modern and technically well-equipped sociological services. Surveys and individual polls among various social groups on the most important socioeconomic, sociopolitical and personal issues should be an indispensable part of ideological work by party organizations at all levels.

In view of this the issue of proper cadre training assumes great urgency.

The goal is to put more of a human face on the profession of party official and to train a qualitatively new cohort of leaders who are capable of meeting the challenge of political realities in a worthy manner. We do not need commanders, we need qualified experts in the human professions: political scientists, historians, sociologists, psychologists, journalists, philosophers and managers. In short, we are talking about the creation of a complete system of cadre training and retraining. We must think about establishing a center for the training of a new generation of cadres, and the House of Political Education could be used for this purpose.

In the version of the draft Program which you have before you your attention is directed to the fact that the present state of the spiritual realm, the low level of public culture and education and the unfounded nature of scientific results are serious obstacles to perestroika in Turkmenistan. Therefore we propose that this area be made a priority in the work of our republic Communist Party.

I am referring to the need to create fundamentally new concepts for development of public education, culture and science. It is clear to all that these things can yield what they should only if they are fully supported with

financial and physical resources, if their realization becomes a matter of primary importance both to party committees and soviets.

Among the strategic goals in our Program are development of culture and aesthetic education. The Central Committee feels that in order to overcome the excesses and deformations which have been created in this area of concern to all the people in the near future we must develop a state program for development of culture in our republic which will make provision for substantial strengthening of culture's personnel potential and physical facilities. While making genuine cultural treasures accessible to the people it is vital that we simultaneously protect people, especially young people, from the decadent influence of "mass culture" and propaganda promoting violence, baseness and pornography. A law to this effect has been passed by the Supreme Soviet. A proposal has been made to establish a special public-state council under the republic president to deal with matters of this nature. In doing so we should rely on progressive national traditions and the moral values of the Turkmen people and the other peoples who are permanent residents of our republic.

The Turkmen Communist Party should do everything it can to widely promote the heritage of Turkmen thinkers, literary figures, artists, folk artists and the intellectual values of other peoples. We could be rendered invaluable aid in this by the storytellers and elders whose memories retain the folk epics and other works which have been handed down from generation to generation.

The intelligentsia should play a major role in implementation of cultural policy. People who are engaged in creative, scientific or educational work should have a sense of their responsibility to the people. By the same token, every creative step by a writer, scientist, physician or artist should definitely have the communist party's support.

At this time of revival and radical democratic political change we feel especially keenly the lack of humanity, decency and spirituality. We do not have enough of these eternal values either in our emerging economic relationships, or in our public dealings and political discussions, or in some articles in the press and some television programs. Among the positive aspects mentioned in the Program of Action which need your support is a section envisioning establishment of new relations with believers. While continuing to adhere to our materialist world view, we must direct our efforts together with those of believers of all religions toward the spiritual and cultural elevation of the peoples of Turkmenistan.

The draft Program encourages research on the republic's social development necessary for assertion of economic independence and sovereignty. We also propose that the significance of historical research be made more up-to-date.

Among the strategic goals of our Program is greater humanity and humanitarianism in science, education

and all aspects of our society. It is essential that the prestige of the humanities be restored, and not only to de-Stalinize intellectual and cultural life. We must acquire the common human values accumulated by classical world culture as a counterweight to the danger which has arisen and now faces the entire civilized world as a result of certain negative consequences of the scientific-technical revolution and ecological and moral crisis.

The draft Program states that the party should not ignore restoration of ethnicity and the problems of its development. This is an important guidepost for ideological work under the conditions which exist in our republic. The concept of ethnic schools and ethnic culture should be acquired not only by us, the Turkmen, but also by all the other peoples who live here. The Turkmen Communist Party should pursue a consistent policy in defense of the rights of women in society and in the family, social services for them, protection of mothers and children and greater respect for and a greater role and responsibility for women in strengthening the family and developing positive family traditions and as guardians of the family hearth.

Relations between party committees and the mass media should be raised to a qualitatively new level.

We must learn to live with diversity in people's opinions, interests and aspirations and to find acceptable compromises. But we are categorically opposed to the way the press is sometimes exploited for the sake of certain people's ambitions, imposes one-sided opinions or covers complex phenomena and processes occurring in our lives unobjectively.

During further editing of these drafts of our fundamental documents we should think seriously about ways of improving the structure of press outlets in our republic, taking into consideration the increasing demand for newspapers and magazines in the languages of the nationalities living in Turkmenistan as well as, and this is no less important, the profitability of party publications.

It would be naive to assume that the few short lines of the Program can contain all the tasks which we face. Everything is so complicated that it will not fit into diagrams or a set of guidelines. But we can and must set some basic orientations for our work.

On what does it seem important for us to focus party committees at this time?

Probably the most important question is how to strengthen party ranks.

There are presently over 115,000 communists in the Turkmen Communist Party. This year almost 3,000 people joined the party in our republic. According to statements submitted a total of 510 people quit the party, giving a ratio of six to one. It would seem that everything is fine and that there is no cause for concern.

But that is only at first glance. If we recall that in 1986 only three people quit the party, then we see that here we have serious food for thought.

The largest number of withdrawals from the party were in party organizations in the cities of Ashkhabad, Nebit-Dag, Krasnovodsk, Mary and Chardzhou and in Dargan-Atinskiy Rayon. The reasons vary. Most cite a loss of respect for the party or unwillingness to carry out party duties and pay membership dues as their reasons for quitting. Some people also openly state selfish, careerist motives.

Public betrayal of one's party convictions is not a new phenomenon, and the people will not be fooled by it. As a rule this is typical of unthinking, unprincipled individuals who are willing to serve only themselves no matter what their ideological garb. I think that primary party organizations will give a proper assessment of this kind of CPSU members and will exercise their right to restore order in their ranks.

The question of how to strengthen communists' unity of actions is an urgent one. The following principles are timely:

- pluralism of opinions which oppose nationalist, separatist and extremist ideological alternatives;
- the social choice of perestroika;
- priority of common human values and working people's interests, subordinating class or nationalist aspirations;
- guarantees of Turkmen SSR state sovereignty within the framework of a renewed Soviet federation;
- unity of interests among the native nation and the republic's non-native population based on joint labor and living.

One of the key aspects of party work is full restoration of the Leninist principle of collective discussion and decision making. I think that no one would object to that. The Turkmen Communist Party should very resolutely support exclusion from our lives of any sort of anonymous or irresponsible leadership and support strict delineation of functions for each person in an elective organ and personal responsibility for performance of those functions.

Particular significance has been attached to ways of improving the party's work with the masses, with labor collectives and at people's places of residence.

In interaction between all branches of the party it is important to overcome alienation from real life, hierarchical subordination, command methods and petty interference, affirm genuine collectivism in work and personal responsibility for one's assigned task, restore a spirit of party comradeship and revive a genuinely Leninist outlook on the correlation between freedom of opinion and unity of action.

Under conditions of emerging autonomy for all party branches it is quite correct that special attention should

be paid to the problem of strengthening party discipline and increasing the responsibility of each party organ, party organization and individual communist. Toward these ends we propose to use both time-tested and new forms and methods. Greater demands will be made of each person. Respect for the party should be increased solely through greater exactingness, conscientious discipline and heightened responsibility. The public expects this of communists, and they have no right not to live up to those expectations.

However, it is also true that the Turkmen Communist Party should create all that is necessary for demonstration of creativity, initiative and independence and toward that end operate primarily by means of explanation, persuasion, democratic consensus and development of practical recommendations, seeking to win people over to our side.

Special attention should be paid to the work of communists in soviet organs. Establishment of republic political sovereignty requires that more decisive steps be taken to increase the role and authority and to the expand the rights and powers of soviets at all levels as organs of people's power.

This process is proceeding quite slowly and unevenly. In their practical efforts many soviets lack experience, competence and decisiveness. They have not completely rid themselves of inertia or the habit of waiting for instructions from party organs.

A great portion of responsibility for the development and infusion of dynamism in the work of soviets falls to their chairmen, an absolute majority of whom are also secretaries of the corresponding party committees. To a large extent it is up to them how specific efforts to bring about transfer of full power to soviets of people's deputies will be carried out in practice. We cannot agree with the fact that many chairmen of soviets are attempting to give their party duties priority in their day-to-day work. They continue to decide many aspects of commercial activity by enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhoses through the party apparatus.

On the basis of what I have said it is clear that we will be justified in resolving to take steps to restrict those duties. Incidentally, this issue was also raised at the third session of the republic Supreme Soviet.

Clearly it is difficult to give up accustomed practices all at once, but today it is completely futile to continue orienting oneself by the past. However, the process of transferring direct administrative functions to soviets in no way means that the party can divest itself of responsibility to perform political, economic and social tasks.

Party committees, while reserving the right to come up with political solutions to problems relative to society's economic, social and intellectual development, are urged to strive for realization of those solutions solely through political methods. Above all this should be achieved through an all-round increase in the activism of each communist deputy, pooling of efforts and qualitatively new effort by party groups and factions exercising their constitutional right to take legislative initiative and to win the trust of the masses. Under new conditions the Turkmen Communist Party's interaction with mass social and political organizations assumes great and important significance. Above all this refers to interaction with trade unions, the Komsomol and veterans', women's and other social groups. Equal rights, partnership and mutual respect combined with common goals: interaction should take place on this basis.

Comrades!

As I conclude this report I would like to stress that the situation is a difficult one and that ambitious efforts lie ahead, efforts which will require a creative attitude toward our jobs, deep thought and an active stance.

The most important thing that we as communists can do to bring about renewal in the Turkmen Communist Party is to set a good personal example. Being constantly in the thick of the people, sharing all difficulties with them, and taking the greatest adversity on oneself is our only privilege, i.e. the opportunity to justify the hopes of the communists who have delegated us to positions of leadership in our republic party organization.

TRUD, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Curtailments Hit

91UN0674B Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by Yu. Ursov under the rubric "Colleagues' Opinion": "Black Saturday for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA"]

[Text] Everything was going as usual in the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial office last Saturday as they prepared the Sunday edition. Preoccupied correspondents ran about the corridors. Section editors corrected and abridged. Executive secretary Sergey Kushnerev was attempting to squeeze into the issue's layout the latest information of interest sent in by the newspaper's correspondents. At exactly 1300, as always, there was a planning meeting. They marked the most appealing articles, decided to replace a couple of headlines...

Everything was normal, if you do not consider the fact that readers will not see the Sunday issue. The paper was not published. The reason for this is that a unilateral decision was made to publish TRUD, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and certain other newspapers five times per week. Tens of millions of subscribers—and, of course, journalists—were not asked their opinion about this.

A "warning antistrike" by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA journalists was directed against the intention of shifting to publication five times a week—which, practically speaking, deprives the country of a daily press. "We Really Want to Work!" was the chief slogan seen during this unusual action. It must be said that KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and TRUD workers will lose practically nothing financially after transition to the five-times-a-week schedule. It is the readers who will lose—and they will lose quite a bit.

As V. Fronin, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editor in chief, stated, the next step will be to set up a "direct line" over which leaders of the Ministry of Communications and Lumber Industry Ministry answer readers' questions. He did not rule out a direct appeal from readers and the editorial board to the country's leadership, and stressed that the present situation with these newspapers is a test of traditional solidarity among journalists.

Now it is TRUD's turn. Will we help our colleagues?

Correspondent Threatened Over Views

91UN0705A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 91
Second Edition p 2

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent M. Kryukov: "Under the Flag of 'Democracy' Some Openly Profess Ideas of Unbridled Anticommunism"]

[Text] Rostov na Donu—Many of our citizens seem to have lost their hearing. They distinguish false voices poorly, and they continue to believe the phrase-mongers

and the demagogues. However, even though slowly, they are beginning to understand who is who. The one to whom this turn of events is not convenient is the one who lets loose an even greater verbal fog. And not only this. Ultimatums and threats come into play.

I also received threatening letters. They were among the responses to the article that I submitted—"Are the Intentions Pure," which was published in PRAVDA on 28 March of last year. One note was especially malicious. Judge for yourself: "T. Kryukov! You should be ashamed. These are the rattles before the hour of death. The time will come—soon!—and you will be unearthed and the record of your concoctions will be revealed." The envelope has a return Moscow address, last name, first name, and patronymic...

Why does the author of the note want my downfall? He is disturbed by the fact that I am defending the CPSU against those who get caught up in the criticism of "partocracy," while covering themselves in the process with discourses about glasnost and democracy. In fact, he vents insults, gratifies his own ambitions, and tries to get the upper hand. I cited examples. My critic did not provide any arguments. He began and ended with a threat. Still, I sent him a letter to the address indicated on the envelope. But I have not received an answer. The letter of P. Gusev from Orlovskiy Rayon, Rostov Oblast has something in common with the note of the Muscovite. He writes: "Dinosaurs bite each other in their predeath agony..." By dinosaurs he means Communists; he covers them with mud, and me as well. I vexed him with another contribution in PRAVDA—"Everyone Extricates Himself as Best He Can" of 26 June, also of last year. I wrote in it about the rally in the stadium in Rostov na Donu. This was an anticommunist sabbath where essentially only "their own" were allowed to speak. Others were whistled down. P. Gusev turned out to be one of "theirs."

This gave a reason for USSR People's Deputy V. Shevlyuga, a molder from "Rostselmash," to say at a party conference of Rostov na Donu Communists: "We waited for this: a former policeman at rallies is teaching us how to live." He had Gusev in mind. And he had a reason for saying this. During the war, in 1944, Gusev was convicted of complicity with the fascists. He served his sentence. But he came to the rally from Orlovskiy Rayon in Rostov "to defend democracy." In his village, "defending" it, he screamed at former frontline soldiers: "Your time is over!" He threatened, true to his nature: "I am not alone. We will soon hang you, Communists!" This was also indicated in my submission.

Gusev demanded that his letter of refutation be published. He wrote that there is no data that he was a policeman. Meanwhile, archival documents show that during the war Gusev lived in Kalinin Oblast, where he cooperated with the fascists. There is no need now to stir up the details, and I am not Gusev's judge. The court trial, you see, was held as far back as 1944. But even today at his new place of residence, Gusev recently

behaved in such a way that he angered the villagers, especially the war veterans. They demanded that Gusev be evicted from the settlement.

The question comes to mind automatically: Why did the Gusev's begin to speak out now? The answer is obvious: They sensed the support of those who under the flag of democracy announced a campaign against Communists. And there is no need for anyone to pretend that nothing of the kind is occurring. It is occurring. The anticommunists are sounding assembly, and their boosters are trying to the utmost. They also flatter such as Gusev, and they pave the way for them. These get dizzy from such attention, they yearn for rallies, and they get deeper into the role of expositors. At the same time, Gusev himself admits: "I am half-educated." But this does not prevent him from asserting: "Marxism-Leninism is a crazy idea." Someone guided his hand in order to be able to write this.

Thus, anticommunism is heating up. This is the way it is instilled into the conscience. For those who are doing this, all means are good—from noisy rallies to the destruction of monuments to Lenin and the burning of buildings of party committees. However, ill-wishers cannot fail to see and hear about those changes that are taking place in the party itself. About its renewal. About the recreation of its true character, which was so distorted by Stalinism. However, not everyone wants the people to have a better understanding of what in fact is going on. It is not convenient. It is not useful to them, and it discloses their true aims. And so they arouse passions and spread discord.

Now political passions are boiling more in the capitals. There are various reasons here. But one of them, very likely, is that "at the periphery," it is easier to perceive each other and get to the bottom of the true intentions of pretenders to "leadership." You will not always hear the false note in the capital choir. The choir is too multifaceted. They can be distinguished later, after they have been listened to. They convince themselves of the intrigue of their idols, who are far from performing unselfish service for the people, of which they tried previously to convince everyone under oath. And, of course, the disenchantment comes. The emperor has no clothes. And as a consequence, the voters in Moscow and Leningrad did not come to the polls recently to elect some additional deputies to the city soviets.

The "democrats" were forced to change their tactics. In Rostov, for example, one of the cochairman of the so-called Donu People's Front, a deputy of the city soviet, spoke to his like-thinkers and said that rallies have already done their job and have helped politicize society, and that, perhaps, they do not have to be resorted to. Now the political struggle has moved to parliaments at all levels. Attempts will be made to get established in enterprises, in order to press the Communists there.

In order to reinforce the spirit of their flock, emissaries from Moscow arrive at the localities from time to time. N. Travkin also arrived in Rostov. I recalled who he was relatively recently—a construction foreman and an important administrative manager. He did not escape the attention of the newspapers. Travkin was able to represent not only his work but himself as well. The journalists took the hook in a friendly way. In my opinion, they already have begun to recopy each other—the very same thing can be read frequently in various newspapers. For them, Travkin is in the public mind now. Those who make additional earnings on anticommunism catch his every word. Because Travkin has become a regular anticommunist.

However, no matter how the Travkin backers try, they will not separate the party of the Communists from the people. And no matter what kind of a wedge they try to drive in here, they will not be successful. It is futile work.

I recall the holiday columns of Great October last year. There were many slogans there in support of the party. I recall one placard most of all. It was held by a young boy who was sitting on the shoulders of his father. The placard read: "My dad is a Communist!"

I mentally wished the young boy and his dad health and happiness.

Editor's Official Obituary

*91UN0716C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 15 Jan 91 First Edition p 4*

[Obituary of Ivan Ivanovich Fomin, editor in chief of the Kaluga Oblast newspaper ZNAMYA: "Ivan Ivanovich Fomin"]

[Text] On 11 January 1991, Ivan Ivanovich Fomin, CPSU member since 1968, editor of the KALUGA Oblast newspaper ZNAMYA, chairman of the board of the USSR Union of Journalists oblast organization, was killed at his work station. I.I. Fomin was born in 1945 in the village of Aristovo, Ferzikovskiy Rayon, Kaluga Oblast, in a peasant family. After service in the Soviet Army, he came to work as a journalist to the Ferzikovskiy Rayon newspaper KRASNOYE ZNAMYA. Upon graduation from the Kharkov Legal Institute, he worked as an investigator in the procurator's office of Ugodsko-Zavodskoy (currently Zhukovskiy) Rayon, and subsequently as instructor of the CPSU Ugodsko-Zavodskoy Rayon Committee. After 1973, he once again worked in the mass media, initially as deputy editor of the rayon newspaper LENINSKIY LUCH, and subsequently as its editor. In 1979, I.I. Fomin was sent for study to the Moscow Higher Party School; after graduating from the school, he worked as a staff correspondent of the oblast newspaper ZNAMYA. In May 1984, I.I. Fomin was appointed deputy editor of the newspaper ZNAMYA, and in one and a half years, its editor. In all positions with which the oblast party organization and the oblast soviet of people's deputies entrusted I.I.

Fomin, he displayed organizational talent and professionalism, a principled and exacting party approach, and a respectful and friendly attitude toward the people.

Communist I.I. Fomin had a keen sense of duty and responsibility for the affairs with whose conduct he was entrusted. Due to these traits, he enjoyed authority. He was elected a member of the CPSU oblast committee, candidate member of the CPSU Oblast Committee Bureau, and deputy of the Kaluga City and Oblast Soviets of People's Deputies. His work in the field of journalism was marked by the Order of the Red Banner of Labor in 1987. The glowing memory of the faithful communist, journalist Ivan Ivanovich Fomin will forever live in our hearts.

[signed] A.N. Ilyin, G.A. Zyuganov, V.V. Chikin, A.V. Tsvetkov, V.V. Sudarenkov, G.V. Zarapin, A.I. Stelikov, V.I. Kuznetsov, A.G. Moiseyenko, N.A. Nenashev, V.A. Boyko, A.P. Ivanov, N.A. Nudin, V.I. Zakharova, B.P. Okonechnikov, A.V. Sevostyanov, Yu.I. Telenkov, V.M. Fedorov, A.V. Chetverikov, I.A. Borodulin, L.D. Arseyev, A.D. Kovalev, A.A. Kruchinin, V.A. Lytkin, V.N. Minakov, V.A. Mokshin, I.F. Nazarov, A.M. Saveleyeva, A.P. Saydov, N.F. Saprykin, V.F. Stepanenko, V.P. Churin, V.P. Kononov, V.N. Nesterov, A.P. Demichev, V.M. Gorchakov, V.A. Ignatov, A.Ya. Gromov, M.N. Astakhov, I.M. Vasilyev, M.I. Yevstigneyeva, K.N. Ikonnikov, G.N. Kryzhenkov, Yu.N. Logvinov, V.N. Omelchenko, S.N. Polishchuk, R.Yu. Chebotarev, V.M. Kolesnikov, A.P. Visyulin, V.F. Reshitko, A.M. Ivashurov, V.A. Boyev, A.P. Zolotin, N.V. Doronina.

Nevzorov on Professional, Personal Beliefs

91UN0658A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 9 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Glebovich Nevzorov by N. Dubrovskaya; place and date not given: "Nevzorov, Again Nevzorov"; article is accompanied by a photograph of Nevzorov placed in the center of a target]

[Text] His name is always on everyone's tongue. And there are sacks of letters to the editor about him—some angrily exposing him, others praising him to the ends of the earth. But today there are more and more like this: "Protect Nevzorov!" What is happening?

Unlike certain of our colleagues, we do not like to surreptitiously record the statements of heroes on a tape recorder. We made an date directly with Aleksandr Glebovich, and here he is before you, esteemed colleagues—with a manner of speaking and thinking that is all his own. And you may draw your own conclusions.

[Dubrovskaya] Your appeal for support for "Seconds" is regarded in various ways: From "He has finally gotten himself into a mess, the KGB fuzz!"—to "Just let them try to touch a hair on the head of our Nevzorov!" But

practically all of the telephone calls and letters contain one common question: What was the occasion for your appeal on the screen?

[Nevzorov] It was the activity of the so-called commission of the Leningrad Soviet on glasnost, of course! I appealed for people to support us in our resolve to get rid of the commission on glasnost. I shall not speak about the fact that about two months ago Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak himself spoke of the need to reduce the number of commissions. I shall simply say that today everyone understands that this must be done. And if this commission is the first to go, it is only fair. Why do we need a commission on glasnost when we have the Law on the Press and Mass Media, which clearly states that there is the journalist, the publisher, the reader, and the court. And their interrelations are clearly determined. That is all! What good is an intermediary here?

I understand, of course, that they will have to add on somewhere and find some reason for paying them 750 rubles apiece, as they pay deputies of other commissions, which as of today are still really useful. I have in mind the commissions for land use, social development, medicine, childhood, and certain others. Working on them are people who have significant professional knowledge and a burning desire to change the situation in the city for the better. Here I see something else: The commission on glasnost or, rather, the "committee for deputy security," consists of people who follow me around the enterprises, make some kind of secret recordings, obtain film from somewhere in order to throw me in the slammer if I should happen to disclose the latest stupidity or vulgarity committed by "their" people...

[Dubrovskaya] That is, you do not like it when your "heroes" treat you the way you treat them...

[Nevzorov] I understand—it can be anybody as long as it is not me... Because probably nobody has had to engage in more ferreting out, reconnoitering, investigating, meeting people with compromising evidence, and other such things, and especially on as large a scale, as I have. But for me it is a part of my job, but what is it for them?... Are there really no problems in the city other than the relations between me and them? Let me note here that I go after the facts of reality or, rather, the inactivity of representatives of authority. But they are settling personal accounts with me.

[Dubrovskaya] Do you seriously think that this is all the Commission on Glasnost does?

[Nevzorov] Of course, I am aware of its slogans. But I am evaluating not slogans but real deeds. In my opinion, there has been a switching of concepts, a distortion of the functions that this commission has officially assumed. In the final analysis we have been given a kind of inquisition within the framework of censorship. That is, the members of this commission have given priority not to a lofty sense of responsibility but to a trivial, I would even say obscene, sense of vengeance.

After all, where does our value lie? In the fact that we can keep just a little ahead of events. We began to fulminate against the Leningrad Soviet at a time when the main characteristic of the press, its basic reaction to the displays of the Leningrad Soviet, was either silent emotion or timid gnashing of teeth. We were the first to conduct an analysis of their activity and its results, and we were the first to inform the voters of what were essentially cases of deception of the people by the people's elected representatives. And now people already know from their own experience who is who in the Mariinskiy Palace.

The same thing is true with the Commission on Glasnost. Again we are ahead of, or, rather, are trying to keep ahead of events. If we do not manage to do this now, then later we and you and all other journalists from other newspapers will simply close their mouths. The people who comprise the "censorship committee" inspire neither professional nor personal confidence in me. Not in the slightest!

[Dubrovskaya] Even the journalists?

[Nevzorov] Especially journalists! The ones who so easily, in general, break with their profession for the sake of some bureaucratic-government-commission-deputy-sit-in business of some kind. That same Sergey Sergeyevich Degtyarev, for example... What do you, as a journalist, have to say about him?

[Dubrovskaya] I would say that he is a person who has chosen his direction and is consistently proceeding in it. And that he has just as much right to do this as anyone else.

[Nevzorov] Quite right, but if people like this make up the Commission on Glasnost, people with these kinds of "directions" and concepts of decency, then I can see what kind of censorship we will all be faced with! The second aspect is the level. Do you remember the timid hints about my attitude toward "a certain powerful organization," obviously the KGB? I happened to meet this deputy. I asked why he did not name the organization specifically. His answer was that he could not name the organization because he could not go to the KGB and ask if I worked there or not. That is, he could not prove it... Do you understand the difference? In order for a journalist to state something publicly, he must have the official document in his hand. But guesses are good enough for their purposes. And, unfortunately, such is the work style in general: tailing people, conjectures, and the desire to save time. But what does the Commission on Glasnost have to do with my meetings with the workers at the enterprises?

[Dubrovskaya] But still, what is there for you to be afraid of if your statements are backed up by documents? Let us say that there was a trade commission. If the workers in this sphere raise a ruckus it will not be difficult to anticipate the reaction of the residents of the city: Plenty of them steal and they do not want it to be monitored because they are afraid they will not be allowed to steal

anymore. Why is Nevzorov, who always double checks everything, afraid that someone else will check his information again?

[Nevzorov] It is not a matter of fear but of the inadmissibility and lack of necessity of this special kind of inquisition and double censorship. Remember that when I was slandering the party apparatus everyone just loved it! Everyone! Both when I was fulminating against the old ispolkom [executive committee] and when my victim was that same Vladimir Yakovlevich Khodyrev. But as soon as the "democrats" themselves ended up in that same role, they immediately took advantage of their own capabilities, which were probably more significant than those of the old apparatus, to suppress all this. The last straw was the plan for television submitted by some V. Solovyev and supported by the Commission on Glasnost. Here I sensed real danger, after which I appealed for support for the program.

As was stated in SMENA, the Commission on Glasnost considered this plan to be the "most democratic." What does this mean—the most "democratic"? According to this plan, television would be broken down and transformed from a force that forms public opinion into a bunch of separate editorial offices that could either accept material or not. Who would decide this? The supervisory commission—one of the main organs of the future structure of television that would include, as was modestly stated, "people's deputies as well." In my opinion, everything is clear here! Anything the "people's deputies as well" do not like will simply not go on the air. So far not a single one of the "people's deputies as well" from the Commission on Glasnost has appeared on "Seconds," and the same reproaches are being hurled in the corridors during chance meetings. So far the only interest in the program comes when something of "their own" is affected and it is necessary to "save face."

[Dubrovskaya] Yes, there are plenty of rumors. It is understandable why, because of the specific nature of our profession, you have connections with the KGB as well. How close are these connections really?

[Nevzorov] As close as they need to be for my work. I have daily contact with the KGB, the GUVd [State Administration of Internal Affairs], the fire departments, "first aid," and the GAI [State Automobile Inspection]. I work with on-the-spot information, and it is dangerous and complicated—mainly having to do with crime that goes through the KGB as well. And if it does not have to do with arms, terrorism, contraband, or several other crimes of this nature, they are third in line to get this information. So sometimes we recheck information through the KGB, and when they sometimes give it to us themselves—through our own channels. I really do have friends there, as I do in other services with which I work. And regardless of how terrible this may appear, I must admit that these are people who are boundlessly dear to me. I have every reason to speak of their exceptional decency, nobility, and love for Russia, and, incidentally, they pay their bills promptly...

But to speak seriously about my relations with the KGB, people who hint about our "connection" are quite wrong to think that I am terribly ashamed of this. No, I am not a ballerina from the Kirov Theater and I am no kindergarten teacher. I am a journalist, and I simply must be "connected" professionally and personally with all the people who work in the spheres of my subjects and interests.

[Dubrovskaya] In order to close the subject of the KGB, let us dot the "i" on your family ties. There are legends going around that your father is an important figure in state security. As far as I know, you grew up without a father...

[Nevzorov] I have said repeatedly that, unfortunately, I do not know my father at all and I actually was raised by my mother alone. But my grandfather—Gregoriy Vladimirovich Nevzorov—was a person of some importance in the KGB. He died five years ago and by the time I started to work he had been retired for a long time. So there is no way he could have influenced my activity. Our relations were typical for a grandfather and grandson. But at the same time because of him or, rather, mainly because of him, the KGB was not an abstract concept for me but specific living people whom I respect. This service is undeservedly being drug through the mud today, as, incidentally, the Army is too.

You can take a knife in your hand and make a speech about what a deadly weapon it is. You can pronounce a sentence on it. But you can also tell about how useful it is and compose a panegyric to it. For the whole question is one of how it is used—right? Or—in whose hands. A knife is an instrument. And the KGB is an instrument of state power. For performing especially complicated and precise operations. If it ends up in the hands of the riff-raff it will be used correspondingly. If it is in the hands of a decent person, the result of the instrument's work is different.

[Dubrovskaya] The mass media are also an instrument. You wrote an article about the motor vehicles obtained by deputies of the Leningrad Soviet. In other words you used your instrument to evoke a negative attitude toward the deputies in the society. But it turns out that the motor vehicles were not distributed by the Leningrad Soviet and they were not for the city's corps of deputies. So the Leningrad deputies did not deserve this reproach. If you had precise information and knew the real state of affairs with respect to the cars, why did you express this reproach over the air?

[Nevzorov] What difference does it make which level the mandate of the deputy elected by the Leningraders comes from? They are Leningrad deputies! I appealed to the city to find the Volga and trade it for two flour trucks from Odessa. Because the plants are standing idle waiting for flour simply because of a shortage of transportation for shipping flour. But did any of these fellows turn in their Volga? No, they were not interested in my suggestion, just as they are not interested in the situation

with flour in Leningrad. They threw themselves into proving that their cars had come from different places and from different people. Is this normal, in your opinion? And, as we all know, among the deputies of Russia there are also deputies of the Leningrad Soviet.

Everything could be destroyed, rot, and die, but they would hold on to their salaries and mandates and their illusory power; they would prattle and do nothing, enjoying the crumbs of the privileges enjoyed by their predecessors who were so loudly condemned previously... There is hardly one among them who would willingly give up his mandate and go through repeat elections...

[Dubrovskaya] That is, the Leningrad Soviet is also an instrument and it has fallen into the "wrong" hands.

[Nevzorov] It is not an instrument but something more ridiculous which originated on the crest of our time of troubles. It is a sham. When there was a dictatorship of the party the soviets did not work but they existed in such a sneaky way that their inactivity went unnoticed. Now that the party has receded, their inactivity has become apparent.

Remember when the American delegations came to visit us and they were shown the computerized first-grade class? Two computers stood side by side on the desk. On one side of the desk sat a teacher and on the other, a student. Both cheerfully tapped on the keyboards and the figures jumped up, but the student's keyboard was a fake. What would have happened if the teacher had gotten up and left?... The present situation is analogous. The adult has departed but the student is still there. And one can see that no matter what expression may appear on the face of the "student" and no matter what intentions the student may have as he pokes at the keys, there will be no result. This is why the Communists relinquished power so easily. Having brought the country to the brink, they stepped to the side, leaving a small group of so-called democrats, who had been given the opportunity to sit in the Mariinskiy Palace, to accept the consequences of the crushing defeat. And the most disgraceful thing in this story is that now all of us are tormented in vain...

[Dubrovskaya] In the first place, you yourself helped many people go through the legislatures at various levels. In the second place, according to your logic, our situation today was predetermined and was not the result of the evil will of the deputies. In the third place, there are some very decent and worthy people among them. Why do you not help the "hostages" of the old system if this is what you consider them to be, which would be right up your alley? And why has your attitude toward democrats in general changed so much?

[Nevzorov] Undoubtedly, there are some decent and worthy people there, and they are in the majority. But their main problem is that they have no chance to agree with one another! There is a struggle of prides, ambitions, factions, and parties, and this is more important to them than the fate of the city. If any real steps had been

taken to the benefit of the people, I would undoubtedly support them! We had the idea of producing a program for national television entitled "Deputies," that is, to give an opportunity to normal, living, honest people to express themselves. Those who go among the insulted and injured, who encounter the problems of the communal apartments, the filth, the ruin, the poverty, the unhappiest of our elderly. People like this must be supported because they are engaged in real work and not in idle talk. But they are only rare rays of light who do not make the most difference.

And as for my attitude... I am no exception to the rule. Just like you and many others, I have thought that I would help real people come into real power. It took time, following the example of my own fate and the fate of the city, to understand that I was mistaken. It cannot be ruled out that they will ultimately understand that their well-being depends on the well-being of the city. Then I will begin to help the whole Leningrad Soviet. But, to be honest, I have less and less hope...

But then what is it I actually do? I do what a normal reporter should do: I seek out and reveal abuses of power.

[Dubrovskaya] As far as I know, your ideal of power is a monarchy...

[Nevzorov] I understand that it is pointless to go into this subject. The people have been morally degraded and destroyed to such a degree that a monarchy cannot exist. It is more of a literary-artistic image that warms the soul.

[Dubrovskaya] Then let us move from the literary-artistic image to reality. In your view, in whose hands should the power lie?

[Nevzorov] I will say what I have said previously, for which I was beaten: The power should be in the hands not of an elected figure but an appointed one. Appointed either by the president or by the leader of Russia. And how they will relate to one another is a different problem. The fate of the city, unfortunately, depends also on which of them has a harder head. But in any case, it would be easier to remove an appointed figure with an appointed temporary cabinet. We have all managed to figure out that elected people are in principle no better than appointed ones. But the appointed ones have the advantage over the elected ones in that they have a sense of responsibility: They know that they can be removed. But the elected ones know something else: How complicated, convoluted, and immovable the procedure for recalling representatives is.

[Dubrovskaya] Are you leading to the idea that presidential rule is necessary?

[Nevzorov] I sincerely think that. After a year or a year and a half the appointed figure with his appointed temporary cabinet can be approved or not approved through democratic elections. But by that time the situation in the country will be stabilized.

[Dubrovskaya] Are you sure that the appointed figure will retain the soviets and the real possibility of democratic elections?

[Nevzorov] This should be ensured by USSR law. A temporary government, as I call it, should be legislatively introduced temporarily. And at that time the people of the temporary cabinet who have recommended themselves one way or another will be either elected or replaced. Alas, most of the deputies today are people who have lived fairly long lives and never distinguished themselves.

[Dubrovskaya] The dream of a "strong hand" is not likely to find a large number of advocates.

[Nevzorov] I understand quite well that I am dooming myself with this statement. But I think that now a strong hand is much more useful and better than weak ones. And I understand quite well how much more difficult it will be for me under a strong hand. I am aware of that too.

[Dubrovskaya] That is, you understand that they could take you and put you away.

[Nevzorov] Yes. But if you were to put on one side of the scale an existence of "600 Seconds" and my own personal existence, and on the other, a normal life in the city, I would choose the latter.

[Dubrovskaya] Say that the strong hand takes away "Seconds" and a couple of other programs and newspapers that it does not like. Then it will be left without any necessary critical eye whose right to exist you are defending so strongly today. It is logical to assume that then the power will again degenerate into that false and cruel but essentially dead force under whose pressure we have already existed. All of this is interconnected. And you are prepared to take a risk, counting on the Russian "off-chance?"

[Nevzorov] I am convinced that we already have a system for insuring us against repetitions of such things. Just as I understand that it is dangerous to destroy the existing structures without thinking.

[Dubrovskaya] Is it because of this understanding that you spoke out in support of G.P. Voshchinin in the ticklish situation that was created?

[Nevzorov] Here you are absolutely right! I know that A.G. Kramarev is an exceptionally decent and honest person, a high-class professional. I respect this person very much. And I know that I have lost many friends because of my position, and this pains me. But the GUVd is one of the few structures in the city that is still in place and can oppose chaos. This is why I think that in today's situation, to change the leadership of the Main Administration would be fatal not only for this department but also for the city as a whole.

Why be in such a hurry? We must also understand that this question pertains to the competence of the republic

or the Union. It is stupid and, to put it mildly, immoral for the deputies of the city to deal with questions like this now, at a time when there are no potatoes in the stores. It would be better for them to work with the forces and provide potatoes for the city. And they are involved in everything but their immediate work—keeping their constituents alive...

[Dubrovskaya] Let us return to another statement of yours that stirred up a storm of questions. What did you have in mind when you said that you have paid agents?

[Nevzorov] That I have them. These are people who, because of their jobs or social position or sometimes because of their personal wishes, cannot "stand out" among the cadre. They do real work and receive money for it. Your newspaper also has a system in which people write under pseudonyms. There are also people who, because of their convictions or, if you will, predilections, help "Seconds" free of charge. I think you have people like these as well.

[Dubrovskaya] That is, these are ordinary relations between the editorial staff and writers?

[Nevzorov] Not altogether. If you have in mind whether I pay them personally or not, it varies. Sometimes the love of Nevzorov alone is not enough, and this is normal. Some do not wish to go through the departments even, say, under a pseudonym, and this is normal, too. And sometimes the information that comes in is such that neither a bonus nor payment for its material assessment is enough.

[Dubrovskaya] The last question. Is your timid attitude toward the church related to the concern of a cultured person for spiritual values or is there a personal side to this?

[Nevzorov] Perhaps the latter. After all, I sang in the church choir, was baptized, and at the age of 20 decided to take monastic vows. But life developed in such a way that because of circumstances over which I had no control I was unable to do this. But I still think that I will never get away from this...

[Dubrovskaya] This, with your "active position in life?!" Frankly, it does not seem very convincing. You are always talking about benefit to the society. But such a step is hardly useful to the society in principle. I understand that if murderers, rapists, and bandits went to monasteries and repented there, they would benefit people if only by removing themselves from the world at large. But the best, most conscientious, and most spiritually advanced people go there. And this is a clear detriment to the society. How do you reconcile these things?

[Nevzorov] I would be happy if the society did not need me! I hope to win. And when I have done everything within my power, I will wash my hands of it all.

[Dubrovskaya] Do you want to earn the moral right to a moral pension?

[Nevzorov] I want to succeed in giving everything I have right now, in our difficult time of trouble. Then, when the situation is normalized and I have no strength left, which, incidentally, is what I anticipate, and there is no point in struggling, I will simply go away so as not to be a burden on this same society... I know that I will not last long. But there is no other way out for me. Especially in an age of war.

[Dubrovskaya] With the Leningrad Soviet?

[Nevzorov] No, with the people for whom Russia is not the most important thing in life. And here I shall stay until the end.

'Death Sentence' for Journalist Nevzorov

91UN0727A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 17 Jan 91 p 1

[IAN report: "'Sentence' for Nevzorov"]

[Text] Late at night on 16 January Leningrad television showed a news program recorded in Vilnius on 14 January by Aleksandr Nevzorov, a popular Soviet television journalist and host of the "600 Seconds" program.

On the basis of independent investigation, Nevzorov states: On the night of the tragic events the paratroopers arrived at the television tower after the shooting had already started there. The next day Boris Yeltsin declared that all military personnel who had participated in this operation should be discharged. The crews of the five tanks and five armored paratroop vehicles, as well as 162 paratroopers, continue to guard the tower.

According to Nevzorov, official Lithuanian authorities attempted to present persons killed in traffic accidents, and a heart attack victim, as victims of the tragic events.

NOVOSTI has learned that the same night a video cassette with a recording of this report was sent over to Lithuania. At 1700 the "600 Seconds" camera crew was sentenced to death at an extraordinary meeting of Sajudis vigilantes.

Slain Editor's Recent Positions

91UN0716B Moscow *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*
in Russian 15 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Excerpts from articles by Ivan Ivanovich Fomin, editor in chief of the Kaluga Oblast newspaper ZNAMYA, published between December 1990 and January 1991: "His Positions—From His Last Statements"]

[Text] A DANGEROUS PROFESSION. This is how they frequently refer to the profession of journalist, and not only because the people who have chosen it have a lower average life expectancy, but because at present journalists are far from being held in high esteem; at times, they are persecuted and even shot at...

All of us are mindful of the recent case of an attempt on the life of the well-known Leningrad TV journalist A. Nevzorov. Look at the number of all kinds of conflicts which employees of the mass media have with the local authorities, representatives of public organizations, and all descriptions of officials!

FUNCTIONARIES of various ranks who are confident of being in the right are now adopting the very command style which they "combated" quite recently. For example, Chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Mass Media Committee V. Yugin sent a series of letters to the Supreme Soviets of republics, as well as kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies. One of them also came to Kaluga. The committee chairman orders "the soviets to resolve the issue of publishing their own press organs in the period prior to 1 January 1991." Do not discuss it, do as ordered, or else...

When I was in the capital city, I asked Comrade Yugin: "Really, on what basis do you deprive soviet chairmen of the right to make decisions in a democratic manner and threaten them?"

He objected: "I demand specifics."

I will point out specifically that in the same letter Viktor Alekseyevich threatened the leaders of soviets with... a fine of 10,000 rubles for failure to comply with his instructions. Quite democratic, is it not?

I am not at all against the creation of new newspapers, and all the more so the newspapers of soviets. Besides, we made the decision to put out our own publication at the oblast level even before the above letter. However, I am against willfulness and intimidation, against misleading people.

OUR LIFE SERVES UP numerous examples whereby not only alien ideas but also unseemly actions are foisted on our society under the flag of pluralism. The most annoying point is, perhaps, the fact that people's deputies, who proclaimed attractive slogans and appeals in their election programs, are their advocates.

Having declared themselves proponents of democracy and combatants of the totalitarian system and all kinds of privileges of the apparatus, the now highly empowered segment of parliamentarians, as a rule, are avidly defending the bloated bureaucratic machine, demanding special privileges for themselves. The desire to boost their capital appreciably has for them replaced selfless service to the people.

N. Travkin, a USSR people's deputy, chairman of the Committee for the Operation of Soviets, and also an RSFSR people's deputy and chairman of the board of the Democratic Party of Russia, spoke only twice before the citizens of Kaluga. The Znaniye Society rewarded him generously, paying him honoraria exceeding 1,000 rubles. Our readers may easily imagine what his other voyages to the cities and villages have netted for the

well-known radical. During these voyages, he discusses a mysterious threat of dictatorship by the CPSU, nomenklatura, and other communist dangers.

THE CHIEF OF THE RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET financial-economic department sent a letter-directive to the Kaluga Oblast Executive Committee: That's how it is, in keeping with the decision made on providing motor vehicles to people's deputies for cash for discharging their responsibilities as deputies, People's Deputy A. Deryagin has been allocated a GAZ-24-10 ("Volga") vehicle in a pertinent notice of allocation from the Ministry of Trade, to be picked up at the place of residence. Assist him in acquiring a car...

Who is going to interfere with esteemed Aleksandr Vasilyevich doing that? Besides, he filed a personal petition, as is the procedure. However, as bad luck would have it, hair-splitting voters called the editorial office and reported this: After all, A. Deryagin purchased a car for himself through out-of-turn preferences two years ago as well. Is this proper?

I believe that only Aleksandr Vasilyevich himself can answer this question, all the more so because his program, which our newspaper published on 27 January of this year, indicates that it is necessary to eliminate privileges and preferences for the leading functionaries of various ranks who are out of touch with real life.

SAD AS IT MIGHT BE, for some reason at present the frequent custom is to regard critical remarks addressed to people's deputies as still more attacks on the democratically elected soviets. Please, I dare to object to the proponents of this point of view, did we not criticize soviet organs before? Do complaints made through the press fail to take into account the opinions of voters?

They do not, and this is precisely the point. Moreover, as a rule these complaints reflect nothing other than the urgent needs of the people. Nobody has a right to neglect them. However, on this score "pluralism" of words and deeds also prevails frequently, and a lapse into absolute demagoguery occurs.

...It appears that in the last months of the year now ending we started talking more about discipline and responsibility and thinking about what is happening around us, the situation in the country. Many suggestions have been aired at various levels. This is what pluralism is all about!

Still, I am convinced that in developing pluralism we should ensure that deeds and words be always honest, responsible, balanced, and effective during the difficult time our society is going through. As we can see, so far this does not necessarily happen. Specious pluralism only harms our endeavor; it is an obstacle to everything constructive.

Mail Workers Scored for Cutting Deliveries

91UN0704A Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Jan 91 p 1

[V. Kuzmishchev report: "Hand Over Your Money"]

[Text] Now, when we are engaged in a campaign to reduce costs for paper and to honestly do our duty to subscribers, we nevertheless fear in the depths of our souls that you will have to get out your pocket books for the publishing house, even for the earlier, relatively low price, and at this moment pay for nothing.

How can that be, the reader may exclaim in surprise, for TRUD has more than 17 million subscribers, and each one has paid 13.80 rubles [R]. Surely this comes to hundreds of millions of rubles?

In fact, "real" money is being paid, but not to us, but rather to Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for the Distribution of Publications]. According to the contract the publishing house signed with Soyuzpechat, by not later than 1 January this money should have been paid into our account.

So where is it? So far the editorial office has been unable to obtain a sensible answer to that question.

Last year could in general be called "the year of great change" with respect to all publishing houses and Soyuzpechat. First, taking advantage of its monopoly right, that department suddenly announced that delivery prices would now be 50.6 percent of the nominal cost of a subscription (so far the nominal price for last year). Thus, the communications people struck the first blow

against the reader's pocket. Where, from what departmental ceiling did this figure come? Why the cost of delivery to Tula and to Magadan should be the same is a closely guarded secret.

Then came a new surprise. It turns out that the communications people are not going to deliver newspapers on days off and on holidays. This was the second blow to the reader, because he has paid for 300 issues annually, not 260.

And this was all done under what seem to be some plausible pretext, namely, easing the really hard work of the communications people and increasing their wages.

Let us suppose that metallurgy workers closed down their furnaces on their days off. That the emergency services did not respond to calls... In some professions days off should be reassigned to other days; this is done the world over.

And where is this postal or other communications worker whose wages have noticeably increased since the price increases? Let him be brought here to the editorial office. We will publish his portrait. But we doubt that we will find one. Incidentally, in connection with this we call to mind the price increase for the use and installation of telephones. Did it make any noticeable difference to our standard of living, comrade communication workers?

And so, let us say this: Taking advantage of its monopoly position, Soyuzpechat has put the newspaper in a difficult position and put its hand into the pocket of the subscriber... But we shall even be unable to meet this exorbitant contract if they do not transfer the subscription money. We are waiting...

Problems Seen in Christmas Holiday

91UN0668A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 5 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[A. Ryabov reports comments by various individuals on an RSFSR decree: "7 January on Our Calendar"]

[Text] As is well-known, a decree of the RSFSR has declared one of the oldest holidays of Christianity—Christmas—to be a nonworking day. One more free day. Is this bad? However, not everything is that simple, and quite a few questions are already cropping up on this point alone, how to implement the decision made by the Russian parliament in a practical way. This is indicated by reports from the localities.

"We did not give any instructions," said V.V. Kalashnikov, chairman of the ispolkom (executive committee) of the Ryazan Oblast soviet of people's deputies. "We think that this is a matter for the work collectives themselves. One thing is clear: Enterprises with a continuous technological cycle will work. And people will have to be paid holiday rates."

V.V. Ryumin, chairman of the soviet of people's deputies of the City of Ryazan:

"I just received my first Christmas greeting card. The people, it seems, are in a mood to celebrate. I will give a call to Comrade Khasbulatov, and I will clarify everything once and for all..."

A.A. Detinov, chief of oblast administration:

"Our work collective council convened and decided to work. We must not be late with our annual report. And the day that is saved is to be added to leave, although some women expressed a desire to have one more day with their children during school break."

"Two thousand and seven hundred persons who are standing in lines for the purchase of Zhiguli's, Niva's, and Samara's will have to put off their purchase from this year to next year. The reason is simple—the Christmas holiday. We will produce 5 million rubles [R] less of spare parts for automobiles," explains A. Yasin-skiy, deputy general director of the Volga automobile plant. "And because of this, the national economy will receive R50 million less overall just from VAZ [Order of Labor of the Red Banner Volga Automobile Plant]. They are also racking their brains in the administration of the Kuybyshev railroad. Just for the one day—7 January—the wage fund of the railroad workers will "grow thinner" by a half million rubles. This money will have to be paid additionally for holiday work. Given the catastrophic situation with loading-unloading, 100,000 tons of freight will not be loaded, and 2,000 freight cars will not be unloaded. In addition, confusion is inevitable on individual lines, because of the fact that a work day is planned on 7 January in Tataria and Bashkiria."

Work will also be paid at a double rate at the Kuybyshev Metallurgical Association imeni Lenin. Production here

is continuous, and it is impossible to stop it. Therefore, R150,000 from the wage fund, which is being reduced even without this because of conversion, will go for holiday pay. The compensation was not foreseen.

As our correspondent was informed, from Kuybyshev Oblast alone the national economy will fall short about 500,000 television sets, 10,000 watches, 15,000 pairs of shoes, 140,000 washing machines, and a mass of equally necessary products...

And how will people of other faiths celebrate Christmas, for example, the Islamic, Catholic, Jewish, and Buddhist faiths? This subject was discussed with our correspondent by Dav'let Mingaliyev, the imam of the Kazakh mosque "Ramadan."

[Ryabov] Holy Imam, what do you, the servant of another religious cult, think of this holiday of the Orthodox believers?

[Mingaliyev] Just as the sacred book of the Muslims—the Koran—teaches. And it teaches to treat people of all beliefs with patience and understanding, regardless of where they make their prayer to God: in a mosque, Catholic church, synagogue, or Orthodox church. Just so that the striving for good does not leave their soul, and that the Almighty accepts the purifying word of prayer.

[Ryabov] On that day, while proclaiming the call to prayer, will you call on your people to celebrate this nonworking holiday of Christmas?

[Mingaliyev] To acknowledge someone else's faith does not mean to follow it, and Allah and the other gods do not forgive their servants such a sin.

[Ryabov] Do you agree with the decision on the 7 January holiday?

[Mingaliyev] How can I agree, a person of 80 years of living experience, when my faith considers unnecessary idleness to be the very gravest of sins? That is why the Islamic religion has so few legitimate holidays—Kurban-bayram and the end of the Great Fast—Ramadan. The main thing is: Any holiday is a celebration of the joy of the unity of people, but the selective preference by secular authority of any particular one, even a faith that is exceptional and very popular, results in humiliation to the other faiths, a bone of contention, discord, and injustice. And for a country, for multinational Russia, a republic of many beliefs and religions, peace and harmony are needed more than anything in these difficult days of interethnic conflicts, so that we hold on to the overall system and move collectively and individually toward one objective along the steep path of perestroika and renewal.

[Ryabov] But if faiths are equalized in rights and in respect, and if the principal holidays of Muslims, Jews, and Catholics are declared nonworking days? Then there will be no offenses and claims, and everyone will be equal before the state in the same way?

[Mingaliyev] It hardly will be possible to celebrate selectively; this is very serious and crucial. Imagine, you come into a store, and half of the sales people are not working, they are celebrating a holiday. The same thing will happen in the militia, in the social security office, on the farm and in the field, and in a military unit and a state establishment. Incidentally, with today's ukase, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan approved a decision to consider 7 January a workday—with the aim of observing the equality of rights and freedoms of all citizens regardless of their nationality and religion."

And here is information from Omsk.

After one of the local newspapers published the decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet about the declaration of 7 January as a nonworking day in connection with the Orthodox holiday of Christmas, a bewildered delegation of representatives of the Kazakh Muslim community came to the Omsk oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]. The faithful from the local Tatar mosque came to the oblispolkom immediately afterwards. These and the others sought advice: What were they to do? Their religion does not permit them to celebrate the Orthodox holiday, but it is not within their authority to arrange days off for their religious holidays—Kurban-bayram, Oruch-bayram, Mevlut, and others.

The decree of the Supreme Soviet of Russia resulted in bewilderment among the non-Orthodox Christians as well—the Lutherans, Catholics, Baptists, Mennonites, Seventh Day Adventists, the Pentacostals, and the rest. They already celebrated Christmas on 25 December.

All told in Omsk Oblast today there are 12 religious denominations, and Orthodoxy constitutes only one of the branches...

A Necessary Epilogue

As we see, the news of the inauguration of one more holiday on the pages of the calendar caused an ambiguous and at times contradictory reaction. Although, it would seem, this news should be gratifying to the heart of any Russian who is indifferent to the difficult process of restoring the historical memory and spiritual rebirth of the Motherland. What is the problem?

"From the standpoint of strengthening the right of an individual to freedom of conscience, both the decision on the celebration of Christmas in Russia and the RSFSR Law on Religious Freedom that was passed last autumn are necessary and important legislative acts," says O. Osipov, a representative of the Council on Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers for Omsk Oblast. "But the preparation for such acts, in my opinion, must be approached with the greatest tact and circumspection, taking into account the peculiarities of today's situation in the republic. Today in Russia there are several dozen religious trends, and their influence on the ideas of the people and on their actions is growing from year to year. And it is very good that the RSFSR Law on Religious Freedom treats with sensitivity and caution the feelings of

believers, declaring in Article 10: "All religions and religious societies are equal before the law of the state. No religion or religious society enjoys any preferences, and they cannot be subjected to any kind of restrictions in comparison with others..."

And it is a pity that the decree of the Supreme Soviet of Russia that came after it the other day concerning the celebration of Christmas on 7 January conflicts with this law and creates a precedent on the basis of which henceforth any mass religious organization will have a right to expect a similar decision from the Supreme Soviet on holding its own religious holidays. There is no assurance at all that this will not occur when such an example is right in front of us. And at the same time, if after this someone is refused a request, there is no guarantee that this will not be incorrectly interpreted by believers. On whom will you tell them to turn their resentful feelings? On the Supreme Soviet? But nothing prevents it from fulfilling these requests also—according to Article 14 of the Law of the RSFSR on Religious Freedom, the state authority of the republic has the right to adopt a decision on the declaration of big religious holidays as additional nonworking days. If the discussion turns on specifically what holidays are to be considered big, it can be said immediately that Orthodoxy clearly will receive preference, because it has a tremendous spiritual and historical base in Russia. It appears, then, that the indignation of people of different faiths will be directed specifically against it? Obviously, in deciding on such a step, the Russian parliament should recall a good old saying: "Look before you leap..."

Actually, the situation that has developed is already creating tension in the relationships of peoples of various religious beliefs. But how was this problem resolved in the relatively recent past? Because the Soviet Union during its own birth was formed not only as a multinational state, but one that was also diverse in its religious composition.

Workers of the Council on Religious Affairs of the country's Council of Ministers gave this information. It seems that the possibility of the free implementation of religious holidays and rites was provided for also by a decree of Soviet authority on the 8-hour workday, which was in effect from 29 October 1917. Later, during the formation of the Soviet Union, these aspects were also considered in the RSFSR Code of Laws on Work of 1922, in Article 109, which stated plainly: "Days of weekly rest are established by local departments of labor in coordination with the councils of professional unions, and they can be designated as Sundays, as well as any day of the week, depending on the national-religious composition of the workers and employees of a given locality."

In 1940, in connection with the switch to a 7-day work week, holidays were abolished. And the holidays that were established later did not have any connection with religious beliefs.

But does this mean that advantage cannot be taken of the already available experience in resolving problems today? It seems it should be the opposite: That is what experience is all about, and it should not be discarded too easily.

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